A Critique of Democracy, by Michael Anissimov, and Democracy: The God that Failed, by Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Anissimov claims that Hoppe’s analysis can be used to justify a preference for monarchy over democracy. Anissimov writes,
The proposal for private rather than public government, at its core, is extremely simple: for something to be properly valued and taken care of it [sic], it must be owned. That includes government. If we want a government that is properly taken care of for the long term, it must be owned by someone. That means no democracy. Does this mean we’re sacrificing our “freedom”? No, because I don’t define freedom as being able to cast one meaningless vote among millions in an election.
I have no problem with belittling the value of the voice option. But it is not obvious to me that monarchy would work well.
First, there is the succession problem. As a citizen, I value continuity. A succession crisis, particularly one that turns violent, is going to create bad discontinuity. My reading of history is that monarchies tend to have succession crises.
Second, there is the problem of retaining the exit option. Just as I tend to place little value on voice, I place a high value on exit. Hoppe writes,
States will always try to enlarge their exploitation and tax base. In doing so, however, they will come into conflict with other, competing states.
I am more inclined to think that democracies will tend not vote to go to war purely to engage in expansion, whereas there is nothing to stop a monarch from doing so.
A bit later, Hoppe writes,
A small government has many close competitors, and if it taxes and regulates its own subjects visibly
more than its competitors, it is bound to suffer from the emigration of labor and capital and a corresponding loss of future tax revenue.
I believe that a monarch has a very strong incentive to try to close off the exit option. Our democracy may very well do this by making you forfeit some of your wealth if you give up citizenship. But still, I think that democracies will tend to be looser about allowing their citizens to leave.
“But still, I think that democracies will tend to be looser about allowing their citizens to leave.”
I wish that was true, but I’m not sure it is–emigration from 19th century monarchies was not notably restricted. And U.S. democracy doesn’t seem to provide much of a restraint on current emigration and expat unfriendly policies (worldwide taxation, FATCA, high-fees to renounce citizenship, demand for taxes payments for 10 years after exit). I assume this is mostly due the large size and relative geographic isolation of the U.S. (for most Americans, residing in another country is not even thinkable, so they don’t pay much attention to or vote based on such policies. And where they are aware, a substantial fraction (perhaps a majority) may favor financial punishment of ‘tax traitors’ like Eduardo Saverin — using the same logic and rhetoric as they do for corporate inversions. Of course I don’t favor monarchy, but the tyrannies of the majority in democracies can be pretty ugly.
“I am more inclined to think that democracies will tend not vote to go to war purely to engage in expansion, whereas there is nothing to stop a monarch from doing so.”
Manifest destiny and the Mexican War show there is nothing to stop a democracy from doing so.
For a small synopsis on why monarchies can be terrible please read the U. S. declaration of independence.
Also, from your discussion, the fallacy of ignoring negative examples of the alternative to democracy seems to be the authors’ method of choice
I’m sympathetic to critiques of democracy, but I think that in advocating for monarchy, they ignore what Barry Weingast and Doug North call the “margin of violence.” Not just in terms of succession, but in how a regime deals with dissenters. How far will the regime go to suppress dissenters and revolutionaries? If it won’t go full Tiananmen Square on them, in the long term I don’t think it can remain stable. It will have to make concessions/compromises, which will only embolden the dissenters, and the next thing you know, they’re signing formal power-sharing arrangements like the Magna Carta and parliamentary democracy is only a matter of time.
If, on the other hand, the regime is willing to use the Tiananmen option, it will need loyal security forces willing to employ such tactics and withstand any resulting backlash. In other words, it will need to buy the loyalty of some pretty rough characters. That also presents some potential long-term problems, because if you need a bunch of thugs to maintain your grip on power, the thugs may at some point realize that they could dispense with you and wield power themselves. Furthermore, the more thugs you need to pay off, the more the distinction between a government “owned” by a monarch and the ugly, backward “natural state” that North and Weingast describe is blurred.
Anyway, that’s my take.
Knowing that Anissimov is conservative, I wonder what kind of monarchy, to the extent that’s even feasible in 2015, he thinks would come about in North America. It’s likely to be a progressive-leaning one. Better to stick to a democracy.
I’m inclined to trust what an empiricist like Steven Pinker has to say on these matters over abstract libertarian system-builders like Hoppe et al.
“First, there is the succession problem. As a citizen, I value continuity. A succession crisis, particularly one that turns violent, is going to create bad discontinuity. My reading of history is that monarchies tend to have succession crises.”
With respect, there are at least two problems here. The first is empirical. Your reading of history, like literally everyone’s, tends to focus on the interesting bits. Succession crises are interesting, but they were hardly common, particularly amongst peoples of the same genetic stock as most modern neoreactionaries. For a brief overview, see here: http://www.moreright.net/monarchy-faq/
The second problem is theoretical. Assuming for the sake of argument that monarchies in the past did tend to have succession crises, this observation is not maximally useful without an understanding of why. If you have a theory of why monarchies must always or inevitably tend to have succession crises, you have a good reason to oppose them. If, on the other hand, your reasoning is of the “correlation = causation” variety, then you may be making a mistake.
“I am more inclined to think that democracies will tend not vote to go to war purely to engage in expansion, whereas there is nothing to stop a monarch from doing so.”
The same two objections arise. Empirical: http://www.moreright.net/monarchy-faq-part-two/
http://www.moreright.net/on-the-absence-of-war/
Theoretical: http://www.moreright.net/hoppe-on-war/
“I believe that a monarch has a very strong incentive to try to close off the exit option. Our democracy may very well do this by making you forfeit some of your wealth if you give up citizenship. But still, I think that democracies will tend to be looser about allowing their citizens to leave.”
I’m sure you can spot the pattern by now. I can believe that marshmallows will rain from the sky on the 14th of March, 2017, but that doesn’t necessarily make it so. It’s nice of you to share with everyone what you think, but it’d be even nicer if you explained why you thought it.
Then you would need a monarchy where citizenship is voluntary, making the ‘social contract’ explicit rather than implicit as well as making exit a viable strategy. I have been writing on this topic for about 15 years.