Market Monetarists Jump the Shark

Scott Sumner writes,

In America mortgage debt is commonly structured so that monthly payments stay constant over 30 years. This means that during periods of high NGDP growth, when nominal interest rates are also high, monthly payments will start very high in real terms, and then fall rapidly in real terms. But your ability to qualify for a house depends on how large the initial nominal monthly payment is, relative to your current income.

Read the whole thing. The logic is this:

1. In the 1970s, house prices started rising, but they did not rise as much as during the recent bubble.

2. In the 1970s, because mortgage rates were high, even though real interest rates were low it was hard to get mortgage credit. That is what choked off the bubble. The same thing did not happen in the recent bubble.

3. High mortgage rates reflect loose monetary policy. Hence, the difference between the 1970s and the recent bubble is that this time monetary policy was tighter.

I agree that there is a “money illusion channel” between nominal interest rates and housing. Back in the 1970s, economists proposed price-level-adjusted mortgages (PLAMs) to get around this problem. If you want more background, go to MRUniversity and watch the first half-hour or so of videos from my housing course.

But….come on. The extension of the recent bubble compared to the 1970s came from the abandonment of standards for down payments. If you think that looser monetary policy would have choked off the recent housing bubble, you’ve jumped the shark.

Conflict of Interest in Mortgage Lending and the Role of Regulation

I received some pushback on this post. This is a response.

There is a narrative of the housing bubble/crash which tries to fit it into a neat oppressor-oppressed model. Greedy banks exploited naive borrowers in an era of libertarian deregulation. Emotionally, it as a satisfying story. Analytically, it is not. Here is why.

There are conflicts of interest between borrowers and mortgage originators, and there are conflicts between originators and investors. The financial crisis was created by the latter, not the former.

The main conflict of interest between borrowers and originators is that it is almost always in the interest of the mortgage originator to induce the borrower to pay an excessive fee and/or interest rate.

In my view, this conflict was not much of a factor in the housing crisis. The vast majority of the defaults were the result of the collapse of house prices, not the cost of mortgage loans.

Nonetheless, I have spent a lot of time thinking about this conflict and how to deal with it, because it bothers me that the most vulnerable people are the ones who are most likely to get ripped off. I do not think that market competition works very well to protect consumers, because a sophisticated lender can make it appear that he is offering the most competitive rate and then turn around and rip off the consumer. I do not think that letter-of-law regulation works very well, because you can never close all of the loopholes.

One possibility would be reputation systems. If an entity like Consumer Reports were to rate lenders and loan offerings, and enough consumers use that entity, then bad actors would be driven out of the lending market. Unfortunately, the most vulnerable consumers do not use these sorts of consumer rating services, so I do not think that solution will work.

The other possibility is principles-based regulation. Audit firms to ensure that their products, policies, procedures, and internal incentives are designed not to exploit vulnerable consumers.

The oppressor-oppressed narrative has lenders giving loans to borrowers when the lenders should know better but the naive borrower does not realize that he or she should not be getting the loan. Some comments on this.

1. Lenders are not omniscient. They make mistakes. A Type I error is making a loan that you think will be repaid, and it turns out to default. A Type II error is turning down a loan that would have been repaid. Until 2007, the main oppressor-oppressed narrative was that lenders were making Type II errors, particularly with respect to minorities. That is, the evil lenders were turning down too many good borrowers. When the crisis hit, the oppressor-oppressed narrative suddenly became the opposite. Lenders supposedly forced loans on unwitting borrowers who could not pay them, and we need to regulate lenders to make sure this never happens again. That is, originators deliberately committed Type I errors.

2. Under the old-fashioned originate-to-hold model, there is never an incentive for lenders to make loans that will not be repaid. You lose money on those loans. In this model, the bank pays its loan origination staff not on sheer volume, but on quality decisions, including rejecting loans as warranted.

3. On the other hand, with securitization, the originator’s idea of a good loan is any loan that can be sold to an investor, without regard to whether it can be repaid. When you deny a loan application, you cannot possibly make money on it. If you approve the loan and it cannot be repaid, that is someone else’s problem. This is primarily a conflict of interest between originators and investors, not between borrowers and lenders. At Freddie Mac, this conflict of interest occupied us constantly. Trying to keep originators from funneling bad loans to us drove enormous amounts of our staff time, business functions, policies, procedures, and contractual arrangements.

4. One of the illustrations of the conflict between originators and investors is that loan applications often include fraud and misrepresentation. The most common examples include over-stating the borrower’s income and/or lying about whether the borrower is going to occupy the home. Income misrepresentation is often initiated by the originator, trying to “help” the borrower get a loan. Occupancy fraud, on the other hand, is almost always initiated by the borrower. It can be hard for the originator to prevent this fraud, because it only becomes clear after the loan has been sold that the borrower never intended to occupy the home and instead is a speculator.

Taking all this together, I do not find the story of deregulation leading to the housing crisis to be very compelling. The main conflict of interest that caused the problem was the conflict between originators and investors. Basically, originators were able to foist bad loans on investors. This is not a case of the rich and sophisticated taking advantage of the poor and naive. On the contrary, the typical originator is a low-class guy working for a poorly-capitalized company in a highly competitive business. The typical investor is a sophisticated money manager.

Regulation was part of the problem, not part of the solution. The regulators’ perverse risk-based capital requirements encouraged the risk-laundering AAA-rated tranche business. And their attack on Type II errors prior to the crisis was at worst a major cause of the crisis and at best spectacularly poorly timed.

Private Securitization and the Housing Bubble

Adam J. Levitin and Susan M. Wachter write,

We argue that the bubble was, in fact, primarily a supply-side phenomenon, meaning that it was caused by excessive supply of housing finance. The supply glut was not due to monetary policy or government housing finance. The supply glut was not due to monetary policy or government affordable-housing policy, although the former did play a role in the development of the bubble. Instead, the supply glut was the result of a fundamental shift in the structure of the mortgage-finance market from regulated to unregulated securitization.

Pointer from Reihan Salam.

The implication is that if government regulates securitization, things will be fine. Some problems I have with this analysis:

1. They do not examine how the market for “unregulated” securitization was in fact bolstered by capital market regulations. Take away the regulatory advantage for AAA-rated and AA-rated securities, and I do not think that the securitization market is able to take off. Remember that capital requirements for banks were so perverse that holding a tranche in a pool backed by sub-prime mortgages required more less capital than originating and holding a low-risk mortgage.

2. The “regulated” sector, namely Freddie and Fannie, lowered its standards at exactly the wrong time, in 2005 through 2007. Several private players, including AIG, either exited the market or tightened standards before the bubble burst.

3. The problem with private securities is not that they lack standardization. It is that the whole securitization model is flawed. It introduces more costs than benefits into the mortgage finance system. That fact has been obscured by all of the support that government has given to securitization, including the “too big to fail” status of Freddie and Fannie and the perverse capital requirements noted in (1) above.

Foreclosure Relief Has Consequences

Nick Timiraos writes,

it’s become more expensive to process loans that default. While banks typically sell to other investors the mortgages they make, they often hold onto what’s known as the mortgage “servicing”—that is, the process of collecting loan payments on behalf of investors. Because the foreclosure crisis has led to higher costs associated with servicing delinquent loans, the easiest way to avoid against having to service a defaulted loan, of course, is to make risk-free loans.

The “foreclosure crisis” is the huge outcry against foreclosures, which caused politicians to impose all sorts of new procedures and fines against mortgage servicers. As a result, nobody wants to service anything other than a squeaky-clean loan. I’ve tried to explain the economics of mortgage servicing in testimony on the Hill and in my housing finance course for MRuniversity.

The Wall Street Menace

1. Stephen G Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi write,

we find that manufacturing sectors that are either R&D-intensive or dependent on external finance suffer disproportionate reductions in productivity growth when finance booms. That is, we confirm the results in the model: by draining resources from the real economy, financial sector growth becomes a drag on real growth.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

2. James Kwak writes,

According to Wilmarth, the fundamental problem, and the reason things don’t get significantly better, is the political power of major financial institutions.

He refers to this article.

Pointer also from Mark Thoma.

I would add that the proposed housing finance “reform” in Corker-Warner is exactly what Wall Street wants. If enacted, it will move essentially all of the risk in housing finance to the shadow banking sector. My guess is that interest-rate risk will prove to be the next bomb to go off, and it will not have a very long fuse.

Narrative Wars on Housing

Peter Wallison writes,

At the time of Lehman’s failure, half of all mortgages in the U.S.—28 million loans—were subprime or otherwise risky and low-quality. Of these, 74% were on the books of government agencies, principally the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

I think that the left’s counter-narrative is that Fannie and Freddie bought the better mortgages of those available. What happened is that the really bad mortgages that they didn’t buy ended up defaulting, causing house price declines, which caused the better (or not-as-bad) mortgages that Freddie and Fannie bought to default, also.

In addition, the counter-narrative is that Freddie and Fannie were driven by their shareholders, not by their regulators, to buy risky loans. I would just note here, as I have before, that it is a bit perverse that we had the Fed tasked with consumer protection in the mortgage industry while HUD was tasked with safety and soundness regulation of the two key lenders. And we are surprised that this did not work out well?

Wit and Wisdom from Me?

Not really. Just another essay for everyone to ignore on housing finance reform.

If we want asset accumulation, then it is better to offer subsidized savings plans to help home buyers reach a 10 percent down payment threshold than it is to offer subsidized mortgages with down payments of less than 10 percent. If we want asset accumulation, we should make sure that there is no government guarantee or support of any kind for loans with negative amortization (including “teaser adjustable-rate mortgages”), second mortgages, home equity loans or cash-out refinances.

I’m afraid that the fix is in on housing finance reform. Wall Street will get what it wants. The housing lobby will get what it wants. I should just let it go and move on.

Good Sentences

From James Kwak.

the worrying thing is that the intellectual, regulatory, and political climate seems to be basically the same as it was in 2004: no one wants to [do] anything that might be construed as hurting the economy, and no one wants to offend the housing industry.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

I get the same impression. The housing lobby is back and is running the show again. Indeed, Ed Pinto writes,

By caving in to the demands of the lobbies representing the Government Mortgage Complex, both the CFPB and the six agencies are committing a grievous error. Calling QMs a prime loan and making QM = QRM gives risky loans an imprimatur they do not deserve. This is a repeat of the false comfort Fannie and Freddie gave to the definition of a prime loan. As we now know there was little that was prime in most of their prime loans.

Have a nice day.

Housing Finance Reform

I collect some of my thoughts in this essay.

Who will win the battle to get the most favorable subsidies and regulations? At this point, all signs point to victory by two of the biggest culprits in the mortgage crisis — the mortgage bankers (firms that originate loans to distribute, not to hold) and the Wall Street investment banks. Both depend on securitization if they are to participate in the mortgage lending process. However, securitization has only been able to compete with traditional bank lending when securities are backed by guarantees from the taxpayers and when bank capital requirements punish banks that hold their own loans.