Martin Gurri (also Andrey Mir) watch

1. Martin Gurri writes,

The information sphere teems with platforms of communication: that is its most typical and abundant feature. The governing elites are not forbidden or unable to speak. They are unwilling to compete for attention. They dread the thought that the public will shout back. This phobia has been the strategic advantage of populists like Trump, who achieve proximity with the public by engaging with it on digital platforms. Until more constructive politicians master the art of online communication, the crisis of the elites will only deepen.

It is a long essay, but worth your time.

2. Gurri interviews Andrey Mir. Mir says,

The internet revealed that the business of the news media rested not on information but on the lack of information. Those conditions are gone. The market is already willing to abandon newspapers, but society is not yet ready. Social habits have slowed down the process. But it is demographics that have begun the final countdown. This is why it is possible to calculate the deadline, figuratively speaking. Millions of students today have never even touched a newspaper. They simply do not know how to consume the press, nor are they aware of why they should do it. As soon as this generation takes command, newspapers are done. Hence the last date for the industry—the mid-2030s.

In July of 2002, I wrote,

The newspaper business is going to die within the next twenty years. Newspaper publishing will continue, but only as a philanthropic venture.

Epistemology and social science

1. On substack, I wrote,

We learn socially, so that most of our beliefs come from other people.

This makes the problem of choosing which people to trust the central problem in epistemology.

What Eric Weinstein calls our “sense-making apparatus” can be thought of as a set of prestige hierarchies, at the top of which are the people who are most widely trusted.

Our prestige hierarchies are based largely on credentials: professor at Harvard; writer for the New York Times; public health official.

The incentive systems and selection mechanisms in the credential-based hierarchies have become corrupted over time, allowing people to rise to the top who lack wisdom and intellectual rigor.

I proceeded to expand on these sentences.

2. Rob Henderson writes,

In his book The Social Leap, the evolutionary psychologist William von Hippel writes, “a substantial reason we evolved such large brains is to navigate our social world… A great deal of the value that exists in the social world is created by consensus rather than discovered in an objective sense… our cognitive machinery evolved to be only partially constrained by objective reality.” Our social brains process information not only by examining the facts, but also considering the social consequences of what happens to our reputations if we believe something.

Later on,

In her recent book Cognitive Gadgets, the Oxford psychologist Cecilia Hayes writes, “children show prestige bias; they are more likely to copy a model that adults regard as being higher social status- for example, their head-teacher rather than an equally familiar person of the same age and gender.” Hayes cites a 2013 study by Nicola McGuigan who found that five-year-old children are “selective copiers.” Results showed that kids were more likely to imitate their head-teacher rather than an equally familiar person of the same age and gender. Young children are more likely to imitate a person that adults regard as being higher status.

and later,

researchers Ángel V. Jiménez and Alex Mesoudi wrote that assessing competence directly “may be noisy and costly. Instead, social learners can use short-cuts either by making inferences from the appearance, personality, material possessions, etc. of the models.”

In my view, these observations/findings make the philosopher’s approach to epistemology seem wrong-footed. The philosopher wants to ask when I should believe my senses. I want to ask when I should believe Jack, especially when he disagrees with Jill. Or Fauci when he disagrees with Mowshowitz.

I pay attention to social learning because of my reading of Henrich and Laland. This predisposition is reinforced by what I found in the Henderson piece. I had an exchange with Michael Huemer on this after this post. I still think that philosophers ought to pay more attention to the issue of how one decides who is trustworthy.

History of the ACLU

James Kirchick writes,

“My successor, and the board of directors that have supported him, have basically tried to transform the organization from a politically neutral, nonpartisan civil liberties organization into a progressive liberal organization,” Glasser says about Anthony Romero, an ex-Ford Foundation executive who continues to serve as the ACLU’s executive director. According to former ACLU national board member Wendy Kaminer in her 2009 book Worst Instincts: Cowardice, Conformity, and the ACLU, Romero and his enablers routinely engaged in the sort of undemocratic and unaccountable behavior practiced by the individuals and institutions the ACLU usually took to court, like withholding information (concerning a breach of ACLU members’ privacy, no less), shredding documents in violation of its own record-preservation and transparency procedures, and attempting to muzzle board members from criticizing the organization publicly. (“You sure that didn’t come out of Dick Cheney’s office?” remarked the late, great former Village Voice columnist and ACLU board member Nat Hentoff of this last gambit). Eerily prescient, Worst Instincts foreshadowed the hypocrisy and fecklessness that has since come to characterize the leadership of so many other, previously liberal institutions confronted by the forces of illiberalism within their own ranks.

Read it and weep.

Fantasy Intellectual Teams: version 2.0

The goal of the Fantasy Intellectual Teams project is to improve public discourse by highlighting writers and podcasters who model high-quality discourse. Version 1.0 has been in progress since April 1. I am excited by the way that the initial buzz has shown that it is a viable method for working toward that lofty goal. We have also learned enough to be able to plan a much-improved version 2.0 for May 1.

The initial set of scoring categories, while a good start, will be improved. Because these categories are so important to achieving the goals of this project, we will develop new versions until we are satisfied. In that sense, the project is in Beta.

For those of you who are interested in the project–and I hope that many of you are–I plan to roll out version 2.0 in about a week, with a new draft around May 1. I encourage you to participate as a team owner by picking a team in the next draft. Leave a message in the comments if you are willing to play.

We will be having each owner pick a team of 7 intellectuals to follow. This is down from 15 in version 1.0, which was too much of a burden on owners. Also, as long as the project is in Beta, seasons will last just one month each. Longer seasons will be desirable once the scoring categories have stabilized.

As an owner, you have two responsibilities. One is to follow the team that you draft and submit claims when intellectuals on your team score points. Another is to provide feedback on improving the way that the project works, especially in defining the scoring categories. The experience of scoring your own team is a valuable basis for feedback.

Below are some initial ideas for scoring rules for version 2.0.
Continue reading

What is fragile?

Scott Alexander writes,

in an area with frequent catastrophes, where the catastrophes have externalities on people who didn’t choose them, you want to lower variance, so that nothing ever gets bad enough to produce the catastrophe.

In an area where people can choose whatever they want, and are smart enough to choose good things rather than bad ones, you want to raise variance, so that the best thing will be very good indeed, and then everybody can choose that and bask in its goodness.

Scott’s essays on “anti-fragile” point to a need to define fragility in a way other than “I’ll know it when Nassim Taleb sees it.” Are we talking about a person, a choice, a process, a system. . .?

It could be that the admonition “Be anti-fragile!” has no practical implications. That is because most disagreements can be framed as disagreements about what are the important sources of fragility.

Conservatives see individual human beings as fragile, but they see the accumulated habits of civilization as anti-fragile. But a progressive could argue that the accumulated habits of civilization make a society fragile. As the environment changes, people need to change in response.

Education and cultural dynamics

John Alcorn pointed out to me that I have two beliefs that appear to be inconsistent.

1. The Null Hypothesis, which is that educational interventions have no durable effect on average outcomes.

2. K-12 educators and college professors and administrators have adverse cultural effects.

It may be tough to reconcile these, but let me try.

Humans have a lot of cultural knowledge to acquire, and we do it by copying others. The Null Hypothesis is true because we do not have interventions that reliably improve one’s copying process. If Jill is better at learning than Jack, we do not have techniques that will produce equal outcomes between Jack and Jill.

But the content of what Jack and Jill learn is affected by educational institutions. If we teach them a heroic narrative of the United States, then they are likely to absorb that narrative. If we teach them a dark narrative of the United States, then they are likely to absorb that narrative. Not everyone who goes through the educational system will support its dominant narrative to the same degree, but the dominant narrative will tend to be absorbed.

I would not say that educators are totally free to impose cultural beliefs on their students. Educators need some support from other influential adults and from students’ peers. Education takes place within a culture, and it has to resonate with that culture to a fair degree. But I think that this leaves room for me to justifiably complain about the cultural influence of K-12 and higher education in the United States these days.

A toy to spot your bias on Twitter

Tyler Cowen writes,

What is the ideological news slant of your Twitter account? (mine was 57% left-wing, 34% right-wing, not too many centrists, at least by their measures, maybe I prefer “the kooks”). I don’t wish to embarrass anyone in particular, but some of the ideological bubbles you can find with this are…just remarkable.

I put in klingblog, and it says I do not interact enough with Twitter to give a reading. Check.

I put in econtalker (Russ Roberts) and it said 48 percent left, 44 percent right.

I put in slatestarcodex (Scott Alexander) and it said 71 percent left, 15 percent right.

My thoughts.

1. I think that Twitter overall leans very far to the left. So my guess is that this measure overstates the amount of leftwing news and understates the amount of rightwing news that a person gets in the “real world.”

2. I suspect that if you are active on Twitter and interested in political issues, you have no choice but to interact with a lot of news from the left. For a long time I have believed that those of us on the right know what the leftwing narrative is on news. But people on the left miss some angles on stories and some stories altogether because these analyses never penetrate their bubble.

Intellectual decadence

I linked to Ross Douthat’s substack on decadence and the intellectuals the other day, but today I want to comment on its main theme.

Which brings us back to the question of traditionalism and dynamism, and their potential interaction: If you’ve had a cultural revolution that cleared too much ground, razed too many bastions and led to a kind of cultural debasement and forgetting, you probably need to go backward, or least turn that way for recollection, before you can hope to go forward once again.

He thinks that starting in the 1960s, our culture threw away too much that was of value. We will have to rediscover it or else suffer from bad ideas.

I certainly think that this will be the case in economics, which as you know I believe is on the Road to Sociology. This will mean a great forgetting of the ideas of Hayek, Buchanan, and Sowell. Those few students who seek out those ideas will have insights into the horrid policy regimes under which they will have the misfortune to live.

What about these FITs?

Ross Douthat writes,

if called upon to name the most important thinkers since the year 2000, assessed purely for their influence, with no comment on quality, I might list (working my way backward in time) Ibram X. Kendi, Robin DiAngelo, Jordan Peterson (14), Peter Thiel (70), Yuval Noah Harari, Steven Pinker (110), Tyler Cowen (2), Ta-Nehisi Coates, Michelle Alexander, Slavoj Žižek, Andrew Sullivan (35), Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris (10), Peter Singer, Samantha Power, my colleague Thomas Friedman … at now we’re back at the turn of the millennium. Religious thinkers? Well, Dawkins and Pinker and Kendi, of course — but okay, more exactly, perhaps James Martin, Rod Dreher (104), Charles Taylor, David Bentley Hart and Tim Keller. (In another ten years I might add a post-liberal Catholic, but not yet.)

Some of these writers are impressive; some less so. Many are journalists, in practice or in spirit — an important occupation, but maybe not the ideal one for generating great works. Will many of them adorn a Great Books curriculum in 2075, if such an antiquated thing exists? I’m doubtful.

The numbers in parentheses are the numbers that they were chosen in the Fantasy Intellectual Teams draft I held on Saturday. Douthat himself was the 44th pick. Among columnists, he was picked ahead of Bari Weiss, Matt Taibbi, David Brooks, Paul Krugman, and Peggy Noonan, but behind Megan McArdle.

Of course, he does not use quantitative scoring criteria. His idea of “influence” probably correlates best with my “meme” category.

Admitting mistakes

In a podcast with Russ Roberts (pick 5), Megan McArdle (pick 38) says,

I can go back and say, yeah, I can’t smooth away into memory and conveniently misremember how I felt about the Iraq war, how I felt about what we should do about the Financial Crisis, and on and on and on and on and on. And, in fact, I wrote a very embarrassing column about the Financial Crisis when the Bear Stearns collapse happened: that we just we’re involved in a garden-variety recession; don’t freak out. This is not that big a deal, we shouldn’t bail them out. Well. So, I think that that is healthy, but most people obviously don’t do that. And so, you end up in a place where most people think that they know better than they actually do, what’s going to happen in the world.

Reading this, I thought of a new FITs scoring category for a future season: admissions of past errors (A’s). But admissions of the type “I was wrong. X is even more of an idiot than I thought” would not count.