Category Archives: Scott Sumner is Coherent

John Cochrane’s Monetary Thought Experiment

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He writes,

The Fed or Treasury could easily say that the yield difference between TIPS and Treasuries shall be 2%. (I prefer 0, but the level of the target is not the point.) Bring us your Treasuries, say, and we will give you back 1.02 equivalent TIPS. Give us your TIPS, and we will give you back 0.98 Treasuries. (I’m simplifying, but you get the idea.) They could equivalently simply intervene in each market until market prices go where they want. Or offer nominal-for-indexed swaps at a fixed rate.

Scott Sumner enthuses,

Excellent. And so Neo-Fisherism has now arrived where David Glasner, Bill Woolsey, Bob Hetzel, Milton Friedman and I were a few decades back. Target the market forecast.

The idea is to pin down expected inflation at 2 percent. I gather that Cochrane figures that actual inflation will then converge to expected inflation. I am not so sure. Suppose that “expected inflation” (defined as the spread between the interest rates on the 5-year nominal Treasury and the five-year TIP) is 2 percent but actual inflation is running at 1 percent for the indefinite future. What sort of arbitrage is available? Go long the spread and short everything in the CPI?

I think that the error is in thinking in terms of “the” rate of interest. There are many different rates of interest. The five-year nominal Treasury and the give-year TIP are just two of them. If the Fed pegs the spread between the two, I am not sure that has any consequences for the other interest rates in the economy. In particular, as I see it, there is nothing to ensure that actual inflation converges to the targeted spread.

If you’re new to this blog, I take an outlier point of view, which is that the Fed is not important for the macro economy. Walrasian economists needed something to pin down the nominal price level, so they nominated the money supply. I instead take the view that money and inflation are largely social conventions. Extreme measures by the government can change these social conventions. Otherwise, in my view, the belief in the power of the Fed is a superstition. This superstition is best maintained if the Fed’s actions are mysterious. If the Fed were to follow a transparent rule, I think that the superstition would be exposed for what it is.

Target the S&P 500?

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Lifted from the comments:

EMH has me puzzled. Since stocks are linked to the economy you must also conclude that long-range predictions of the economy are no better than throwing darts. Yet many economists seem to believe that the Fed could in fact target NGDP and therefore create the economy they want in some respect (obvisously there are plenty of variables they can’t control). Is a variable really efficient if someone can target it?

To put it more simply perhaps, the Fed COULD target the S&P 500 if they wanted to (essentially pick a value). If an entity exists that can control a variable then isn’t it impossible for that variable to be completely unknowable?

1. Long-range predictions of the economy are not much better than throwing darts. Even projections of a year ahead are not much better than just guessing that the real GDP will grow by 2.5 percent.

2. I think that Scott Sumner would say that the Fed could target the level of the S&P 500. That is a nominal variable.

3. However, the Fed cannot target the real return on stocks. If the Fed targets an S&P 500 of 2200 for one year from now, and this is credible, then the S&P 500 has to rise today to the point where the expected real return is comparable to that on other assets.

4. Part of the EMH is that markets anticipate what the Fed will do. So the Fed cannot suddenly surprise markets by targeting an S&P 500 of 2200. If you extend that, you would say that the Fed cannot suddenly surprise markets by targeting a particular level of NGDP.

5. I think there is a bit of tension between believing in the EMH and believing that the Fed can choose any NGDP value it wants. I think Scott is aware of the tension, and I forget how he resolves it.

6. I think that bringing up the stock market is a very good way to raise the issue of whether the Fed can target any nominal variable.

7. Of course, I am not the one who has to defend the proposition that the Fed can target nominal variables. I believe that financial markets can do what they want with asset prices, and that money and prices are consensual hallucinations.

Larry Summers on Upward-Sloping AD

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He writes,

Notice that as Keynes, Tobin and subsequently Brad Delong and I have emphasized, wage and price flexibility may well exacerbate the problem. The more flexible wages and prices are, the more they will be expected to fall during an output slowdown leading to an increase in real interest rates. Indeed there is the possibility of destabilizing deflation with falling prices leading to higher real interest rates leading to greater output shortfalls leading to more rapidly falling prices and onwards in a vicious cycle.

Read the whole thing. There were many sentences I wanted to excerpt. Pointer from Mark Thoma.

In AS-AD, if your Y-axis is inflation rather than the price level, then AD slopes upward. That is, the more inflation you have, the lower the real interest rate, and the higher is AD. If AD gets steeper than AS, then have a nice day. Because if that happens, then a “favorable” supply shift leads to lower employment and output. One way to interpret secstag is as a claim that we have been experiencing an AD curve that is upward-sloping and steeper than AS.

Keep in mind that Summers and other mainstream macro economists talk about potential GDP as if it were some tangible quantity, rather than a made-up number. In mainstream macro, we all work in a GDP factory, and the factory has a capacity that we call potential GDP.

The PSST story rejects that. It says that we produce many different types of output, and we only have the potential to produce the output for which we have discovered patterns of sustainable specialization and trade. If we could discover other patterns of sustainable specialization and trade, we could produce a different mix of output, and perhaps this would raise the level of GDP. But raising GDP by discovering patterns of specialization and trade is akin to raising GDP by discovering a practical cold fusion technology. Complaining about the economy operating below potential is like complaining that we do not have cold fusion.

Related: Tyler Cowen on the difficulty of disentangling AD from AS. Plus Scott Sumner commenting on Tyler Cowen.

The State of the Economy

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1. There have been several posts pointing out that wage growth has been slow, even though the unemployment rate has fallen.

2. There have been several posts, including some of mine, on low long-term interest rates. More recently, the WSJ talked with James Bullard.

Right now, “the markets are making a mistake” and expect the Fed to maintain its ultra-easy policy stance longer than Fed officials themselves currently expect, Mr. Bullard said. When it comes to these expectations, “I would prefer that those be better aligned than they are.”

3. Scott Sumner writes,

The 4-week moving average of layoffs came out today at 287,750. Total civilian employment in September was 146,600,000. The ratio of the two, i.e. the chance of being laid during a given week if you had a job, was below 2 in 1000. That’s only happened once before in all of American history–April 2000.

However,

We are even seeing a lower employment/population ratio in the key 25-54 demographic, compared to seven years ago.

Read his whole post.

On (1), I would note that a few years ago wage growth was violating the Phillips Curve on the high side, and now it is violating the Phillips Curve on the low side. And yet mainstream macroeconomists stick to the Phillips Curve like white on rice. I would emphasize that the very concept of “the” wage rate is a snare and a delusion. Yes, the Bureau of Labor Statistics measures such a thing.

Instead, think of our economy as consisting of multiple labor market segments, not tightly connected to one another. There are many different types of workers and many different types of jobs, and the mix keeps shifting. I would bet that in recent years the official statistics on “the” wage rate have been affected more by mix shifts than by a systematic relationship between “the” wage rate and “the” unemployment rate.

On (2), I view this as evidence for my minority view that the Fed is not a big factor in the bond market. Instead, the Fed is mostly just following the bond markets. When it actually tries to affect the bond market, what you get are “anomalies,” i.e., the failure of the bond market to do as expected by the Fed.

On (3), I think that we are seeing a Charles Murray economy. In Murray’s Belmont, where the affluent, high-skilled workers live, I am hearing stories of young people quitting jobs for better jobs. On the basis of anecdotes, I would say that for young graduates of top-200 colleges, the recession is finally over. The machinery of finding sustainable patterns of specialization and trade is finally cranking again.

In Murray’s Fishtown, on the other hand, the recession is not over. I would suggest that we are seeing the cumulative effects of regulations, taxes, and means-tested benefits that reduce the incentive for firms to hire low-skilled workers as well as the incentive for those workers to take jobs. As Sumner points out, President Obama’s policies have moved in the direction of making these incentives worse.

Scott Sumner on a Basic Income

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He writes,

The problem with simple solutions is that poor people are just like everyone else–they’re complicated. And they have complicated problems.

That is why you do not want to try to solve poverty in a nation of 300 million people at a national level. A basic income is a partial answer. State and local governments and charities have to supply the rest of the answer.

Nick Rowe suggests a simple way to estimate the currently-feasible amount of a guaranteed annual income.

Housing Re-Bubble?

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Nick Timiraos reports,

the [Federal Housing Agency home price] index shows U.S. prices now standing just 6.4% below their previous peak in April 2007.

…The Case-Shiller national index, which is set to report its own measure of July home prices next Tuesday, showed that home prices in June were 9.9% below their 2006 peak.

Some comments:

1. Overall, consumer prices have risen about 15 percent since 2007, so you might say that on an inflation-adjusted basis home prices are more like 20 or 25 percent below their 2007 peak.

2. However, even on an inflation-adjusted basis, house prices are higher than they were in late 2003, by whichi point cries of “bubble” already were being heard.

3. If I were Scott Sumner, perhaps I would say that this suggests that the 2007 prices were not really a bubble. Indeed, the real anomaly was the crash in house prices in 2008-2009, due to tight money. But I am not Scott Sumner.

4. The case that we are in another bubble strikes me as weak. It is certainly is not a sub-prime lending phenomenon. Two phrases that I hear a lot in casual conversation with real estate folks are “all-cash deal” and “foreign buyer.”

5. Even if house prices were to fall sharply again, my guess is that there would be many fewer loan foreclosures. Lenders are taking on much less risk, and instead home buyers are taking on more of it.

6. It seems to me that we are much closer to full recovery in the housing market than we are to full recovery in the labor market. Does that not pose a problem for the theory that the recession was mostly an aggregate-demand phenomenon caused by the loss of housing wealth?

7. Again, today’s economy feels so much like 2003 and 2004. Very low r, seemingly below g. Last decade, Bernanke labeled this a “global savings glut.” This decade, Larry Summers calls it “secular stagnation.”

8. In June of 2004, I wrote Bubble, Bubble, is there Trouble? arguing that low r was the central economic puzzle, and that given low r, housing prices were not out of line. I have been excoriated since then for failing to call the housing bubble. In 2009, that excoriation seemed warranted. Today, it seems like you could change the date to June of 2014 and re-print it.

Politics, Reasoning, and Group Affiliation

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Daniel Kahan writes that one should view culturally motivated reasoning (CMR)

as a form of reasoning suited to promoting the stake individuals have in protecting their connection to, and status within, important affinity groups. Enjoyment of the sense of partisan identification that belonging to such groups supplies can be viewed as an end to which individuals attach value for its own stake. But a person’s membership and good standing in such a group also confers numerous other valued benefits, including access to materially rewarding forms of social exchange (Akerlof & Kranton 2000). Thus, under conditions in which positions on societal risks and other disputed facts become commonly identified with membership in and loyalty to such groups, it will promote individuals’ ends to credibly convey (by accurately conveying (Frank 1988)) to others that they hold the beliefs associated with their identity-defining affinity groups. CMR is a form of information processing suited to attaining that purpose.

That sounds right to me. I wonder if Kahan would consider the possibility that this description applies as much to climate-change activists as it does to their opponents.

Related and recommended: Scott Sumner’s post on intellectual decay.

The Macroeconomics of Unobservable Expectations

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Scott Sumner writes,

A big demand slump isn’t just an economic disaster; it’s also a prediction of an economic disaster. And that means it’s a prediction of policy failure. At least that’s the implication of the Woodfordian view of macro (which I accept.) Changes in current AD are mostly driven by changes in the future path of AD. Changes in near-term NGDP are mostly driven by changes in expected NGDP 1, 2, 5 and 10 years out in the future. Call it the term structure of NGDP. And those are driven by the future expected path of monetary policy.

And of course whenever we have crashes like 1920-21, 1929-30, 1937-38, 2008-09, we also tend to have asset market crashes. Asset markets aren’t perfect (1987) but when there’s a very big economic slump on the way they are pretty good at sniffing it out.

Unfortunately, this puts a huge emphasis on something that is unobservable, namely “expected NGDP 1, 2, 5 and 10 years out in the future.” Any time you have a theory that relies on such an unobservable, you drift further away from the realm of science and nearer to the realm of circularity.

In Sumner’s defense, he wants expectations for nominal GDP to be observable, by having tradable NGDP futures contracts. Even so, it is rare for any such contracts to go out more than a year ahead.

Scott Sumner on AS-AD

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A good post. Read the whole thing. He ends up,

I’d like to dispense with all discussion of AS and AD, and replace it with nominal shocks and real shocks. A nominal shock is an unexpected change in NGDP. A real shock changes the price/output split for any given level of NGDP. As Tyler suggests, one type of shock is often entangled with the other. But it’s still important to keep them clear as a theoretical matter, so that we can think clearly about how monetary policy should respond (or not respond) to various types of situations.

PSST is all about real shocks. I am inclined to think of money and inflation as “consensual hallucinations.” That is, people get into habitual ways of undertaking transactions and adjusting prices. In the 1970s, these habits changed quite a bit. In other periods, they have been more stable. Often, the “noise” in prices (problems with measuring the “aggregate price level”) is large relative to any signal that might be inferred from changes in the measured rate of inflation. So I think that attempts to explain inflation on the basis of alleged causal variables, whether monetary or real (e.g., the unemployment rate) involve torturing the data to obtain a confession.

Financial Stability, Regulation, and Country Size

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Lorenzo writes,

Something that is very clear, is that “de-regulation” is a term empty of explanatory power. All successful six have liberalised financial markets–Australia and New Zealand, for example, were leaders in financial “de-regulation”. If someone starts trying to blame the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on “de-regulation”, you can stop reading, they have nothing useful to say.

Pointer from Scott Sumner.

The deregulation story amounts to saying that we know that regulation can prevent a crisis, but a crisis occurred, therefore there must have been deregulation. In fact, the risk-based capital rules that I have suggested helped cause the crisis were at the time they were enacted viewed as regulatory tightening, to correct flaws in the regime that existed at the time of the S&L crisis. The deregulation that did take place was intended to reduce bank profits by making the industry more competitive, not to increase profits or risk-taking.

Lorenzo’s post mostly beats a drum that I have been beating, which is that government tends to get worse as scale increases. He writes,

It is generally just harder to stick it to folks (either by what you do or what you don’t do) in a way that doesn’t get noticed in smaller jurisdictions. (Unless jurisdictions are so small they fly under the media radar but are big enough to be semi-anonymous–urban local government in Oz has a bit of a problem there.)