The Case Against Occupational Licensing

Edward Rodrigue and Richard V. Reeves write

Since state licensing laws vary widely, a license earned in one state may not be honored in another. In South Carolina, only 12 percent of the workforce is licensed, versus 33 percent in Iowa. In Iowa, it takes 16 months of education to become a cosmetologist, but just half that long in New York. This licensing patchwork might explain why those working in licensed professions are much less likely to move, especially across state lines: [next they have a chart showing the lower rate of mobility for licensed professionals]

Pointer from Mark Thoma. The article points out several other adverse effects of overly restrictive occupational licensing.

It seems to me that in the interest of regulating interstate commerce, Congress could do pass a law saying that someone licensed in state X is entitled to work in that same occupation in state Y unless state Y can give a compelling reason unless state Y can provide a compelling reason otherwise. As its stands, variations in licensing requirements work like interstate tariff barriers, which our Constitution was designed to eliminate.

Robotic Hiring

It seems to outperform human hiring, at least according to Mitch Hoffman and others, who write,

We evaluate the staggered introduction of a job test across 130 locations of 15 firms employing service sector workers. We show that testing improves the match-quality of hired workers, as measured by their completed tenure, by about 14%.

Here is an abstract of a more recent version. Some questions:

1. How does this affect diversity?

2. Can testing work for high-skilled jobs, also? Software engineers? Middle managers?

3. What would Tyler Cowen say?

De-skilling in the Labor Market

Beaudry, Green, and Sand write,

the first object of this paper will be to document that the demand for cognitive tasks has actually been declining since 2000. Such a decline in demand has had, and continues to have, a direct impact on more skilled workers, but we go on to show that it has likely had a substantial impact on less skilled workers as well. In particular, we argue that in response to the demand reversal, high-skilled workers have moved down the occupational ladder and have begun to perform jobs traditionally performed by lower-skilled workers. This de-skilling process, in turn, results in high-skilled workers pushing low-skilled workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to some degree, out of the labor force all together. This process had been going on since 2000, but, as argued in earlier papers, the housing boom between 2003 and 2006 masked some of the effects which only become fully apparent after the financial crisis.

Pointer from Mark Thoma (with a couple of clicks in between).

If your main evidence for de-skilling is that people with college education are in jobs that you would not think require college degrees, then there might be another story. That is, credentials do not prove cognitive ability. In fact, we may have observed an increase in the proportion of people attending college who are not really college material and in the number of colleges producing graduates with only high-school level skills. These people would wind up in jobs not requiring great cognitive ability.

The WaPo on Government Workers

One one page, Joe Davidson writes,

[Congressman Paul Ryan] viewed federal employees as a privileged class.

On the facing page, Lisa Rein writes,

A year after auditors documented tens of thousands of federal workers on paid leave for at least a month and longer stretches that exceed a year, close to 100 Department of Homeland Security employees still are being paid not to work for more than a year.

The large number persists even after the Obama administration urged agencies in June to curtail their reliance on what is known as administrative leave, the government’s go-to strategy for dealing with employees facing allegations of misconduct.

While employees stay home, they not only collect paychecks but also build their pensions, vacation and sick days and move up the federal pay scale.

No comment.

Women Gather, Men Hunt

Catherine Rampell writes,

But it’s still a bit strange that women are more likely to spend money on ever-rising tuition when they’re not seeing the same financial upside as men.

She goes on to write,

The three fields in which women outnumbered men in the highest numbers are more traditionally utilitarian: health professions (125,000 more women than men), education (61,000) and psychology (60,000).

I am sorry, but psychology is not a utilitarian major. It is a self-indulgent major. There are approximately zero jobs seeking anyone with an undergraduate degree in psychology. Meanwhile, the number of jobs for people with advanced degrees in psychology is very small relative to the number of undergraduate psychology majors, so admission to graduate programs is quite selective.

As for education and allied health professions, I would note that these are occupations that are highly regulated. That is, people with less formal education could do many of these jobs, but they are not allowed to compete for them. They are also fields that strongly resist the concept of merit pay.

Rampell adds,

There are, at least for the time being, lots of decent, middle-class jobs predominantly held by men that don’t require higher education (such as construction and other trades); comparably paying jobs disparately held by less educated women are few and far between.

Females riding garbage trucks are like Black Swans–they may exist but I have never seen one.

A very crude version of evolutionary psychology is that women gather and men hunt. That is, women look for safe and reliable income while men seek income in ways that are more dangerous and can involve extremes of success and failure. I do not think that one should carry this idea too far, but Rampell’s column can be placed in that framework.

Confirmation Bias, Illustrated

Scott Sumner writes,

And I just want to make sure readers are not getting lost in the weeds here. This is not one of those “he said, she said” where reasonable people can disagree on whether the PCE or CPI is a better price index. This is a pay/productivity gap being invented by using the slowing moving price index (NDP, which is similar to the PCE) to make worker productivity look better, and the faster moving price index (CPI) to make real wages look lower. That’s not kosher. You need to use the same type of index for both lines on the graph.

Brad DeLong writes,

I score this for Larry Mishel….

Pointer from Mark Thoma.
DeLong and Sumner are on opposite sides, and each is certain.

Fundamentally, I think that the reason that this happens is that economic propositions are not falsifiable. They only hold “other things equal,” and other things are never equal. A measure of worker productivity that is reasonable according to one person’s framework is not reasonable according to another person’s framework.

If you continue to insist that economics is a science in spite of the non-falsifiability of propositions, you end up deciding that those who disagree with you are evil and anti-science. As I say in the Book of Arnold, you end up wallowing in confirmation bias.

On this particular, by the way, my inclination is to agree with Sumner. That may be political bias on my part. But also, I think you would be seeing a lot of other dramatic things happening if productivity were outstripping wage growth. Very high demand for labor. A big improvement in international competitiveness, leading to large trade surpluses. etc. At the minimum, it seems to me that Mishel and DeLong owe us some comment on why these other developments do not seem to have taken place.

Contrary to what you see in online debates “this one chart” is never a debate-settler. You don’t make a convincing case with one chart. You need lots of disparate, corroborating evidence.

Evidence for Sticky Wages?

The WSJ reports,

Scant availability of skilled construction workers has hampered home construction at various times in the past few years of recovery. But the shortfall seems to have grown more acute of late, as new-home sales are up 21.2% so far this year from the same period last year and commercial construction has increased steadily.

This is an interesting phenomenon for several reasons. First, what happened to all of the construction workers that were laid off after the housing bust? Second, what is happening to wages in the construction industry?

In particular, why have wages not risen to a point where the market clears? Or have they in fact risen, and the phrase “scant availability” of workers means “scant availability at the wage that we would prefer to pay,” which is below the market-clearing wage.

Bryan Caplan vs. Sociologists on the Labor Market

He writes,

The chief failure in labor markets is that wages tend to be too high, leading to durably high unemployment.

Why? Mostly because so many workers view employers with resentment and suspicion. To contain this resentment and suspicion, employers compress wages and avoid wage cuts even when there’s high unemployment. The unintended effect is to make unemployment far higher – and hence more traumatic – than it needs to be, especially for the least-skilled. It’s the Tinkerbell Principle at work. Involuntary unemployment, free labor markets’ chief shortcoming, exists largely because workers believe that free labor markets are bad for workers.

Several links omitted. Read the whole post. I think it could provoke a lot of useful discussion.

For the most part, Bryan challenges the view that in the boss-employee relationship, the boss takes advantage of higher status and power. That is the way I think that sociologists view labor markets.

Bryan writes,

Everyone talks as if bosses have the better end. But talk is very different from action. If everyone were trying to start their own businesses and hire workers, that would count as “acting as if bosses have the better end of the deal.” Most workers, however, make no effort to become entrepreneurs. You could object that most workers don’t have the money to open their own businesses, but most rich workers make no effort to become entrepreneurs either.

Almost nobody likes having a boss. But going out on your own is risky and stressful, so most people put up with it. Still, I think that one could argue that in the workplace, this fact gives bosses the sort of power that sociologists impute to them.

From this point of view, the best public policy to support workers would be to make it easier to go out on your own. Starting your own business can be daunting from the standpoint of paperwork: getting a license, filling out tax forms, etc. Also, health insurance is much more subsidized for large businesses, particularly those that do business in more than one state. If government were to take its thumb off the scale, perhaps the “exit option” would be more valuable to employees, which would raise their bargaining power in the workplace.

Just as almost nobody likes having a boss, Bryan would turn that around and ask whether anybody likes having employees. Employees grouse and they malinger. Public policy also could mitigate this by improving the “exit option” for bosses, that is by make it easier to screen potential employees and easier to fire those who fail to perform.

Make Working Matter

Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Abigail Wozniak write,

internal migration within the United States has fallen continuously since the 1980s, reversing the upward trend that occurred earlier in the 20th century.

Pointer from Richard Florida.

The kaleidoscope is not shaking so much, which may impede the formation of new patterns of specialization and trade. What is that? The authors write,

We find a decline in the wage gain associated with changing employers, but no change in the wage gain
associated with staying at the same employer (i.e. the return to firm-specific tenure). We find qualitatively similar results in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Although our evidence is only descriptive, it suggests that the distribution of the relevant set of outside offers has shifted in a way that makes labor market transitions—and hence geographic transitions—less desirable to workers.

So, maybe some of the wage differentials that used to cause people to migrate within the U.S. have been arbitraged away. But what about the differential between working and not working? Shouldn’t that be enough to motivate people to change locations?

My answer would be that the accumulation of fragmented means-tested programs has produced a high implicit marginal tax rate on people who do not have steady work. This gets back to the idea of consolidating those programs into a single flexible benefit program with a clear, low marginal tax rate.

Working More = Markets Working

Tim Harford writes,

A few years ago, the economists Mark Aguiar and Erik Hurst published a survey of how American work and leisure had evolved between 1965 and 2005. Both men and women had more leisure time — although nothing like as much as Keynes had expected. But some people defied this trend. The best educated and the highest earners, both men and women, had less free time than ever. Starting in the mid 1980s, this elite began to drop everything and work ­furiously.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

What Harford does not mention is what I think is the most important trend, which is the drop in “home production.” We are making much better use of our non-work time, because we enjoy genuine leisure rather than doing unpaid tasks that we do not like.

Several decades ago, when an economist colleague bragged about building a deck on his house, I pronounced the aphorism “Do-it-yourself is a market failure.” He should have been able to earn more income by working more hours as an economist, and then pay someone else to build the deck. But he worked in a fixed-salary position for an employer that did not allow outside consulting.

The main trend is that people are doing less unpleasant work. As Harford notes, some people now enjoy their jobs. People are doing less unpaid housework (as I write this, a paid worker is mowing my lawn). Many people whose unpleasant jobs have been “lost” are now out of the labor force.