Not the libertarian moment

My latest essay is on the confusion of the libertarians. The theme is that the left is no longer reliably libertarian on social issues and the right is no longer reliably libertarian on economic issues. For example,

The most ardent progressives now look upon a Haidt or a Pinker as at best suspect and at worst unacceptable. Their traditional liberalism, like libertarianism, is anathema to the contemporary progressive.

Possibly related: Daniel Klein argues that Libertarian Party candidates reduce liberty by drawing votes away from Republicans.

But, frankly, recent events have reinforced in me a deeper feeling that the Democrat Party is a left-wing party in an illiberal sense that spans generations and continents. The concern goes beyond sizing up positions on the issues; it reaches to broader norms of honest government, civility, and fair play, norms upon which liberty depends.

I feel surer than ever before that the Libertarian Party reduces liberty.

Good news

Morris P. Fiorina writes,

the Fox viewing audience is about one percent of the eligible electorate while news shows on MSNBC fall short of that. Sean Hannity’s is the highest-rated political show on cable television with an audience of about 1.5 percent of the eligible electorate. On the other end of the spectrum Rachel Maddow gets a bit over one percent. Anderson Cooper 360 draws in a paltry 0.4 of one percent.

If he is correct, then the people that you see sharing political posts on Facebook and Twitter are a small minority.

He also makes this interesting point:

Under current practices in 2045 the Census Bureau will record the children of Senator Ted Cruz’ daughters as Hispanic even if they are only one-eighth Hispanic by that point. Inter-ethnic and inter-racial marriages have dramatically risen, producing increasing numbers of children of mixed-race or ethnicity.

Alberto Mingardi vs. nationalist populism

About the new Italian government leaders, Mingardi writes,

Salvini and Di Maio both champion a vulgar form of Keynesianism: a blind preference for government spending, regardless of the macroeconomic outlook.

This has dire consequences for the long-term health of the economy.

Italy’s cost of borrowing has roughly doubled since the government took power last spring. This is a serious matter in a country where the public debt is over €2.2 trillion or 132 percent of GDP. It also translates into a higher cost of credit for households and businesses.

In an email exchange with me, he writes,

perhaps for the first time in my life I see the danger coming from the right, not the left. Immigration (that is: an exaggerated perception of it and its negative externalities) is triggering parties that are making nationalism great again. Their narrative is centred around the need to restore national sovereignty: so that immigrants, but also products and foreign financiers, can be kept at a distance. They do defend the welfare state and define it, somehow, as a national welfare state: the nation is that unit (established upon an alleged common culture/language) in which you can redistribute money from Peter to Paul.

. . .At the end of the day, they are campaigning against the idea that politics is a limited activity: that it can offer just a certain amount of answers, and at a certain cost. They claim that once proper sovereignty will be restored there will be no limit to what government can achieve. In short, they are campaigning against budgetary constraints and those that they see as enforcers of such constraints: the EU, financial markets, et cetera.

Timothy Taylor on corporate social responsibility

He writes,

It seems to me that many discussions of the “social responsibility” of firms do not pay sufficient attention to these gains from pleasing customers and paying workers and suppliers. Such gains should not be taken for granted.

I think that people place corporate wealth in a mental category that is used for natural resources, like water or minerals. If you control such resources, then you must be rich, and you must recognize an obligation to share them. When you think in terms of endowments of resources, you don’t think in terms of corporations creating wealth or competing just to survive.

Maybe I should expand on that thought. Meanwhile, read the rest of Taylor’s post.

More AI skepticism

From a commenter.

If we start from new loans to train the computer, we have no real test until lots of defaults happen. If, as mentioned above, only 2.5% of mortgages default in normal situations, it will take a long time to accumulate more observations than there are variables to look at. The machine can’t test itself until there are hundreds or thousands of defaults to compare, even assuming there was not a special case like a financial crisis that skews the numbers. Our only real hope is that the defaults that do happen occur very quickly in the life of the mortgage, first 3-5 years or so, in which case in a decade we will probably have good amounts of data. I don’t know how long it takes the average mortgage default to happen, so it might work, or it might not.

Defaults do tend to occur early in the life of a mortgage., Over time, there is usually equity buildup due to paydown of principal and rising home values, so that seasoned loans tend to perform well. This was true in 2007 and 2008–loans originated in 2003 or earlier were not prone to default. But the commenter’s points (read the whole thing) are still well taken.

With chess, a database of games is probably very representative of all of the circumstances that the computer is going to encounter. That is not true with mortgage lending.

I read recently that average credit scores are currently the highest they have ever been. Does that mean that making a loan right now is safer than it’s ever been? I doubt it. If conditions are unprecedented, then obviously they cannot be represented in the database.

Russ Roberts’ podcast with Rodney Brooks also elaborates on AI skepticism.

Genes and cognitive ability

Nicholas W. Papageorge and Kevin Thom write,

we utilize a polygenic score (a weighted sum of individual genetic markers) constructed with the results from Okbay et al. (2016) to predict educational attainment. The markers most heavily weighted in this index are implicated in neuronal development and other biological processes that affect brain tissue. We interpret the polygenic score as a measure of one type of endowed ability.

Perhaps a newer version of the paper is here.

The paper finds that gene-environment interaction matters. But I think it is important that we now have a genetic score that can serve as a proxy for IQ. Also, this genetic score affects economic outcomes even when educational attainment is controlled for.

By the way, Robert Plomin’s forthcoming book is on my radar. This review points out the obvious, which is that the book will not be well received.

And also, Tyler Cowen points to this paper, which says that it is liberals who attribute outcomes more to genetic factors.

I can only imagine genetic effects being powerful if you hold constant the cultural context. Suppose it were possible to create reliable polygenic scores for the Big Five personality traits, plus cognitive ability. I can imagine that these scores would be useful in predicting outcomes among a group of American teenagers. But if you were to take a random sample of teenagers around the world and use nothing but these scores to predict long-term outcomes, I cannot imagine that this would work. To carry the thought experiment even further, think in terms of plopping people with identical polygenic scores into different centuries.

Lilliana Mason watch

1. Paul H. P. Hanel, Natalia Zarzeczna, and Geoffrey Haddock write,

We directly compared the variability across moderate-, left-, and right-wing groups. Our findings suggest that the values of more extreme (left-wing or right-wing) supporters are usually more heterogeneous than those with more moderate views. We replicated this finding for politics-related variables such as attitudes toward immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions. We also found that country-level variables (income, religiosity, and parasite stress level) did not moderate the pattern of value variability. Overall, our results suggest that endorsing the same political ideology is not necessarily associated with sharing the same values, especially in the case of common citizens holding extreme political attitudes.

That is from the abstract. I could not find an ungated version of the actual paper. Depending on the exact nature of the analysis, this might confirm the view that polarization is more a matter of hating the other team than it is about substantive differences.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.

In a separate post, he passes along a chart showing that hatred of each party has gone up four-fold since 1980. Stare at the chart. Right now, I don’t think there are nearly as many rabid Republicans or rabid Democrats as there are rabid anti-Democrats and rabid anti-Republicans.

Martin Gurri watch

Tyler Cowen writes,

Possibly the shorter news cycles are also a result of greater general disillusionment with politics and especially with elites, a theme outlined in Martin Gurri’s forthcoming book “The Revolt of the Public.”

Also, Gurri would say that elites have lost control of the news cycle. The top TV networks and newspapers used to be able to tell the public what is “news.” They could keep a story going if they wanted to. Now, people click away from stories that don’t grab them, so everyone in the media has to behave like a troll. It’s easier to do that with a current story than with last week’s story.

Love them out of their cult?

Here is a recent conversation between Dave Rubin and Eric Weinstein. You will find yourself agreeing with some of what they say and disagreeing with some of it.

I did not find Eric persuasive when he compared opening a border to immigrants to allowing a dinner guest to stay in your house forever. I don’t own the land where immigrants reside. They are not my guests to throw out.

I think that we lack the will to enforce immigration law because from an individualistic perspective it feels wrong to do so. When they work for what they get and obey other laws, it’s hard to feel good about throwing them out of the country.

Suppose that we do not think of land in this country as something that we as citizens own collectively. Instead, land is owned by individuals. An immigrant is going to pay rent to an individual landlord. Throwing out that immigrant means that the state breaks a voluntary contract between two individuals, the landlord and the tenant. There may be justifications for doing that, but I don’t think you arrive at those justifications through a metaphor of a guest over-staying.

Eric also said something that was counterintuitive when he said “We need to love them out of their cult.” He supported Bernie Sanders, but he thinks that Sanders has some bad economic ideas. Weinstein says that in general progressives have adopted some bad ideas, but they have good intentions. If we can love their intentions, then perhaps we can coax them away from their bad ideas.

This approach appeals to me. One of my favorite children’s fables is the one about the sun and the wind competing to get a man to take off his coat. The wind blows hard and cold, but that only makes the man pull his coat tighter. The sun bathes the man in warmth, and he removes his coat. I think there is a lesson there for those involved in political conflicts.

But I think that there are complicating factors. Most important, I worry that political anger is fueled by emotional needs, not good intentions. The anger comes from internal demons, a sort of bitterness (self-hatred?) that the individual projects outward.

Suppose that there is a spectrum of personal contentment. At one end of that spectrum there are people who are happy with their lives and comfortable in their skins. They feel gratitude. Many of the conservative and libertarian intellectuals that I regularly follow fit in this category. The folks I know at Reason, at National Review, or in the GMU economics department. At the other end of the spectrum are young men who are so frustrated and angry that they become serial killers.

The politics of anger falls somewhere in between. At the extremes, it might be close to the serial-killer end of the spectrum.

How does anger on the left compare with anger on the right? The following is very speculative.

Think of life contentment as normally distributed, with an upper tail of people who are very grateful and a lower tail of people who are very bitter. Now imagine graphing two distributions of life contentment, one for well-educated, articulate people on the political left and one for well-educated articulate people on the political right. My sense is that while the two distributions would overlap, the distribution of the people on the left would be shifted to the bitter side relative to the people on the right. Again, I am limiting this to the well-educated and articulate.

Getting back to Eric’s idea, my worry is that by the time someone has become bitter and has translated that bitterness into political activism, it is too late to love them out of it. Ideally, one could find a way to prevent or overcome such bitterness in the first place. Failing that, it is important to find a way to channel that bitterness toward areas where it is least destructive. Video games or something.