From Pew, which says
We call this a canvassing because it is not a representative, randomized survey. Its findings emerge from an “opt in” invitation to experts who have been identified by researching those who are widely quoted as technology builders and analysts and those who have made insightful predictions to our previous queries about the future of the Internet.
Respondents gave their answers to the following prompts:
The economic impact of robotic advances and AI: Self-driving cars, intelligent digital agents that can act for you, and robots are advancing rapidly. Will networked, automated, artificial intelligence (AI) applications and robotic devices have displaced more jobs than they have created by 2025?
Please elaborate on your answer: Describe your expectation about the degree to which robots, digital agents, and AI tools will have disrupted white-collar and blue-collar jobs by 2025 and the social consequences that will emerge from that.
Bonus question: To what degree will AI and robotics be parts of the ordinary landscape of the general population by 2025? Describe which parts of life will change the most as these tools advance and which parts of life will remain relatively unchanged.
Here is how I would have answered (note the PSST slant):
1. In a market economy, trade takes place in order to gain from specialization and comparative advantage.
2. There are always such gains to be had, so in principle everyone can always participate in the market economy. In a frictionless economy, meaning that all adjustment to change takes place immediately and costlessly, everyone would do at least some market work.
3. In practice, the economy is not frictionless. One of the big frictions is that market work is taxed, whereas non-market work is not taxed. Among those who face the highest tax rates for market work are poor households who receive subsidies that disappear rapidly as income rises. This is not to say that the subsidies are bad policy (although in my opinion they are very poorly designed) but simply to report the fact.
4. Another source of friction might be termed discovery-process friction. Sustainable patterns of specialization and comparative advantage are only revealed gradually, through a trial-and-error process of new ventures launched and old ventures shut down.
5. Holding the discovery process and other frictions constant, more rapid technological change may lead to higher rates of unemployment, on average. With more rapid technological change, the economy is likely to spend more time out of adjustment than in a state of near-full employment.
6. Looking ahead, I would not rule out technological changes that help to improve the discovery process and thus reduce economic friction. For example, it might be the case that as more business data is collected and analyzed in real time, entrepreneurs will become more accurate in choosing profitable business opportunities and avoiding unprofitable ones.
7. However, I would not rule out the possibility that government policy will become increasingly dysfunctional and thus increase economic friction.
8. I think that the more fundamental question is to what extent valuable skills and capital in the economy will tend to become highly concentrated among a small elite rather than dispersed. I certainly think that this is one scenario. Thus, even though everyone may participate in the market economy, some of us could be Vickies and some of us could be Thetes.
9. Which brings me to my answer to the bonus question. I would suggest that Neal Stephenson’s The Diamond Age is more insightful than any science fiction that I might write.
2025 is just not very far off. The average age of a car in the U.S. is now up to 11 1/2 years (and growing), so the average aged car of 2025 has already been on the road for a year or two. I think those who envision widespread use of self-driving cars by then are fooling themselves. Google, in fact, seems to switching from focusing on self-driving cars, to cute, slow-moving, non-threatening self-driving buggies (apparently intended mostly for the mobility impaired):
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/527756/lazy-humans-shaped-googles-new-autonomous-car/
I’m just not sure where all the fresh robotics/AI optimism is coming from. Siri et all have been around for several years, and the technology has not been an unqualified success nor has it advanced rapidly following its introduction. It’s just a phone feature that most people don’t find that useful and don’t bother with most of the time. And robots? How many NEW niches have robots entered in the past decade? Nothing’s coming to mind. I’m sure the factory robots of 2014 are better than those of 2004, but that’s just incremental. The Roomba was introduced in 2002, hasn’t changed that much since, and isn’t all that popular relative to the size of the vacuum market. I think Stephenson’s future of matter-compilers and microbot swarms is considerably farther off than 2025.