The case for PSST

If you listen to Raj Chetty at Princeton, one implication is that the economy is not well described as a GDP factory. Most of the talk is about heterogeneities in the economy. Affluent consumers behave differently from low-income consumers. Small service businesses were impacted differently from other firms. And above all, the patterns of specialization and trade that were broken are not likely to come back quickly.

As a result, the “stimulus” largely missed its target. In order to be able to see this, Chetty and his collaborators are using new data sources, rather than the standard government statistics that were designed for the Keynesian paradigm.

But to make the most sense of what he finds, it helps to read Economics after the Virus, my latest essay. I had already anticipated most of Chetty’s empirical results when I wrote,

In a typical recession, households reduce spending involuntarily, since they have lost income. In this case, household members have deliberately chosen not to shop or travel or seek entertainment outside their homes, even if they can afford to do so. . .In a typical recession, construction and durable-goods manufacturing experience the sharpest declines, while service industries stay relatively stable. In this case, in-person services have been among the hardest hit sectors of the economy. In a typical recession, nearly every industry can look past the immediate troubles and foresee something close to a return to normal. In this case, retail stores, restaurants, entertainment venues, institutions of higher education, hotels, and the like foresee drastic changes even if the economy were to revive rapidly.

It is one of my most important essays. Academic economists, including Chetty, should be reading it in something like the American Economic Review, in order to have perspective on Chetty’s findings. But the PSST story is too “soft” to sell to an academic journal. George Akerlof explains the methodological bias.

it has become all-but-uncontestable that new theories need to generate testable predictions. This belief may seem innocuous; but, in point of fact, it involves rejecting softer tests of theories, such as those that evaluate models based upon the quality of their assumptions as well as the quality of their conclusions. It especially entails exclusion of evidence from case studies, whose detailed evidence can be highly informative regarding context and motivation. While harder tests with statistical data may be a gold standard, restricting the set of permissible tests reduces—perhaps greatly—the ability to test theories. Hence, bias toward the hard makes us too accepting of existing theory and insufficiently willing to be self-critical as a profession.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.

Economic scenarios

Here is how I think about economic prospects for the next few years.

One driver will be fear of the virus. Fear will be short-lived if the virus goes away this summer and does not come back, or if there is a vaccine, or if a treatment protocol makes it much less lethal in vulnerable populations. But if the virus comes back in the fall and still threatens lives, then fear of the virus will affect activities for a long time.

Another driver will be what we might call business shakeout. Some industries have been ripe for transformation by the Internet since before the virus: brick-and-mortar retail; higher education; high-cost health care. To what extent will the virus accelerate this shakeout?

Put these possibilities into a matrix.

light shakeout heavy shakeout
fear fades Europe’s hope stock market’s hope
fear lasts stagnation unrest

Europe has a low tolerance for shakeouts. Its policies are geared toward that. European governments tend to channel transfer payments through employers. So you have zombie companies paying zombie workers.

The stock market is expecting a lot of shakeout. The tech leaders are worth more now than they were before the virus. But if virus fears persist, economic activity overall will take a long time to recover, and the tech giants will be getting a larger share of a small pie. The stock market must be expecting the fear to fade even as the big shakeout takes place.

I think that there is at least a 25 percent chance that virus fears persist and continue to curtail economic activity. In that case, the European approach, which the U.S. also may attempt, will be to try to freeze the economy in place by subsidizing legacy businesses. The result will be stagnation. But if governments do not have the money or the capability to keep zombie businesses going in a high-fear environment, then the shakeout will destroy the way of life for many households. That is a recipe for a lot of social turmoil.

Accounting for stimulus checks

Scott Sumner writes,

April saw by far the largest increase in personal income ever seen in America. That’s not normal for a month that is likely to end up being the absolute trough of the 2020 depression. And saying it’s “not normal” during a depression is an epic understatement.

In freshman macroeconomics, the letter Y often is used to stand for GDP and for national income, interchangeably. In the national income accounts, they are arrived at separately. Nominal GDP is measured as the purchases of goods and services at market prices. Nominal income is the payments received by workers and investors. Any difference between these two measured is labeled as a statistical discrepancy.

Personal income includes transfer payments, which are checks written by the government–Social Security, or unemployment compensation, or this year’s stimulus checks. Transfer payments are not part of national income, because they are not earned from the sale of goods and services. If you counted transfer payments in national income, the “statistical discrepancy” would get out of hand.

All of these flows are measured at annual rates. If you get a $1000 stimulus check in April, then at an annual rate that is $12,000. And some of us did not even get our checks until May. So the second quarter (April, May, and June) is going to see a whopping increase in personal income.

Some households will spend their stimulus checks right away, but many households will not. There’s only so much spending you can do with all the stores closed. In the national income accounts, there will be a big increase in personal savings. This will not be matched by investment; instead it will be matched by government dis-saving, a larger government deficit.

Suppose that households were to spend all of their income in the second quarter. Meanwhile, 20 percent are unemployed, so output should be down by a lot. Nominal spending up and real output down means that prices have to rise.

As I see it, the price rise was delayed by the fact that households did a lot of saving. Eventually, as they spend their stimulus checks, we will see the impact on prices.

Consider an extreme case. Suppose that textbook Y is $1. That is, we produce $1 of output and receive $1 in income. Next, the government writes a total of $99 in stimulus checks to households. Now households have $100 in personal income, and the government has a $99 deficit. When households spend their $100 on the output, the price of output will go up. Income will also go up, which means people can spend still more. The process only stops when the government engages in saving by running a surplus. That surplus cuts into personal income, reducing spending.

Some outlandish long-term virus predictions

I don’t want to post much about the virus. Maybe once a month, taking a more long-term perspective. Take these predictions not as “I believe these are highly probable” but instead as “I find these less improbable than others are currently seeing them.”

1. We will find that regional differences in the impact of the virus depend very little on differences in government interventions. We will down-rate the importance of lockdowns or track-and-trace. Instead, we will up-rate genetic differences and lifestyle differences that affect the immune system in general (take this WSJ essay as a portent). The significance of vitamin D will receive more attention. In addition, we may find that someone’s previous exposure to other viruses affects the immune response to this virus, so that the history of other viruses in a population matters. Sunlight and/or temperature may prove to be important factors affecting the severity of the virus. Finally, we may find that some of the regional variation is due to different mixes of virus strains that prevail in different areas.

2. We will quietly give up on a vaccine. Instead, the focus will shift toward general enhancement of our immune systems. Also, there will be strong social shaming of people who fail to self-isolate when they have fever or other symptoms of illness. The common cold will be as unwelcome in public as leprosy or measles.

3. In years to come, tourism will be highest in the summer months of the country visited. The conventional wisdom will be that you visit Brazil only in January-February, and you visit Italy only in July-August. Even if this virus is no longer salient, people will carry with them a generic perception that you incur health risk if you visit a place during the “unsafe season.”

4. Ventilators will be mothballed. Instead, the treatment of choice for severe cases of the virus will be antiviral cocktails.

5. Student life at colleges this fall will be heavily regulated, to the point where the on-campus experience feels hardly more interesting than staying at home. Among students, deaths from the virus will be much rarer than deaths of despair (suicide will be higher than normal), but where virus deaths do occur the institutions will be forced to close temporarily, and in some instances permanently.

6. In the early fall, the media will be filled with stories, including many false alarms, about a second wave of the virus, particularly in Red states. A realistic picture will emerge only after the election.

7. Florida may do worse in the summer than in the winter, because summer is the season where Floridians spend all day inside.

Signing off

I am demoralized. It occurred to me the movie we’re in.

Fauci plays Big Nurse.

Who plays Randle McMurphy? Trump? Rand Paul? Elon Musk?

Doesn’t matter. The ending is brutal. You don’t want to watch.

I’ll be spending my time outdoors. Not on the computer.

General update, May 12

1. Christian Gollier writes,

In this paper, I suppose that herd immunity is the exit door from the pandemic. In the absence of a vaccine, attaining herd immunity requires to expose a fraction of the population to the virus, and to recognize that some people in this targeted population will die. Determining who should be exposed to the virus to attain the herd immunity is a crucial policy issue. . .Some individual characteristics such as the age or the existence of co-morbidity have been shown to have a huge influence on the lethality of the SARS-Cov-2. For example, Ferguson et al. (2020) report that the covid infection-fatality ratio is 0.002% for individuals less than 10 years old, and 9.3% for people aged 80 years and more. Given this 4650-fold difference in mortality risk, it may be desirable to expose less vulnerable people first in the hope of building the herd immunity before relaxing the protection of the more vulnerable people.

Pointer from the diligent John Alcorn. What is your guess as to when the lockdown debate gets shifted toward these terms?

2. Philipp Kircher and others write,

When the young engage in more risky behavior, they reduce the time until herd immunity is reached. The young then take a larger share in the infections needed for herd immunity, which is amplified if the old can shield themselves for short periods by voluntarily engaging in stronger social distancing.

Our calibrated benchmark indicates that the positive externality is indeed present in the absence of a vaccine/cure. This can limit and sometimes negate the effects policies such as temporary shelter-at-home policies. It also indicates that its strength is limited, as it is quickly overpowered through other channels, for example in extensions with scarce hospital beds which the risk-taking young exhaust through their behavior. The interactions by age indicate that it is an important margin to consider, that the effects are not trivial, and that age-specific policies might be warranted.

Another point from JA, and another example of where I think the debate needs to shift. Of course, I should not that this paper uses a simulation model, which I don’t think adds value to the discussion.

3. Daniel Klein and others defend Sweden.

Swedish authorities have not officially declared a goal of reaching herd immunity, which most scientists believe is achieved when more than 60 percent of the population has had the virus. But augmenting immunity is no doubt part of the government’s broader strategy—or at least a likely consequence of keeping schools, restaurants, and most businesses open. Anders Tegnell, the chief epidemiologist at Sweden’s Public Health Agency, has projected that the city of Stockholm could reach herd immunity as early as this month. Based on updated behavioral assumptions (social-distancing norms are changing how Swedes behave), the Stockholm University mathematician Tom Britton has calculated that 40 percent immunity in the capital could be enough to stop the virus’s spread there and that this could happen by mid-June.

We could frame the “opener” vs. “closer” debate this way: openers wish to achieve herd immunity sooner rather than later, while closers wish to achieve it later rather than sooner.

Herd immunity is costly to achieve, in that some people will get sick and die in the process. Closers believe that we should not be trying to hasten to get to herd immunity, presumably because there is an alternative endgame that can be achieved within a reasonable time frame. As one commenter put it,

Which strategy we should pursue depends upon our wild-assed guess as to whether a vaccine or significantly better treatment will appear before civilization ends in economic ruin.