Political indigestion watch

Peggy Noonan writes,

But an end to political correctness in the arts and entertainment cannot come from the right. It can come only from the left. All the organs of entertainment and art in America, from Broadway to Hollywood, through Netflix , the museums and onward, are entities of the cultural left. They are run and populated by the cultural left.

They have the pertinent power. When conservatives write or speak against limits on free speech, what they say is heard by the left as mere reaction, a cover for intolerance, and so dismissed.

. . .The turnaround might begin—just one idea—when some powerful cultural entity produces a documentary featuring great figures of entertainment and the arts saying how they feel about limits to artistic expression. What their personal experience with political correctness is, how it has limited what they do, what the implications are. It would require significant cultural figures who are not identified with the right to speak their peace.

That hypothetical scenario would be part of what I call vomiting the Social Justice authoritarianism out of the system. Meanwhile, those on the left who agree with Noonan on this issue end up in the Intellectual Dark Web.

Question on marriage trends, continued

Yue Qian says,

For analytical purpose, I classified each individual’s income by the decile he or she occupied in the income distribution of the 1980 and 2008–2012 analytic samples, respectively. My study showed that for a majority of couples, husbands were in a higher income decile than their wives regardless of the time period and the educational pairing of spouses.

Using sophisticated statistical models (log-linear models) to control for gender differences and shifts in marginal distributions of education and income, I found that the tendency for women to marry up in income was greater when they married down in education: Women were 93 percent more likely to marry men in higher income deciles than themselves among couples in which the wife had more education than the husband than among couples in which the wife had less education than the husband.

Pointer from David French. The paper itself appears to be gated. It seems pertinent to a post from a couple of weeks ago.

Sebastian Junger on human connection

An excellent podcast with Russ Roberts. One excerpt:

When you deprive people of the chance and the necessity of acting heroically and generously for other people, you deprive them of a fundamental part of what it means to be human, what it means to have a meaningful life; and a fundamental way of feeling content and happy in your life.

All sorts of interesting thoughts in the conversation. I may be tempted to annotate it.

In general, we can see Russ expanding into more non-economic topics. I think this may be right.

When Russ and I were students, professors taught us to defend capitalism as an economic system. The neoclassical model of factor rewards was a defense of the distributional aspects of capitalism. Macroeconomics was a claim that economic downturns, rather than reflecting ever-deepening systemic crises, could be managed and contained.

What we are seeing now is a much broader assault on our entire social system and its values. Does liberal democracy suffer from a spiritual void which new ideologies are trying to fill?

Straight economics does not seem sufficient to answer the contemporary progressive left. The Intellectual Dark Web is where we are groping for better approaches.

Question on marriage trends

from a commenter:

Half a century ago, men earned roughly 60% of college degrees. Today, women earn roughly 60% of college degrees. And the gap seems to be growing, as women outpace men in formal education.

2)Matching by educational attainment in the marriage market — marrying someone at a similar formal education level — is increasing.

Have you any insights or conjectures about how the seeming tension between these two trends eventually might shape politics?

Well.

On politics, assuming these trends lead to an increase in unmarried college-educated women and unmarried men without a college degree, it would seem to favor the Democrats. The women will vote ardently for Democrats, but a lot of the men will take out their frustration in other realms.

I would not count on the trends continuing. The bargaining power that college-educated men have enjoyed is probably not conducive to a healthy society. One indication of that is the backlash that has emerged as the #MeToo movement. But at some point college-educated women will discover that to restore their bargaining power exit works better than voice, as it were. They could create more competition among males by finding alternatives to the college degree as ways of qualifying men as marriage material. The process of coalescing around such alternative signals may take a while, but it is something to watch for.

Martin Gurri watch

1. Suzanne Fields writes,

The information balance of power has changed, writes Martin Gurri in a new book, “The Revolt of the Public,” which dissects with originality and depth the impact of the Internet on the political culture. “A generation ago, the public could exist only as a passive audience,” he writes of the great age when the daily newspaper was the king of the mountain and television news was dispensed on a reassuring hierarchical model, from the top down.

2. Gurri himself writes,

Populist is an elite term. It seems to imply that certain opinions are popular when they shouldn’t be. Populists of a nationalistic strain have won elections, handily and repeatedly, in Hungary and Poland. In Italy, two very different populist parties, cats and dogs together, share in running the most popular government in Europe, with 68 percent approval ratings. (By comparison, Macron’s approval numbers have plummeted as low as 23 percent.) Elites ascribe these victories to demagoguery: populists win elections by misleading the public. The reverse of this proposition is more nearly correct. Populist parties and politicians are riding, sometimes uneasily, on the wild kinetic energies surging from a mutinous public.

The post is about France. The Yellow Vests sound like they leaped right out of the pages of The Revolt of the Public.

How religion tames politics

Andrew Sullivan writes,

if your ultimate meaning is derived from religion, you have less need of deriving it from politics or ideology or trusting entirely in a single, secular leader. It’s only when your meaning has been secured that you can allow politics to be merely procedural.

Conor Barnes writes,

Instead of developing a relationship to God and a recognition of one’s own imperfection, we wanted our non-anarchist families and friends to develop their “analysis” and recognize their complicity in the evil of capitalism. These non-anarchist friends grew increasingly sparse the longer I was an anarchist. They didn’t see how terrible the world was, and they used problematic language that revealed hopelessly bad politics. Frustrated with them, I retreated further and further into the grey echo-chamber of my “chosen family.”

I recommend reading both essays in their entirety.

I think of major religions as having teachings in two realms. One realm is the self, and the other realm is the world at large.

In the realm of the self, the teaching is typically that as a human being you have weaknesses, flaws, and some inclinations that are evil. You are taught to acknowledge this and to strive to improve. These sorts of teachings make you somewhat hesitant and uncertain about claiming to know how others must live.

In the realm of the world at large, the teaching is that there is wickedness and injustice that we must try to correct. These sorts of teachings incline you to think that you know how others must live.

So there is tension between the teachings in the two realms. The teachings in the realm of the world at large incline you to be intolerant and authoritarian. The teachings in the realm of the self incline you to be humble. People have to find the right balance, so that they care about the world at large without becoming despotic in their inclinations.

But what if you have no religious affiliation, and instead you get meaning in your life primarily from your political beliefs? Political movements do not come with teachings in the realm of the self. Their entire focus is on the flaws that are in the realm of the world at large. There is nothing to hold you back from a righteous certainty that can justify violence and totalitarianism.

Virginia Postrel on culture

She writes,

In both markets and culture, the blue-collar values of loyalty, solidarity, security, and physical production, have largely given way to the creative-class values of creativity, self-expression, risk-taking, and brains. It’s the revenge of the nerds. The winners are symbolic analysts. The losers are guys good with their hands. For those who adhere to the old values, the shift can be infuriating. Many people suddenly feel not merely economically insecure but culturally disrespected.

Near the end, she poses some questions.

What can a liberal analysis tell us about cultural change? Do institutions of experimentation and feedback work to correct errors in cultural systems as they do in economics? Are there significant differences that might affect outcomes? Are the time scales similar or different? Are there institutions that might limit the collateral damage—a worthwhile question in the case of economic dynamism as well?

Culture is too important to be left to the sociologists.

The church vs. the clan

Jonathann F. Schulz writes,

Church marriage prohibitions pushed Europe away from a kin-based society and paved the way for the development of inclusive institutions. . . this paper highlights the role of kin networks for the formation of commune cities in Europe. This suggests that the seeds of the Great Divergence (Pomeranz, 2000) between Europe and other regions of the world were already planted by the Church’s incest prohibitions in late antiquity. Even today, medieval Church exposure and the absence of strong kin networks are associated with higher civicness and, ultimately, with more inclusive national institutions.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.

Cousin marriage is still prevalent in parts of the world. There are those, including Schulz, who see this as a source of major cultural differences.

Personality, culture, and violence

Tage Rai wrote,

Across all cases, perpetrators are using violence to create, conduct, sustain, enhance, transform, honour, protect, redress, repair, end, and mourn valued relationships.

Individuals and cultures certainly vary in the ways they do this and the contexts in which they think violence is an acceptable means of making things right, but the goal is the same. The purpose of violence is to sustain a moral order.

I’ve linked to this essay before. More recently, Charles Chu reminded me of it.

I speculate that personality and culture interact when it comes to violence. Culture signals when violence will be approved. Some violent practices have been greatly reduced over the last few hundred years, because they now meet with widespread disapproval.

But I believe that individuals differ in their attraction to violence. If you are inclined to violence, you are likely to seek out situations in which violence meets with widespread approval; or you may come up with ways to justify violence even when most people in your society would not condone it.

I suspect that there is a vicious cycle. A movement or cause that justifies violence will attract people who are inclined to violence. They will engage in violent acts, which the leaders of the movement or cause will feel a need to justify. The more that they rationalize violence, the more their movement will attract violent supporters. And so on,

Some Gurri nuggets

From Martin Gurri’s The Revolt of the Public, to be released on Nov. 13, with a forward by me.

In business, as in nature, most new trials fail. This is true of every sphere of human activity. Most new government policies fail to meet their intended goals, for example. Most educational reforms fail. Most scientific hypotheses fail. The trial part of trial an error entails mostly error, unless the set of trials is large and competitive enough to produce a possible success, and the system is smart and agile enough tp recognize success and reward it.

Authority has always fostered an illusion of inevitability. For obvious reasons: if an expiration date were stamped on the Federal government, defection from its mandates would begin today.

our species tends to think in terms of narrowly defined problems, and usually pays little attention to the most important feature of these problems: the wider context in which they are embedded. When we think we are solving the problem, we are in fact disrupting the context. Most consequences will then be unintended.

If [Paul] Ormerod is right, most democratic contests today are fought over phantom issues, and democratic politicians, to get elected, must promise to deliver impossibilities. If, in truth, they have displayed excessive partisanship, it may be because team play between political organizations–the tally of wins and losses–retains a reality to which they desperately cling. . .

The nihilist benefits prodigiously from the system he would like to smash. He’s not marginalized–not a street person, not a foresaken soul, not a persecuted minority. . .a radical ingratitude describes the feeling that makes the nihilist tick.

p. 206, 215, 253, 256, and 285-287, respectively. All are even more interesting when spelled out in context.