Some outlandish long-term virus predictions

I don’t want to post much about the virus. Maybe once a month, taking a more long-term perspective. Take these predictions not as “I believe these are highly probable” but instead as “I find these less improbable than others are currently seeing them.”

1. We will find that regional differences in the impact of the virus depend very little on differences in government interventions. We will down-rate the importance of lockdowns or track-and-trace. Instead, we will up-rate genetic differences and lifestyle differences that affect the immune system in general (take this WSJ essay as a portent). The significance of vitamin D will receive more attention. In addition, we may find that someone’s previous exposure to other viruses affects the immune response to this virus, so that the history of other viruses in a population matters. Sunlight and/or temperature may prove to be important factors affecting the severity of the virus. Finally, we may find that some of the regional variation is due to different mixes of virus strains that prevail in different areas.

2. We will quietly give up on a vaccine. Instead, the focus will shift toward general enhancement of our immune systems. Also, there will be strong social shaming of people who fail to self-isolate when they have fever or other symptoms of illness. The common cold will be as unwelcome in public as leprosy or measles.

3. In years to come, tourism will be highest in the summer months of the country visited. The conventional wisdom will be that you visit Brazil only in January-February, and you visit Italy only in July-August. Even if this virus is no longer salient, people will carry with them a generic perception that you incur health risk if you visit a place during the “unsafe season.”

4. Ventilators will be mothballed. Instead, the treatment of choice for severe cases of the virus will be antiviral cocktails.

5. Student life at colleges this fall will be heavily regulated, to the point where the on-campus experience feels hardly more interesting than staying at home. Among students, deaths from the virus will be much rarer than deaths of despair (suicide will be higher than normal), but where virus deaths do occur the institutions will be forced to close temporarily, and in some instances permanently.

6. In the early fall, the media will be filled with stories, including many false alarms, about a second wave of the virus, particularly in Red states. A realistic picture will emerge only after the election.

7. Florida may do worse in the summer than in the winter, because summer is the season where Floridians spend all day inside.

Signing off

I am demoralized. It occurred to me the movie we’re in.

Fauci plays Big Nurse.

Who plays Randle McMurphy? Trump? Rand Paul? Elon Musk?

Doesn’t matter. The ending is brutal. You don’t want to watch.

I’ll be spending my time outdoors. Not on the computer.

General update, May 12

1. Christian Gollier writes,

In this paper, I suppose that herd immunity is the exit door from the pandemic. In the absence of a vaccine, attaining herd immunity requires to expose a fraction of the population to the virus, and to recognize that some people in this targeted population will die. Determining who should be exposed to the virus to attain the herd immunity is a crucial policy issue. . .Some individual characteristics such as the age or the existence of co-morbidity have been shown to have a huge influence on the lethality of the SARS-Cov-2. For example, Ferguson et al. (2020) report that the covid infection-fatality ratio is 0.002% for individuals less than 10 years old, and 9.3% for people aged 80 years and more. Given this 4650-fold difference in mortality risk, it may be desirable to expose less vulnerable people first in the hope of building the herd immunity before relaxing the protection of the more vulnerable people.

Pointer from the diligent John Alcorn. What is your guess as to when the lockdown debate gets shifted toward these terms?

2. Philipp Kircher and others write,

When the young engage in more risky behavior, they reduce the time until herd immunity is reached. The young then take a larger share in the infections needed for herd immunity, which is amplified if the old can shield themselves for short periods by voluntarily engaging in stronger social distancing.

Our calibrated benchmark indicates that the positive externality is indeed present in the absence of a vaccine/cure. This can limit and sometimes negate the effects policies such as temporary shelter-at-home policies. It also indicates that its strength is limited, as it is quickly overpowered through other channels, for example in extensions with scarce hospital beds which the risk-taking young exhaust through their behavior. The interactions by age indicate that it is an important margin to consider, that the effects are not trivial, and that age-specific policies might be warranted.

Another point from JA, and another example of where I think the debate needs to shift. Of course, I should not that this paper uses a simulation model, which I don’t think adds value to the discussion.

3. Daniel Klein and others defend Sweden.

Swedish authorities have not officially declared a goal of reaching herd immunity, which most scientists believe is achieved when more than 60 percent of the population has had the virus. But augmenting immunity is no doubt part of the government’s broader strategy—or at least a likely consequence of keeping schools, restaurants, and most businesses open. Anders Tegnell, the chief epidemiologist at Sweden’s Public Health Agency, has projected that the city of Stockholm could reach herd immunity as early as this month. Based on updated behavioral assumptions (social-distancing norms are changing how Swedes behave), the Stockholm University mathematician Tom Britton has calculated that 40 percent immunity in the capital could be enough to stop the virus’s spread there and that this could happen by mid-June.

We could frame the “opener” vs. “closer” debate this way: openers wish to achieve herd immunity sooner rather than later, while closers wish to achieve it later rather than sooner.

Herd immunity is costly to achieve, in that some people will get sick and die in the process. Closers believe that we should not be trying to hasten to get to herd immunity, presumably because there is an alternative endgame that can be achieved within a reasonable time frame. As one commenter put it,

Which strategy we should pursue depends upon our wild-assed guess as to whether a vaccine or significantly better treatment will appear before civilization ends in economic ruin.

Why R we mindless?

When it comes to virus policy, to whom should we assign status and credibility? I propose that we severely downgrade the status of anyone who speaks in terms of R, or R0. That concept is not helpful. A society could have R well below the “magic number” of 1 and still have a lot of elderly people dying from the virus. A society could have an R above 1 while insulating its elderly and thus having a low death rate.

I keep coming back to the Avalon Hill metaphor, in which what matters is the attack factor and the defense factor. The attack factor is the amount of virus particles that you get hit with. You get hit with more when you spend several minutes in a closed environment with someone who is expelling a lot of virus, especially by coughing or sneezing or singing or yelling. The defense factor is the strength of your immune system, which depends mostly on your age.

I want to focus here on the defense factor. If we had a vaccine, that could give everyone a strong defense factor. To the extent that people who have had the virus are immune, then they have strong defense factors. Young people have strong defense factors. People over 70 presumably have weak defense factors. People with heart conditions or compromised immune systems have weak defense factors.

Is there a rigorous way to evaluate my defense factor? That is something I would like to see researchers working on. If I knew for sure that I have a strong defense factor, then I could be a lot more relaxed about resuming some of my favorite activities.

Although the defense factor is likely to fall on a continuum, for simplicity let us say that there are people of type H and type L, for high defense factors and low defense factors, respectively. I can imagine linking people’s behavior to their defense factors and also to the defense factors of people with whom they must interact.

–If you are type L, then you want to avoid getting the virus. This means only being in places where you can be sure that no one has the virus. If you must be around people who may have the virus (say, you are a health care worker), then you have to follow extreme safety protocols involving personal protective equipment and sanitizing afterward.

–If you are type H and you do not have to interact with people who are type L, then you can interact with whomever you want. Your only responsibility is to try to avoid inflicting a high attack factor on someone. If you do not have antibodies, then you may have the virus, so that you should wear a mask while indoors around people with whom you don’t live. If you have antibodies, then you are harmless to others, even without a mask.

–If you are type H and you have to interact with people who are type L, then you have to be certain that you do not have the virus. You are good to go if you have antibodies. Or if you have been strictly self-quarantining for two weeks. Or if you have reliably tested negative for the virus.

This approach does not try to drive R to any particular value. If R is high among type H people, that could be a good thing.

Whose course will scale?

Tyler Cowen writes,

My fall semester teaching was assigned to be online even before Covid-19 came along. The enrollment for that class – Principles of Economics – will be much larger, with hundreds more students, but with some assistance, I expect to handle it.

Suppose that none of the top tier colleges can have on-campus learning in the fall. If a lot of students are taking courses on line, then they should be able to choose courses from colleges other than the one in which they are enrolled. As an online student, your best approach might be to take econ with Tyler, engineering from someone at Carnegie-Mellon, journalism from someone at Northwestern, etc.

The online course market could end up looking like the textbook market. The per-student cost should fall to about the cost of a textbook. The market structure will tend toward winners-take most. If Tyler is one of the winners, he could have a few hundred thousand students.

In the online environment, having a good traditional brand, like “Mankiw,” will not matter much. Your competitors have been focused on the online product and persistently iterating and improving it.

With on-location college, the school can foist on you an inexperienced teaching assistant who can barely speak comprehensible English and charge your parents a fortune for the privilege. I don’t think that model will be viable if colleges go on line.

[UPDATE: Read Scott Galloway’s take, which is somewhat different from mine, but is still based on the view that online education scales differently from in-person education.

In ten years, it’s feasible to think that MIT doesn’t welcome 1,000 freshmen to campus; it welcomes 10,000. What that means is the top-20 universities globally are going to become even stronger. What it also means is that universities Nos. 20 to 50 are fine. But Nos. 50 to 1,000 go out of business or become a shadow of themselves.

}

General update, May 11

1. How Portland is using the worst legislation in history to loot.

So Oregon’s largest district has hatched a plan to have its employees work four days a week for the remainder of this school year, and it is banking on its unionized employees agreeing to the deal. Employees would lose 20% of their pay from the district but would have that more than backfilled by receiving 20% of the weekly state unemployment benefit to which they are entitled under the state Work Share program plus the full $600 weekly federal match.

Pointer from David Henderson. Note that some private sector firms, such as Shake Shack, chose to refrain from looting. But our public servants have no such qualms.

2. Boris Johnson addressing the British people (video, pointer from John Alcorn). Lots of power rhetoric. To my ear, he doesn’t trust the people to make good decisions. He only trusts them to sacrifice and obey rules.

3. You can look up the track record of models, for U.S. states and other countries. Pointer from JA.

4. Ian Hall and others write,

it is important to observe that the 73% value is the prevalence of care homes with outbreaks and not the incidence. This means homes should expect to suffer multiple importations over time. These outbreaks will accumulate cases so the final attack rate within a home may be large due to a mix of explosive outbreaks and repeated importation.

Pointer from JA. The article is about the UK. I give them credit for at least focusing on the topic of nursing homes (care homes in Brit-speak). I believe that there are now thousands of research papers on the virus, but my guess is that about 10 or fewer of them focus on nursing homes, which is where such a large share of the deaths and large outbreaks have taken place.

5. Chris Pope discusses nursing homes in the U.S.

With schools closed, many long-term-care workers have children to look after and would earn more under the CARES Act by staying home than by going to work, where they may risk getting infected and infecting family members. As a result, many nursing homes are currently staffed at less than 50 percent—putting further strain on those workers who remain and causing safety standards to slip even further.

6. Bryan Caplan on the case for paid human experimentation. That would be voluntary. What we have instead is involuntary human experimentation, using lockdown protocols. And the results of these experiments is never clear.

7. Lars Christensen writes,

once the lockdowns come to an end people will be able to return to work – not necessarily to their old jobs and not necessarily in the sectors they used to work in, but the reason they haven’t been working is not that their reservation wage were higher than their productivity so there is little reason why we shouldn’t see the share of temporarily unemployed come down very fast in the coming few months.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen, who writes “Not my view, but happy to pass along.” As I see it, Christensen is applying conventional macro theory. Aggregate demand is not really damaged, because permanent income is not down. It is a short-term aggregate supply shock, and soon all will be well. I think of it in PSST terms, and once patterns of trade have been disrupted it takes a long time to discover new patterns. I hope he is right and I am wrong.

Economic reality and illusion

On the one hand, you have reality. Over 20 million jobs were lost in April, or more than 13 percent of employment. The other day I linked to a study suggesting that over 40 percent of these job losses are permanent. And there are more layoffs pending.

On the other hand, you have illusion.

The technology-heavy Nasdaq Composite Index entered positive territory for the year, erasing much of its losses from the coronavirus-fueled rout. Other major U.S. indexes also notched strong gains for the week. The S&P 500 rose 3.5%, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average advanced 608 points, or 2.6%. The Nasdaq Composite added 6% for the week.

I am going to offer a view of the economy. Feel free to disagree with it.

You don’t have to tell me that financial markets are saying something different. I already know that. The markets believe that today’s economic slowdown is temporary and that today’s low inflation and interest rates will last a decade. My way of looking at the economy implies something close to the opposite.

And you don’t have to tell me that typical macroeconomists disagree with me. I know that, too. Continue reading

General update, May 10

1. In Connecticut,

Between April 22 and April 29, the state’s death total rose from 1,544 to 2,089, or 545 new deaths, according to data released by the state Department of Public Health. In that same seven-day period nursing home deaths rose from 768 to 1,249, meaning 481 among the 545 new deaths — about 88% — were nursing home patients.

We have a friend who lives in the highest-end elder-care facility in the St. Louis area. She is truly locked down. The front door is guarded, and the residents are not allowed out. They can outside into the back courtyard, but they cannot leave the facility. They can receive grocery deliveries. Meals are not eaten in the cafeteria, but instead are placed in front of the door, wrapped in plastic.

The nation’s governors are fighting on the beaches, they’re fighting in the fields, . . .and the real battle is in the nursing homes. Not our finest hour.

2. I recommend this Heying-Weinstein podcast from yesterday. I listened at 1.25x speed, because he talks slowly for my taste. From about minute 30 to minute 47 they discuss the issue of whether the virus likely originated in nature, came from a lab intentionally, or came from a lab by accident. I think they would put their money on “came from a lab by accident,” and their arguments make sense to me.

On another topic, they are not “openers.” Of course, they raise concerns about deaths from the virus, as do all “closers.” My responses are two fold. One is that it is not fair to assume that everyone will immediately revert to gathering in closed spaces and traveling as much as they were before. The other is that with so many of the deaths in nursing homes, I am not convinced that the marginal saving of life from locking down the rest of us is all that high.

One argument that they make as evolutionary biologists is that the more that we expose humans to the virus, the more chances we give the virus to evolve in ways that make it more adept at infecting people.

My problem with that argument is that it seems to me that a lockdown only stops the virus from adapting if we eradicate the virus. But the lockdowns we have are not going to eradicate the virus. Those of us who shelter in place need to eat, which means that there are people out there who need to move around to get food to us.

It seems to me that these two people for whom I have great respect have allowed themselves to fall into the “moving goal posts” fallacy. The lockdown that was originally sold as delaying the spread of the virus is now being defended as if it could eradicate the virus.

As a thought experiment, a total worldwide lockdown that is militarily enforced might be sufficient to eradicate the virus. But the partial, flatten-the-curve lockdown does nothing in the long run to deprive the virus of opportunities to explore mutation space.

3. Clare Malone and Kyle Bourassa write,

Almost uniformly across these states, people started staying home beginning on March 14. The percentage of people staying home rose rapidly over the following nine days and tended to plateau by March 23.

The Cuebiq data suggests that behavioral changes were largely driven by people making a voluntary choice to stay home rather than being forced to do so by a state-sanctioned stay-at-home order. One need only look at the behavior of residents in North Carolina and their neighbors in South Carolina: While North Carolina issued a stay-at-home order eight days before South Carolina, a stabilized number of people in both states started staying at home about a week before North Carolina’s order.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen. In mid-March, people were making decisions to restrict activity independently of what political leaders were telling them to do. I don’t think that has changed.