How the media woke up

Zach Goldberg writes,

In 2011, the terms racist/racists/racism accounted for 0.0027% and 0.0029% of all words in The New York Times and The Washington Post, respectively. What we see over the past decade is a continual dramatic increase in usages of “racism” and its variations. Moreover, the graph shows that this increase occurred a half decade before the arrival of Donald Trump. By 2019, they would constitute 0.02% and just under 0.03% of all words published in the Times and Post—an increase of over 700% and just under 1,000%, respectively, from 2011.

…In 2011, just 35% of white liberals thought racism in the United States was “a big problem,” according to national polling. By 2015, this figure had ballooned to 61% and further still to 77% in 2017.

The gist of Cynical Theories

I think that there is a natural tendency for professional philosophers to look at the book by Helen Pluckrose and James A. Lindsay from the standpoint of how well it captures a philosophical position that the reviewer has studied extensively. That is not how I evaluate the book. I want the book to help me understand what you might call the “folk beliefs” that non-philosophers distilled from the academics.

By analogy, suppose somebody were to attempt a history of Keynesian economics with a goal of understanding how Keynesian economic policy came to be conducted. It is not so important to get “what Keynes really meant” (in fact, that is an endlessly debatable topic) or to provide a definitive account of the various Keynesian models that appeared in academic journals. Instead, what is important is to explain how the “folk Keynesianism” of journalists and political leaders developed and evolved.

I take the view that it is unlikely that the arcane academics have much direct cultural influence. So arguing with Pluckrose and Lindsay (PL) about their analysis of the arcane academics is beside the point.

The people who are in a position to directly influence the culture are those who hold high-leverage positions in our society. They include college administrators who write policies and implement training programs, public school curriculum writers, corporate human resource departments, journalists, and career officials in government. I believe that one can be confident that PL are accurately characterizing the “folk ideology” of these influential bureaucrats. That “folk ideology” seems plausibly derived from some of the academic philosophy that PL discuss, even if there is room to quibble with the treatment of academic philosophy in PL–and there is always room to quibble with someone’s treatment of any school of philosophy.

For me, Cynical Theories does not stand or fall on the quality of it scholarly interpretations of Foucault, Derrida, or subsequent philosophers. It stands or falls on its ability to explain and predict the rhetoric, modes of argument, and behavior of the bureaucrats who employ what PL refer to as Theory with a capital T.

Here is what I see as the gist of PL’s claims:

1. Liberalism and Theory are incommensurate. Liberalism presumes that we should pursue truth objectively, using logical deductions and empirical observations. From the liberal perspective, some of the propositions held by Theorists, concerning sex for example, are false and even ridiculous. Theory presumes that truths are contingent on identity, so that a white male may hold to a different “truth” than a black female. From the Theory perspective, liberal concepts of logic and empiricism are primarily tools used to perpetuate the privileged in a power structure. They are not necessary or sufficient for the pursuit of truth.

2. Theory developed in three phases. I think of these as razing a village, designing a new housing development, and building a new housing development.

3. The first phase was post-modernism. According to PL, post-modernism developed two principles, a knowledge principle of radical skepticism that objective knowledge or truth is attainable, because knowledge is culturally constructed; and a political principle that society can be viewed in terms of power and hierarchies, and these culturally construct knowledge.

4. The second phase PL call “applied post-modernism.” This looked into specific topics, including colonialism, race, and gender, and looked at how the language and cultural practices in these areas could be interpreted as reflecting and protecting power structures.

5. The third phase PL call “reified post-modernism.” That means taking the ideas into the real world and trying to do something about the power structures. That is what all of the bureaucrats are doing. But one irony that the book emphasizes is that the first phase declared that there was no certainty in knowledge, but the final phase treats the analysis of power based on identity groups as if it were absolute Truth. In terms of my metaphor, when the original village was razed, it was with the view that nothing could stand up. But the new housing development discards that extreme skepticism (although it still does not think that the old village has any legitimacy).

Let me reiterate my first point. The rhetorical defenses of Theory are impregnable to the attempts by liberalism to appeal to what it considers to be reason. To put it starkly, the Theorists refuse to be reasoned with. They would say that someone like me is merely trying to uphold privilege, either consciously or otherwise.

Liberalism seeks to deal with dissent by listening to it, debating it, and co-opting it. But Theory does not have those mechanisms. Silencing dissent is its modus operandi, one might even say its mission. Regular readers know that I describe it as the religion that persecutes heretics. Left-leaning liberals have a hard time processing the threat that this represents. They would much rather focus on the threat that they perceive comes from Donald Trump.

Liberalism vs. Theory

I am reading Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, Cynical Theories. I would describe it as a solid critique of the social justice movement and a stalwart defense of liberalism.

An excerpt:

Liberalism accepts criticism, even of itself, and is therefore self-correcting; Theory cannot be criticized. Liberalism believes in progress; Theory is radically cynical about the possibility of progress. Liberalism is inherently constructive because of the evolutionary processes it engenders; Theory is inherently corrosive because of its cynicism and attachments to methods it calls “critical.”

If I could recommend one book to a student about to enter the indoctrination center known as a contemporary university, this would be it. In fact, I will be recommending it to a wide range of people, including readers of this blog.

My main takeaway is that the threat to conservatism on college campuses may not be as significant as the threat to liberalism. Liberalism’s natural reaction to dissent is to co-opt it. Liberalism accepts what it can of a dissenting point of view without losing liberalism itself. But the new ideology is so antithetical to liberalism that it cannot be co-opted.

Cultural evolution and economics

Nathan Nunn writes,

There are two primary benefits that culture provides over rationality. First, culture-based decision-making provides a quick and easy way to make decisions. To the extent that rational decision-making (narrowly defined) requires costs due to information acquisition or cognitive processing, then acting on one’s transmitted cultural traditions and values saves on these costs. The second benefit is that relying on culture allows for cumulative learning.

More separate excerpts below.
Continue reading

Bret Weinstein and Tom Bilyeu, annotated

A two-hour conversation with Bret Weinstein and Tom Bilyeu. When I listened, I sped it up 25 percent. Although they go on several tangents, the main theme is the high level of political tension that currently threatens the country and Bret’s proposed solution, which is a third-party ticket that would involve power sharing by a liberal and a conservative, each of whom is a cut above most politicians in terms of desire to do what is best for the country and mental flexibility to work toward solutions.

I should say at the outset that while I appreciate most of what Bret Weinstein has to say on this and other podcasts, I discount his proposal, because I think that our problems are intellectual, cultural, anthropological, and psychological more than they are political. Our universities have been deformed, so that they elevate conformist mediocrity over the wisdom that comes from curiosity and open-mindedness. Our culture is too divided and antagonistic. Our individual brains and our collective norms have not adapted successfully to the communication environment that has emerged in the last decade. And the pandemic has exacerbated our individual psychological problems, leading us to be more willing to violate norms of non-violence. Continue reading

Finding the best ideas

A commenter asks

How does one find the best ideas at present?

I think an important heuristic is to consider a person’s error correction mechanism. The vast majority of people try to create the impression that they are never wrong. That makes them untrustworthy by my heuristic.

One of the reasons that Scott Alexander is (was? will SlateStarCodex come back?) such a useful source of ideas is that he is very diligent, and even systematic, about error correction.

Andrew Sullivan on the religion that persecutes heretics

Andrew Sullivan writes,

There is no such thing as persuasion in this paradigm, because persuasion assumes an equal relationship between two people based on reason. And there is no reason and no equality. There is only power. This is the point of telling students, for example, to “check their privilege” before opening their mouths on campus. You have to measure the power dynamic between you and the other person first of all; you do this by quickly noting your interlocutor’s place in the system of oppression, and your own, before any dialogue can occur. And if your interlocutor is lower down in the matrix of identity, your job is to defer and to listen.

He is reviewing the book by Lindsay and Pluckrose, which will be out in a couple of weeks.

The other side does it

A phenomenon that I am very alert to is that of justifying our side doing something wrong by saying that the other side does it. (Is there a name for this?) For example, someone left a comment on this site that implied that it made sense for blacks to treat police with disrespect, because police treat blacks with disrespect. Another common example is defending trade barriers as “retaliation” for another country’s trade barriers.

If blacks retaliate for racist treatment by resisting arrest or threatening police, this is likely to make things worse, rather than better. If we retaliate for trade barriers by putting up trade barriers, this is likely to make things worse, rather than better.

I would say that when you do something bad and, when asked to justify it, all you can come up with is “the other side did it to us,” then you are pretty desperate to rationalize your actions. If your program spits out “Our side is entitled to commit atrocities,” there is a bug in your logic somewhere.

More thoughts on the religion that persecutes heretics

In TLP, I contrast demonization rhetoric with persuasion rhetoric. As an exercise, you might try to pantomime each. That is, act out the facial expressions and hand gestures of someone who is demonizing another person. Then act our trying to persuade another person. I am pretty sure that you will appear more open and relaxed doing the second.

Demonization and persuasion are mutually exclusive. If you are demonizing, you are not persuading, and conversely.

When I wrote the book, I assumed that everyone would believe that persuasion is better than demonizing. My thought was once people recognized that their political rhetoric was demonizing, they would want to change.

But the religion that persecutes heretics actually prefers demonization to persuasion.