MIT and the Transformation of American Economics, edited by E. Roy Weintraub. David Warsh cited it and I blogged on Warsh about ten days ago, talking about how other universities’ resistance to hiring Jews enabled MIT to surge ahead. I think it is a fascinating volume, and I don’t think it’s just because I did my graduate work at MIT. A few things I’ve picked up so far.

1. Economic methods changed relatively rapidly between 1935 and 1955. In 1935, economics still looked a lot like a branch of social and political philosophy. By 1955, it was much more technical and policy-oriented, with a shiny scientific veneer. Keynes and the Depression got economists interested in activist government, and the operations research of World War II stimulated much subsequent work on theory, data collection, and policy.

2. Beatrice Cherrier’s essay, and others in the book, describe the emergence of what Samuelson dubbed the “neoclassical synthesis.” You can think of this as an attempt to reconcile Solow’s growth theory, in which saving is good, with Keynesian macro, in which saving is bad. The resolution is to say that the economy is only Keynesian in the short run.

3. In Andrej Svorencik’s essay, we get quantitative support for the view that a few dissertation advisers at MIT have played a dominant role in the profession as a whole. He points out that in my era Dornbusch out-sired Fischer in terms of numbers of students. Still, I continue to hold Fischer responsible for turning macro into a wasteland.

4. In Yann Giraud’s essay, we find that Samuelson’s textbook was bitterly opposed by conservatives, who put pressure on the MIT Administration, which in turn persuaded Samuelson to make changes. If this caving into outside pressure seems surprising, remember that this was the McCarthy era, and most individuals and institutions preferred discretion to waving a red cloak in front of that bull, so to speak.

I am still only part way through the volume.