Loss of libertarian focus

Ross Douthat has a column on the way ideology influenced pundits’ reactions to the virus crisis.

Along with infectious-disease specialists, the people who seemed most alarmed by the virus included the inhabitants of Weird Right-Wing Twitter (a collection of mordant, mostly anonymous accounts interested in civilizational decline), various Silicon Valley eccentrics, plus original-MAGA figures like Mike Cernovich and Steve Bannon. . .

Meanwhile, liberal officialdom and its media appendages were more likely to play down the threat, out of fear of giving aid and comfort to sinophobia or populism. This period was the high-water mark of “it’s just the flu” reassurances in liberal outlets, of pious critiques of Donald Trump’s travel restrictions, of deceptive public-health propaganda about how masks don’t work, of lectures from the head of the World Health Organization about how “the greatest enemy we face is not the virus itself; it’s the stigma that turns us against each other.”

. . .The fact that the virus seemed poised to help Democrats and hurt the Trump administration, the fact that it was being hyped by CNN and played down by Hannity, the fact that Trump himself declined to take it seriously — all of this mattered more to many Republicans than the fear of foreign contamination that the virus theoretically should have activated

As you might remember, my wife and I started our stay-at-home policy on March 12. So I was hardly the first person to take the virus seriously, but I was ahead of many people, especially elected officials. At that point, I did not have an ideological axe to grind.

On March 21, when I wrote my virus economics FAQ, I was trying to explain why the virus crisis posed a problem for individualism. That is, many people would tend to want to go out and not take into account the risk that they could infect others.

In the last several days, I have become less receptive to what government is doing. I remain committed to taking the virus seriously. But I have very low confidence in the health “experts.” Instead, of carefully experimenting and learning, they are flailing–“tampering,” as quality control guru W. Edwards Deming used to refer to it. And my confidence in mainstream macroeconomists and their remedies, which was never high before the crisis, is even lower now.

I would like to see an effective libertarian opposition to current policies. But that is difficult for me to jump-start, in part because some libertarians seem committed to a version of virus denialism that I do not share. Meanwhile, others on the right (I hesitate to call them libertarians) seem to be driven primarily by pro-Trump (or anti-Democrat) partisanship. Rather than fight the “stimulus,” they spent their energy denouncing Speaker Pelosi for temporarily obstructing it.

The number of mouths trying to get attention exceeds the capacity of available ears. As another libertarian pointed out to me, even the presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee has trouble getting noticed these days.

The EMH in view of the crisis

Question from a reader:

I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts about what we should conclude about the efficient markets hypothesis based on the recent events.

I’ve always been convinced in the truth of (semi-strong) EMH and handled my finances accordingly. However, my conviction was greatly shaken by the recent events. It seems clear that in the weeks preceding the financial crash earlier this month, the markets had completely ignored the evidence of the coming COVID-19 pandemic and the shock it would cause.

One month ago, on March 1, I sent the following to family members.

Folks,
Here are my thoughts on the stock market. Basically, I think that there is a chance that it could fall much further, and my own reaction will be to sell some stock market mutual fund shares and park them in a money market fund for a while. You might want to look into doing that with some of the stock market mutual funds you have in retirement accounts–shift them from stock mutual funds to money market funds, still within the retirement account family. No tax implications from doing so.

My thinking is that with the coronavirus, the number of shutdowns and travel restrictions is going to increase. The economic adversity this is likely to cause is not something that can be mitigated by the Fed, even though some people seem to attribute magical powers to the Fed..

If I thought that people would get over the initial panic and get back to normal soon, I would not be so pessimistic. But my guess is that instead the panic will get worse. even if the virus itself were to turn out to be a non-event. Hence, the economic consequences of the reductions in trade, travel, and tourism will still be quite severe.

My $.02

This was very unusual for me. I cannot remember ever offering market timing advice before. Incidentally, the first big market move after I sent this was the huge “Biden rally.” So for a couple days I looked pretty bad.

My general view of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is that I don’t believe it, but I act as if it is true. I treat the market as ignorant, so I do not interpret stock market movements as if they forecast the economic outlook. But I figure I am at least equally ignorant, so I almost never try to outguess the market.

If we are back to me being equally ignorant, then it probably would make sense to get back in. But I have such a negative view of the stimulus compared to the Wall Street view that I am willing to wait a while for proof that I am the one who is stupid.

On a somewhat related note, some angry commenters asked me where I am putting my wealth in light of my post on the inflation virus, with which they vehemently disagreed. I am glad that so many people refuse to believe the inflation scenario, because that gives me more time to think about it. The hard assets that I might want to buy are going to remain cheap for a while.

I know that there are inflation-indexed Treasury securities (TIPS), and they may turn out to be the best choice, but I am not sure. Remember, what I foresee is a scenario in which the government is printing money as a last-ditch desperate attempt to pay its bills. Owning the debt instruments of a government in such dire straits does not strike me as risk-free.

Citizens’ Daily Briefing

I have reached the point where I am afraid that we are permanently losing our way of life. When government obtains new powers in a crisis, it does not relinquish them. When the Fed is going to have power to control more capital than all of the bank loans and corporate bonds combined, that is going to make the American economy like the Chinese economy, where the government also acts as the central source of credit. On the fiscal front, we may never again see Federal government is taking on a share of the economy not seen since World War II, starting from a higher debt level than we ended the war with, and with no thought whatsoever of future fiscal austerity.

I disagree with the elite consensus in two ways. First, I do not think that we should rely so heavily on the stay-at-home strategy and we ought to at least in some region try the masks-and-scarves strategy. Second, I think that the “stimulus” is misguided. At the very least, the government should have a plan to undo the increase in debt and a plan to unwind the huge Fed balance sheet.

If we are going to get off this disastrous course, people who agree with me will have to be heard. My thought is to try to start some sort of discussion about how to do this.

President Trump and his virus task force seem to give daily briefings. I would like to see citizens get together, say on Zoom, to give their own briefings. Call this idea Citizens’ Daily Briefings.

My dream is that eventually every day there would be several thousand different online meetings, each with a few dozen participants, discussing these issues and coming up with ways to pressure the elites to change course. You can think of this as a modern version of Committees of Correspondence.

I would like to hear comments from anyone who would like to see this idea work. I know what I am proposing is difficult to execute and likely to fail. It may not be desirable to try. But I don’t need to hear any of that. Negative, hostile, and snarky comments are not welcome. If you don’t buy into the spirit of the idea, just keep silent.

UPDATE: at 6:30 pm eastern time today, March 31. Meeting id 824-584-0623. Going to try a Zoom meeting. A learning experience.

Repeal the CARES act

Amit Seru and Luigi Zingales write,

The need to help individuals and small firms has provided cover to the largest corporate subsidy program in U.S. history. Under intense pressure from lobbyists, the Cares Act allocates $510 billion to support loans for large businesses. A small chunk of this money ($56 billion) will be used directly by the Treasury to grant loans to airlines and other “strategic” firms (read: Boeing). The Treasury will then confer the rest ($454 billion) to the Federal Reserve to absorb losses the Fed might incur in lending to firms in the private sector.

The expectation is that the central bank will leverage this money 10 to 1, enabling it to lend up to $4.54 trillion to companies. That sum is more than all U.S. commercial and industrial loans outstanding at the end of 2019 ($2.35 trillion) plus all the new corporate bonds issued during 2019 ($1.41 trillion). Thus, if this capital is all deployed by the Fed, and at rates that will surely crowd out private capital, all capital allocation in the U.S. in 2020 will be done by the Federal Reserve System, not by the capital market.

Their recommendation is for more transparency and oversight. Really? Our country has switched to an economic system somewhere to the left of Bernie and barely to the right of Lenin, and you would be satisfied with transparency and oversight?

I applaud Seru and Zingales for coming forward to point out the radicalism in the CARES act. But it requires a more radical response.

Today’s spending, tomorrow’s taxes?

A commenter asks,

With plan B the taxes happen sooner. With plan K the taxes happen later. We will scramble to produce output to pay those taxes later so the difference between B and K is just the timing of taxes. Apparently you don’t agree so I’m asking why?

Because no one will vote for the necessary tax increases. Look, they could do it now if they wanted to. They are spending 50 percent more in 2020 than they did last year. They could enact tax increases to go into effect in 2021 and later to pay for that spending. But they won’t. That’s even assuming that an increase in tax rates would actually work to increase revenues, which is no sure thing.

After World War II, we restored fiscal health with economic growth and Dwight Eisenhower. Economic growth meant that even though tax rates were not increased to pay off the debt, tax revenues went up.

Because we were willing to cut government spending from its wartime levels, and because Eisenhower had old-fashioned values about fiscal responsibility, for more than a decade we ran what economists call primary surpluses. The primary surplus is the government deficit if you do not include interest payments. If interest payments are $50 and the deficit $80 $20 (good catch by a commenter0, then the primary surplus is $30. If you keep running a primary surplus long enough, the interest payments keep falling until you no longer have a deficit. It’s like if you keep paying off some of the principal on your credit card, eventually you get out of debt.

But in case you haven’t noticed, Dwight Eisenhower is no longer President. We aren’t running primary surpluses, and we are not going to. We had some nice economic growth in the 1990s, and it took a while for Washington politicians to catch on, so the fiscal situation improved for a couple years. We had some slow economic growth from 2011-2019, and even though the Obama and Trump Administrations outspent the resulting increases in tax revenues, the Federal debt increased only gradually.

And now we have that 50 percent increase in spending. With more to come, probably. And no tax increases.

10 percent of GDP here, 10 percent of GDP there, and soon you are talking about real money. Of course I could turn out to be wrong, but I think this time we will catch the inflation virus.

AEI paper on virus containment policy

Written by Scott Gottlieb and others. They call it a road map to reopening, and it includes various benchmarks and milestones that might be used in deciding when to lighten up on the shut-downs. Pointer from Yuval Levin.

My main quibble with it is that I think that we should at least try a “masks and scarves” strategy in one city and compare it with the “shut down the economy” strategy in a comparable city. Although the report recommends using masks or face-covering fabric, it does not consider that this might substitute for strangling local economies.

[UPDATE: You want to object, “We can’t experiment with people’s lives in a crisis!” My response is that we are doing exactly that. We are experimenting with various lockdown policies, but not in a way that allows us to learn from the results. ]

For the future, the report recommends,

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious gaps in our nation’s pandemic preparedness. COVID-19 will not be the last public-health emergency to threaten American society. We must invest in the scientific, public-health, and medical infrastructure needed to prevent, detect, and respond to the next infectious disease threat.

. . .We need to move away from a decentralized system that promotes unequal implementation of preparedness measures across the nation and toward more coordinated execution of response. . .Preparedness for public-health emergencies should be elevated as a function in the White House, with a coordinating function analogous to the director of national intelligence.

I fear that this is exactly what will happen. But it embodies a form of the Nirvana Fallacy, in which a big spending spree and consolidating power in a central agency are presumed to work. Some points to consider:

1. We already have a CDC, and it failed at its One Job. It may have done more harm than good, by trying to monopolize testing and by recommending against people wearing masks.

2. After 9/11, we created the TSA. Do we think that was cost effective? Remember to include the lost time for passengers. Plus the inconvenience and the effort it takes to implement workarounds for the restrictions on liquids.

We are in a Robert Higgs Crisis and Leviathan moment. Government officials always say in a crisis “We need more power.” They never relinquish it. Look at where the Fed’s balance sheet stood ten years after the “emergency” of 2008. It had not even come close to shrinking back toward its pre-crisis level. And now, of course, it will grow by another order of magnitude.

We have increased government spending by roughly 50 percent over last year. What do we expect to happen in 2021?

a) We go back to the old baseline level of spending.

b) We cut spending below the old baseline, as part of the process of restoring fiscal health.

c) We continued to spend about 50 percent more than the old baseline.

You and I both know that the answer is (c). Keynesians will be warning us that any “cuts” in spending will cause a recession. And politicians, having increased their ability to conspicuously bestow funds on various constituents, will not relinquish their enhanced control over resources.

Thoughts on heterogeneity

Tyler Cowen asks why numbers imply spread rates and death rates that are so difficult to reconcile across regions and countries.

People are feeding their elegant dashboards, nifty charts, and fancy computer models with worthless numbers. Nobody seems to want to listen to me on that. But it would not surprise me to find that all of the heterogeneity that cannot be explained by demographics and differences in treatment quality is simply an artifact of the way that numbers are collected.

Only fools claim to know precisely the true spread rates or the true death rates. We don’t even have decent ballpark estimates.

If we were to obtain data that were good enough to infer true spread rates and death rates, and these rates turn out to differ greatly across regions, then I would speculate on a combination of two factors. First, different variants of the virus, which spread and kill at different rates. Second, a highly skewed spreading phenomenon. That is, instead of every infected person proceeding to infect exactly 2.2 other people, you have a few infected persons infecting dozens of others, and most infected people infecting no one else. Put those two factors together, and you will get heterogeneity. But I emphasize that this is purely speculative. Don’t take this idea and run with it. Stop guessing. Get some facts first.

I wish someone at the CDC would take and run with the idea of obtaining scientific data, rather than guessing using the numbers that are being collected. In a scientific study, the investigator chooses who gets tested for the virus, and when the tests are conducted. The study uses the same type of test kit on every subject, preferably a test kit with a low rate of false positives and false negatives. Tests are conducted by carefully trained workers who follow very standard procedures. Before we test a large sample of people, we administer two tests to 100 people and count the number of times that we get different results on the two tests. If it is large, then we need to figure out how many tests we need to do on one person to get a reliable result.

Of the many problems with numbers as collected and reported, consider the issue of time lag. Suppose that two regions each test 1000 infected people on day 1. Region A reads and records the results a few hours later. Region B reads and records the results a week later. Suppose that the one-week spread rate is 100 percent per week, and each region then tests 1000 new infected people. Suppose that the death rate is 1 percent, and death occurs near the end of the week.

After day 8, each region has 2000 cases and 10 deaths. But region A, which reads the results quickly, will report that cases are doubling weekly and the death rate is 10/2000, or 0.5 percent. Region B, which reads the results slowly, will still report 1,000 cases, with a death rate of 1.0 percent.

Another problem is that there is very large variation in the ratio of tests to infected people, not only across regions but over time within a region. As you ramp up testing, you increase the reported spread rate and lower the reported death rate.

Almost all health agencies have chosen not to monitor this crisis scientifically. I wish I could change that.

A sense of relief

We have been living through tense times. But the legislation that President Trump signed on Friday should make us feel better.

Economists overwhelmingly agree that we needed this dose of fiscal medicine, and probably more, to treat individuals and businesses that are suffering and to minimize the potential for their troubles to spread. Rising to the occasion, Congress put aside its polarized politics and passed the bill. The press, which has been harshly critical of the Administration for its tardy and often ineffectual actions in dealing with the virus, is much more on board with these economic measures. We are seeing America come together to take constructive measures in a crisis.

If you are like most people, the passage of this legislation eased some of your anxiety. Government is doing something, and it’s going to help. You are experiencing a sense of relief.

And you should not read the rest of this post. Continue reading

The inflation virus

Michael Mandel writes,

In the short run, the sheer disruption of the sudden lockdown advocated by the health experts is going to send both demand and prices plunging. . .

But then, like a tsunami wave, trillions of dollars of Federal Reserve funding and Treasury payments to individuals and businesses will finally come roaring onto shore. Demand should soar for all sorts of goods and services that the global economy is too disrupted to provide in quantity. The most likely outcome: A new era of rising prices like we have not seen since the 1970s.

My thoughts:

1. Right now, we are laughing at the people hoarding toilet paper. But wait a few years. When toilet paper is $50 a roll, we’ll see who’s laughing.

2. The “stimulus” is injecting new money and money-substitutes (I’ll just say “money” from now on) in the economy amounting to 20% of GDP. Since GDP isn’t going up, that is 20 percent more money chasing the same amount of goods. So prices ought to rise by 20 percent at some point.

3, But it doesn’t stop there. Inflation is a social and psychological phenomenon. At some point, people lose the belief that money and government securities are a store of value, because their value is eroding quickly. When that psychology kicks in, what do you do? You try to get rid of financial assets as fast as you can and buy toilet paper. By which I mean all kinds of stuff.

4. When everybody tries to trade financial assets for stuff, what happens? The price of stuff goes up. In other words, the fear of inflation becomes self-fulfilling, causing more inflation. In monetary jargon, the velocity of money goes up.

5. Supposedly the Fed will know how to stop the inflation virus before it causes much damage. But viruses seem to have a way of eluding the government agencies that are supposed to stop them.

Have a nice day.

My idea in the Wall Street Journal

Far and away the best policy solution I’ve seen to the economic hardships created by our response to the Covid-19 pandemic is a proposal by economist Arnold Kling.

That is Tom Giovanetti, of the Institute for Policy Innovation. He continues with an excellent write-up of the credit-line proposal and its rationale.

UPDATE: Following a trail from Tyler Cowen, I got to this post by Miles Kimball.

Instead of mailing $1000 check to each person as is being discussed, mail each adult a government credit card with a $5000 line of credit. Mail similar government credit cards with lines of credit that are a certain percentage of previous revenue to small businesses that would be most strongly affected by the coronavirus.

He wrote that on March 19. So I think he had the idea before I did.