Ilan Wurman writes,

whenever an agency or independent commission wants to make a new rule, it must submit the rule directly to Congress by a certain deadline. Congress would then have three options for responding. First, Congress could take no action, leaving the rule idle. (Whether this happens because Congress cannot reach a consensus or because lawmakers in fact approve of the rule is immaterial here.) After seven months of inaction, the rule would take effect and become binding law, provided the president assents to it. Second, Congress could pass a bill containing the rule, or an amended version of the rule; the president would then need to approve the bill, and then the rule would become law. (This second case is no different than the ordinary legislative process described in the Constitution.) Third, Congress could pass a “resolution of disapproval,” which would effectively veto the rule, meaning it would not be presented to the president and would not become law.

Read the whole article, which is about trying to revive the principle of separation of powers while continuing to have agencies that exercise all three powers. The example above would provide a legislative check on the rule-making powers of agencies.

With this legislative veto in place, Wurman argues that the agencies would not longer need to be independent of the executive. The agencies could instead fall under the control of the President, which is what the executive branch is supposed to do.

Wurman also proposes a way to check agencies’ judicial power. I was not able to follow the legal technicalities of his suggestion.

The ideas are impressive. However, in the end, I came away thinking of the proposals as putting lipstick on a pig. The pig is the notion that experts are capable of engaging in planning for everyone. That is the idea that is behind the creation of the agencies and giving them power in the first place. If we continue to operate under the assumption that expertise works well, then Wurman’s proposals would change nothing. And if we challenge that assumption, then the solution is to restrict the powers of the agencies.

To put this another way, it is the cultural status of the administrative state that needs to be changed. Its (un-) constitutional status derives from its cultural status.

Thomas A.Firey writes,

Proof of the system’s failure is reflected in the fares Metrorail customers pay. Currently, fares cover less than half of the system’s operating and maintenance expenses—and little to no capital costs. WMATA officials, fearing public backlash, have no interest in raising fares to recover more of the cost. Put simply, Metrorail’s own users judge the system to not be worth its cost.

He offers this shocking solution:

Public officials would better serve both Metrorail customers and the broader public by terminating the rail system and shifting attention to bus transit and the road system.

I think it is fair to say that the idea of terminating the DC Metro rail system is inconceivable to most people, no matter how much its costs exceed its consumer value.

Rail-based transit systems are a symbol of the central planning mindset. They are rigid, impersonal, and in most cases economically unsustainable.