Following a trail from this comment, I got to a 1973 paper by Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber.
The problems that scientists and engineers have usually focused upon are mostly
“tame” or “benign” ones. . .the mission is clear. It is clear, in turn, whether or not the problems have been solved.
Wicked problems, in contrast, have neither of these clarifying traits; and they include nearly all public policy issues-whether the question concerns the location of a freeway, the adjustment of a tax rate, the modification of school curricula, or the confrontation of crime.
The paper is filled with insights, such as
In the sciences and in fields like mathematics, chess, puzzle-solving or mechanical engineering design, the problem-solver can try various runs without penalty. Whatever his outcome on these individual experimental runs, it doesn’t matter much to the subject-system or to the course of societal affairs. A lost chess game is seldom consequential for other chess games or for non-chess-players.
With wicked planning problems, however, every implemented solution is consequential. It leaves “traces” that cannot be undone. One cannot build a freeway to see how it works, and then easily correct it after unsatisfactory performance. Large public-works are effectively irreversible, and the consequences they generate have long half-lives.
The paper is also notable for the way in which it describes–in 1973–the fallibility of experts relative to technocratic expectations.
Thanks. Definitely I’ll look at this later.
There’s a concept of “hard problems” discussed by Peter Schuck. I’ve provided this citation before but here it is again.
I believe his training is in law. Discussion is restricted to social issues at the national level–so there are no insights but chess or the hard sciences or computation.
The topics he looks at are, or could be considered, “national issues” that are policy related, explicitly or implicitly.
https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691167435/one-nation-undecided
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It’s interesting to see #5, the wicket problem is a “one-shot” operation.
On the topic of “We have just one chance to try to solve this with a project,” I was immediately reminded of urban freeways.
Urban freeways in the USA are a funny thing. In terms of the history of their inception, many of them were built burst, and then at some point the effective launching of new ones mostly just stopped abruptly. Los Angeles would be an exception, but I’m thinking of the ones in the Northeast and the Upper Midwest / Great Lakes.
I am reminded that at some point the World Bank stepped back from financing the construction of large dams.
probably we could put medieval cathedrals in the old Carolingian lands into this class of things that were started in bursts.
My mistake: Schuck’s terminology is that of “hard issues,” consistent with his statement that he is discussing things that are, or might be, “public issues.”
Rev. R.L. Dabney made these points a further 100 years earlier, and, some would argue, more eloquently:
My first introduction to “wicked” problems and “messes” was at Judith Curry’s climate etc blog: https://judithcurry.com/2012/03/11/messes-and-super-wicked-problems/#comments She has used these concepts to persuasive effect over the years in climate discussions. It seems that there is an axis here, though, with a certain school of economics that claims that anyone who doesn’t subscribe to their preferred set of policies is irrational. Tyler Cowen’s blurb on Ryan Murphy’s Markets Against Modernity noting other blurbs by Scott Sumner and Ryan Caplin gives a general flavor of the school which can be summarized as “we know it all, why don’t you shut up and let us run the world.” Acknowledging unknowns seems to be the more pluralist and scientific approach. But I suppose if the Know-it-All’s were ever to make a persuasive argument for a policy it would be worth the time to listen.
I think you are uncharitable (unfair?) toward Ryan Murphy’s Markets Against Modernity. There certainly is a fair amount of “you’re wrong; we’re right” in it but a lot of that is justified (e.g., most vaccines really are safe and effective).
The argument of the book is that the way our brains are structured often leads to misunderstanding the world and/or making bad decisions. How and in what situations that is true is a tremendously important question that has led to a lot of interesting research and a lot of conflict (e.g., Daniel Kahneman v. Gerd Gigerenzer).
Rittell and Webber touch on a subject about which I have some first-hand knowledge, which is defense planning. I was involved in various aspects of it from 1963 to 1997, as a civilian analyst and manager in a government-sponsored think-tank and as a “whiz kid” in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I learned, fairly early in my career, that defense planning — despite the pretensions of “scientific” analysis that attend it — is a wicked problem. One of my assessments of “scientific” analysis can be found here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/18XxAX8OPqRcFEd1lk_wUbM1uo9Eu2ehq/view?usp=sharing
With respect to urban freeways, my own city of Ann Arbor is one of the few medium sized cities in the region that has no urban freeway or even large, arterial roads cutting through the city. One was planned in the late 60s but I understand local opposition managed to kill it. The difference in the feel and livability of the downtown is palpable. Some of the other cities afflicted by these monstrosities should really tear them out (a few have done so, but not many)
Jane Jacobs was very right in stopping the construction of unneeded urban highways in New York City. She was also very wrong in applying the same principle in Toronto which resulted in a much needed highway ending prematurely and causing permanent traffic havoc. Like most things, thoughtful balance is often the key. The gentrified residents of a University town may appreciate the aesthetics of being highway free but I don’t think it is a good general policy for a small city without an established University and it is a suicidal policy for a large city with a diversified economy.