Category Archives: Politics

Marrying a person and a job, as an economist

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By now you may have read–see Tyler’s post or the WSJ coverage–about the survey of the American Economic Association that found that nearly 100 women economists have been sexually assaulted by another economist. I condemn the perpetrators, but I don’t see this statistic as a reason to condemn the entire economics profession or all of its male practitioners.

1. Can you easily find elsewhere a sub-population of similar size with fewer sexual assaults?

2. I haven’t looked at the study. Did they tabulate the number of male-female pairs of economists who are happily married? I bet that off the top of his head Tyler can think of at least 15 economist-economist marriages. In the entire economics profession, how many such pairs are there? 1,000? More?

3. Did they ask how many consensual relationships there were between economists? I’ll bet that it would be almost impossible to find a different sub-population of women with a higher ratio of consensual relationships to sexual assaults.

I don’t get invited to conferences. Should I feel sorry for women who are afraid to speak up at conferences for fear of “disrespectful treatment”?

The tiny, back-scratching cabal that largely controls academic economics is mostly male. But the fact that it is male is not the real scandal. The real scandal is that it is a tiny, back-scratching cabal.

Russ Roberts on economics and loneliness

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Russ Roberts writes,

But not everything that is important can be quantified. I worry that as economists, we too often are like the drunk at 1 am looking for his keys under the glare of a streetlight. You go over to help and when you fail to find the keys you ask the drunk if he’s sure if he lost them here. Oh no, he responds. I’m not sure where I lost them. But the light’s better here.

Roberts points out that some of the most painful social problems are associated with people feeling lonely and unloved, and economics does not have much to say about this.

Economists focus on the material well-being of a large-scale society. The ability of strangers to cooperate in the context of the market is probably our key insight.

But does cooperating with strangers provide emotional satisfaction and a feeling of being loved? Probably not. Personal interdependence satisfies human needs for closeness better than impersonal interdependence. But personal interdependence is a characteristic of small-scale society–the family, the tribal band, the village.

Our increased material wealth arises from more specialization, which means more impersonal interdependence. But people still need the comfort and status that come from personal interdependence. It seems to me that in our modern world there is a tendency for people reach out for substitutes for personal interdependence. Russ mentions opiods. I sometimes think that the increased intensity of political engagement is another substitute. It is an opiod of a different sort.

The hard-left splinter party

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Ted Van Dyk writes,

Begin with the objective conditions. The first is continuing public disenchantment with political, media, financial and cultural establishments.

File that one under “Martin Gurri watch.”

Voters thus will be looking for a 2020 Democratic presidential candidate who is reflective, experienced, a unifier rather than divider, and demonstrably capable of serious governance. In other words, not just another pugnacious self-seeker.

How many of the announced Democratic aspirants fit that description? Most thus far appear to be appealing mainly to diehard anti-Trumpers important in early primary and caucus contests. But it’s a mistake to believe that general national opinion conforms to that of party activists. You could ask Presidents Goldwater and McGovern about that mistake.

My thoughts:

1. Prior to what Gurri calls the revolt of the public, our two-party system operated on the median voter model. Party insiders, whose main interest was in winning elections, controlled the nominating process and chose candidates close to the center. But just as Olivier Blanchard declared that “the state of macro is good” just prior to the financial crisis that preceded double-digit unemployment, John Zaller and others published The Party Decides at exactly the moment when their thesis became false. The median voter model does not apply in a Martin Gurri moment.

2. For Democrats currently, it appears that “the hard left decides.” The hard left is committed to policy positions that antagonize members of the Democratic coalition that are not part of the hard left.

3. The Green New deal is in some sense a declaration of war against those workers whose skills are complementary with capital based on the internal combustion engine. The war is being declared by the class whose skills are complementary with capital based on silicon. The AFL-CIO understands which side of the war its members are on. So might many African-Americans and Hispanic American citizens.

4. African-Americans and Hispanic American citizens are also not likely to see themselves as beneficiaries of another hard-left commitment, which is to non-enforcement of immigration laws.

5. Among Jewish Americans, many assign Israel a low priority or are unhappy that it has a right-of-center government. But few American Jews are comfortable with the hard-left position that Israel is inherently a pariah state. My line on Congresswoman Omar is that she will not cost the Democratic nominee even 100 votes in 2020, but she has begun a process that will gradually break the bonds between Jews and Democrats. It took the Democrats a long time to earn the enmity of working-class voters, but in 2016 their efforts to do so paid off, so to speak. The same could happen vis-a-vis Jewish voters after another decade.

6. Progressive gender dogma does not expand the Democratic coalition. I have seen the bathrooms where “men” and “women” have been replaced by signs saying “stalls and urinals” and “stalls only.” That may satisfy the demands of the hard left, but let’s ask the average progressive woman how she feels as she heads toward a “stalls only” bathroom and sees a man preceding her.

The hard left is a splinter party. In a proportional representation system, it would have a solid 15 percent of the vote. In our political system as it exists, the hard left creates opportunities for Republicans and pitfalls for Democrats.

Martin Gurri watch

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Noah Smith suggests that from a historical perspective, the revolt of the public is not new. He cites the period from 1789-1848 as well as the 1960s.

These were two former eras, one far in the past, one recent, in which spontaneous activism and popular rage led to widespread rejection of elites and endemic political chaos. And yet in each case, the public didn’t need Facebook or Twitter to revolt – all it needed were pamphlets, independent newspapers, books, or that ultimate information technology, word of mouth.

So the Revolt of the Public might not be such a new thing under the sun. Instead, it might be a recent manifestation of a recurring phenomenon – a periodic eruption of popular discontent. Such a cycle might be driven by improvements in information technology – the printing press, telephones, radio, blogs, and now social media. Each time information technology improves, it might lead to an explosion of chaos and rage while elites and institutions struggle to adapt. But each time in the past, the slow-moving engines of government, business, and media have eventually figured out how to put the lid back on public rage. It may turn out similarly this time.

An argument for home schooling

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Jay Schalin writes,

According to her National Academy of Education biography, Ladson-Billings is “known for her groundbreaking work in the fields of Culturally Relevant Pedagogy and Critical Race Theory.” Ladson-Billings once wrote that “we educators should align our scholarship with the philosophy of Marcus Garvey: race first!”

He found that she is the author most used in schools of education. The rest of the top ten authors seem to be equally hard left. The article links to his full study.

A conference on moderation (Martin Gurri watch)

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I attended this event on the 25th.

There are two videos, one for the morning talks, and one for the afternoon talks. If you watch the video for the afternoon talks, near the end, close to the 4 hour, 11 minute mark, I ask the last question at the session that featured Tony Blair.

My father would have been proud. He always liked to measure the social distance that he traveled from his childhood with Yiddish-speaking parents in the St. Louis ghetto. Finding me in the same room with the former British Prime Minister would have given my father lots of nachas, so to speak.

My review of the conference overall:

David Brooks gave a lucid, entertaining opening speech. About minute 44-45 in the video, he gives an account of contemporary progressiveness that could come straight out of my three-axes model.

Earlier, he cites Andrew Delbanco’s The Real American Dream, which argues that America has had three phases of animating cultural idea. Until around 1830, it was “God.” Americans were fulfilling God’s will. From then until World War II, it was “nation,” meaning manifest destiny for the United States. After the war, it became the “self.”

Brooks argues that the individualism of the latest phase has reached its end as a successful animating idea. We need a cultural paradigm shift. He suggests that what might work better now is a form of communitarianism, in which we care about children (not just our own), the dignity of work, our local living places, and racial and social integration. We need for politics to be less important.

In the end, his “politics of love,” as he calls it, is easy to ridicule, and he recognizes that. But he tries hard to justify his proposal.

The first panel was “Why isn’t the center holding?” and it included Martin Gurri. Not surprisingly, I found Gurri’s remarks the most compelling. But I think he also came through to people in the audience who were not as familiar as I am with his views.

Frances Lee did make the interesting point that as political parties separated on ideological grounds (recall that 60 years ago, the Democratic Party was an amalgamation that included Northern African-Americans and white segregationists from the South where African-Americans were kept from voting) and elections became close enough that either party could win, party loyalty has strengthened. There is fear that if you work with the other side, you are helping them win, and this fear is expressed very strongly in the primary-voting public.

I got to ask a question at this panel. I wanted to make the point that the political divide is a subset of a broader cultural divide. It’s about the 2 hour and 9 minute mark. I don’t think anyone wanted to answer the question, but Brink at least helped to clarify what I was trying to get at.

The next panel struck me as less focused. I did note that Damon Linker cited a poll that suggests that in the 2×2 quadrant of left/right and social/economic issues, the least populated quadrant among American voters is the libertarian one of socially on the left and economically on the right. Will Wilkinson expressed doubt that any poll holds for very long, because American voters are volatile on the issues. Yascha Mounk suggested that demagogic politics is on the upsurge because people want contradictory things (I would say that in economic jargon, they don’t appreciate trade-offs), and politicians must try to cater to that.

The third panel turned me off quite a bit. Often, the discussion veered into philosophical and historical trivia. When it got back to present-day reality, it seemed to consist mostly of ritual expressions of contempt for Mr. Trump. At one point, Professor Levy implied that the Republican Party as an institution would benefit by having a prominent conservative Senator utterly denounce Mr. Trump. While I think that it would help to have a Republican challenge Mr. Trump in the primary in 2020, that challenge should serve to articulate what mainstream Republicans want the party to stand for. The challenger should in no way denounce Mr. Trump but instead should commit to supporting whoever the party nominates in the general election. And, no, William Weld does not get my endorsement for the role.

Denouncing Mr. Trump as Mr. Levy recommends would amount to the political equivalent of a suicide bombing that fails to even approach its target. Mr. Trump does not depend on establishment support in the way that President Nixon did. When Nixon lost the establishment, he was gone. But today a politician’s personal brand is more important than establishment support. See Tyler Cowen’s column on the young Democratic congresswomen. In general, hearing Professor Levy’s pontifications reminded me of the refrain, “You want more Trump??? This is how you get more Trump.”

In the hallway, Elaine Kamarck, a Bill Clinton Democrat who has written a book on primary politics, expressed her view that the winner of the Democratic nomination in 2020 will be someone who drives down the “center-left lane,” as she called it. I suggested that the convention might arrive with 12 candidates each having 8 percent of the vote. She ridiculed that possibility. If there had been time, it should have been possible to formulate a bet. A simple one would be, “A center-left candidate will arrive at the convention with more than 40 percent of the delegates.” Presumably, she would bet for this. I would bet against it. I would not bet more than a few dollars, because she knows much more than I do about the subject. That is what would make it fun if I won.

What do I think of the overall project of reviving a “third way” or a moderate center? I was skeptical going into the event, and I remain skeptical.

I would like to see a more moderate tone in politics. But oddly enough, Levy speaks for me when he writes,

if “moderate” is the name of a substantive position, then it risks being nothing at all, or at least nothing stable, only something defined with reference to the shifting sense of who counts as extreme.

I look at the “shifting sense of who counts as extreme” differently than he does. To me, it looks like the Overton Window is racing full speed to the left. In fact, the window has moved so far to the left that I think most young Democrats see Blair and Clinton as far right-wingers. Consider that when Barack Obama ran for President, he was against gay marriage, and by the time he left office his Administration was pushing trans-gender bathrooms. Consider that President Clinton took pride in balanced budgets and gave thought to fixing entitlement programs*, and now we have Larry Summers and Jason Furman writing that with interest rates so low the government should do a lot more borrowing and spending. And of course, socialism is now a yeah-word and capitalism is a boo-word among Democratic politicians.

After Munich, Winston Churchill said,

for Czechoslovakia and in the matters which were in dispute has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching his victuals from the table, has been content to have them served to him course by course.

I cannot support a moderation that amounts to serving the left’s victuals course by course. Get the Overton window to stand still, or maybe move it back to the right a couple of notches; only then we can talk about moderation.

*one of the event’s panelists, I believe it was Damon Linker, suggested that Clinton was getting ready to propose entitlement reform until a certain #metoo episode weakened him politically

Getting to Denmark?

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A commenter wrote,

In Denmark you get your free day care so you can become a 2 income family, double income outs you very quickly into the top marginal tax rate of around 60%. Average income tax rates are 45% there, plus a non deductible 25% VAT, plus a 45% top marginal rate for capital gains in case you were trying to save for retirement, plus a 1-3% land tax.

Are these taxes creating ‘equality’? Nope, Denmark has a widening gap in wealth and income, they have started from a very narrow distribution, but have steadily worked to hollow out the middle class. It makes no sense to earn in the middle of their income distribution, you either need to drop into the range where you receive net benefits or jump way into the top of the income range to afford what amounts to top rates of 70-80%.

I have suggested that in the U.S. we have done this also. A household below the median income pays payroll taxes, sales taxes, and possibly property taxes. It loses benefits at a steep rate, and when you factor that in it faces a high tax rate. This impedes upward mobility, as I argued in my essay on the Universal Basic Income.

Tomorrow belongs to whom?

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A lot of people I know like to express symmetrical fears about the political environment. They fear both Trump and the young Democratic radicals. Jews complain about anti-semitism on the left and on the right. Etc.

My fears tend to be more asymmetric. One reason relates to this song from Cabaret. Listen to it if you don’t know what I’m talking about.

Ten years from now, what will the battlefield look like? My thoughts:

1. Hundreds of thousands of Trump soldiers will be dead, of old age or opiates.

2. Hundreds of thousands of new college graduates will have been schooled in leftist doctrine.

Regardless of whether symmetric fears are justified at the moment, I think that for the next ten to fifteen years, the most important threats will come from the left.

But my sense is that a relatively small proportion of the most extreme leftists want to have children. That gives me hope for the longer term.

Martin Gurri watch

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Who said this?

Most politicians do not have excellent social media skills, but many will try to get noticed and have an impact (or at least hire staff members who will). As more politicians up their game on social media, more of these attempts will hit home. Ocasio-Cortez will have competition. The influence and reach of political celebrities will grow stronger, and the parties will become weaker yet.

This may be a more important trend than what is sometimes called political polarization. But what does this new, more intense celebrity culture mean for actual outcomes? The more power and influence that individual communicators wield over public opinion, the harder it will be for a sitting president to get things done. (The best option, see above, will be to make your case and engage your adversaries on social media.) The harder it will be for an aspirant party to put forward a coherent, predictable and actionable political program.

Actually, it was Tyler Cowen, but it echoes The Revolt of the Public.

But Tyler reaches this important, sobering conclusion:

Finally, the issues that are easier to express on social media will become the more important ones. Technocratic dreams will fade, and fiery rhetoric and identity politics will rule the day.

Should economists study folklore?

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Stelios Michalopoulos and Melanie Meng Xue write,

Folklore is the collection of traditional beliefs, customs, myths, legends, and stories of a community, passed through the generations by word of mouth. This vast expressive body of culture, studied by the corresponding discipline of folklore, has evaded the attention of economists. In this study we do four things that reveal the tremendous potential of this corpus for economists and political scientists interested in comparative development and culture.

I am tempted to say that culture = folkways + institutions. That is, one aspect of culture is bottom-up, informal, emergent folkways (or folklore). Another aspect, institutions, is culture that is hierarchically-influenced, formalized, and codified.

Following a painstaking effort to catalog folklore across subgroups, the authors write,

We demonstrate the predictive power of folklore-based measures of culture on current norms as reáected in modern surveys, concluding that folklore itself may be one of the vehicles via which culture is vertically transmitted across generations.

It seems interesting.