Two examples.

1. Stephen Matteo Miller writes,

While these findings do not establish that the Recourse Rule caused the financial crisis, they are consistent with the view that the rule encouraged securitizing banks, especially the largest ones, to hold the assets that turned out to be at higher risk of distress. In other words, though the Recourse Rule may have been intended to lower risk-taking, it may have encouraged greater risk-taking on the part of these banks.

The Recourse Rule got its name because its primary provision was to force banks to keep capital against assets that had been sold with recourse, meaning that the assets could be put back to the bank if they lost value. But another provision of the rule allowed banks to reduce capital against mortgage securities with AA and AAA ratings. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae warned about the distortions this would create at the time the rule was issued, in 2001. I have discussed its role in the financial crisis of 2008 in Not What They Had in Mind and in The Regulator’s Calculation Problem, the latter focusing on the book by Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir Kraus that emphasizes the role that capital (mis-)regulation played in the lead-up to the crisis.

2. Saad Alnahedh and Sanjai Bhagat write,

Regulations were announced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in July 2014 to increase MMF [money market funds] disclosures, lower incentives to take risks, and reduce the probability of future investor runs on the funds. The new
regulations allowed MMFs to impose liquidity gates and fees, and required institutional prime MMFs to adopt a floating (mark-to-market) net asset value (NAV), starting October 2016. . .we find that institutional prime funds responded to this regulation by
significantly increasing risk of their portfolios, while simultaneously increasing holdings of opaque securities.