It is called Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History, and I received a review copy. I am not very far into it. An alternative title might be “Average is over. . .and maybe so is everything else.” From the back cover:
Historical analysis shows that long spells of equitable prosperity and internal peace are succeeded by protracted periods of inequity, increasing misery, and political instability. These crisis periods–“Ages of Discord”–have recurred in societies throughout history. Modern Americans may be disconcerted to learn that the US right now has much in common with the Antebellum 1850s and, more surprisingly, with ancien regime France on the eve of the French revolution.
I will have some problems with his approach to history, if what he says on p.6-7 is any indication.
What we need is theory in the broadest sense, which includes general principles that explain the functioning and dynamics of societies and models that are built on these principles, usually formulated as mathematical equations or computer algorithms. Theory also needs empirical content that deals with discovering general empirical patterns, determining the empirical adequacy of key assumptions made by the models, and testing model predictions with the data from actual historical societies.
This sounds like it borrows some of the more dubious methodological doctrines of economics. I have been arguing that mental processes are important in explaining social outcomes. I fear that the emphasis on mathematical equations and data leads instead to a focus on physical processes, to the neglect of mental processes. I do not think that Turchin will turn out to be such a physical determinist. But we will see.
Somewhat related: Yascha Mounk on indicators of fragility in democracy.
The first factor was public support: How important do citizens think it is for their country to remain democratic? The second was public openness to nondemocratic forms of government, such as military rule. And the third factor was whether “antisystem parties and movements” — political parties and other major players whose core message is that the current system is illegitimate — were gaining support.
Pointer from Tyler Cowen.
Turchin also uses indicators, but his set is different.
Hard to know when ‘this time is different’ applies, but the current unprecedented state and trend in technology makes the statement plausible. That makes historical cycle arguments suspect.
Then again, take a look at the the recession-shaded historical chart of the unemployment rate on calculated risk blog. Eyeballing it with a cyclic bias will make one think it’s ‘about time’ for another downturn. The market apparently disagrees.
I tend to view the US historically has the following in terms of history:
1) There is good 25 years growth and then 8 – 10 recessionary periods with enormous creative destruction creating the growth cycle. So we had growth 1876 – 893, 1900 – 1929 or 1948 – 1973 or 1983 – 2008 with down cycles of 1893 Panic, Great Depression, 1970 Inflationary Environment, and the 2008 Financial Crisis.
2) Although economist love creative destruction, it has a real impact on the rest of the society. The 1970s had an incredible amounts of creative destruction but lord knows we do not want to experience that again. (And how miserable was 2009 & 2010?)
At a very long time scale, what results in rebellions and revolutions and whether they are successful or not, flourishing and collapse, is an interesting subject. A podcast on the subject suggests flourishing and collapse are closely related when in an attempt to further past successes by doing more of the same leads to collapse when it fails though specific reasons vary. Our civilization is hyperconvergent with increasing levels of integration but also increasingly critical areas that can lead to collapse.
At less long time scales, there does seem to be something like Kondratieff waves in technological innovation and risk appetites that seem intrinsic to both change and human nature, not necessarily deterministic patterns but more likely than not as prisoners of our own history and psychology.