And to sound petty for a moment, I don’t want to pass away during the opening moments of a Carlsen-Caruana match, or before an NBA season has finished (well, it depends on the season), or before the final volumes of Knausgaard are translated into English. And this is a never-ending supply. The world is a fascinating place and I fully expect to appreciate it at the age of eighty, albeit with some faculties less sharp. What if the Fermi Paradox is resolved, or a good theory of quantum gravity developed? What else might be worth waiting for?
Off hand, I would say
1. Grandchildren
2. Medical progress to reverse degenerative illness
Aside from the problems others have articulated so well, I thought the universality of his argument was preposterous. As if everyone is in the same mental and physical health at 75.
It’s such a strange thing to hope for considering that most people who want to die can do so. He seems to have little respect for other people’s revealed preferences.
A devastating critique of Emanuel in two sentences. Perfect!
I have to say, it is nearly impossible to not be snarky. Emanuel says that progress on aging when from improvement to just extending a poorer quality of life circa 1960. What happened circa 1960 or so? I that about the time we started weighting spending toward geriatrics? No mention of this hypothesis? At all? Fine.
What if we actually started uncrowding out NIH funding with the non-public good spending? Wouldn’t that swamp any personal feelings we might have on when we’d prefer to die?
Off hand, I would add:
3. Great-grandchildren
4. Exoskeletons / robotic prostheses for mobility (ideally non-medical)
5. Mind/computer interfaces for memory, reminders, concentration
I don’t necessarily think we’ll have “the singularity” and upload ourselves to the cloud in my lifetime but if a little electric current can improve the memory of college students then it can’t be long before a small implant can help extend the mental faculties of the aged. I could add virtual reality to this list, allowing interaction, travel, etc., without a mobility component at all. Japan isn’t just doing robotics for elder care but actual wearables that augment the muscles, carry weight, strengthen joints, etc.
I also think small countries will begin to compete for retirees based on deregulated medicine, so the FDA won’t always be able to get in the way of these types of devices.
I prefer Kling’s reasons to Cowen’s, and surely Cowen is being facetious by calling his own desires petty. Cowen’s seem like highbrow signaling, no doubt deeply held, but lacking the deeper understanding that he seeks to enjoy the world that results from such wondrous breakthroughs and not the breakthroughs themselves. When one’s potential enjoyment of the world is severely diminished by loss of sense, mobility, or reason, let alone net enjoyment which may go negative due to ailment and bodily discomfort, I am skeptical that Cowen’s judgment will persist. Perhaps I am relatively more sensitive to experience than Cowen, but I think it is lower on Maslow’s hierarchy than intellectual wonder. That is, a miserable existence precludes enjoyment of intellectual wonder.
Still, it’s very hard to reason about, even for one’s own self, let alone attempting to reason on others’ behalf. More difficult still is how to preserve human rights and dignity for an entity which has been drained of its humanity.
Re-reading Cowen, I agree that merely wanting to see the conclusion of a narrative is “petty” though understandable. Framing the problem in terms of “would I want to pass just before X’s conclusion” seems like a distraction, though maybe it is useful in humanist terms.