Category Archives: Monetary Economics

Michael Woodford on QE

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He says,

I think the point is a fairly simple one, and it has to do with the question of why the central bank purchases should be able to move the market price anyway, which, again, people thought was kind of obvious. They said if you’re buying more of something, surely that will tend to make it more expensive. But when you ask whether that should actually happen with a lot of sophisticated traders out there in the market that are also trading against the central bank, what we argue is that if the other traders in the economy aren’t constrained in the financing they can mobilize to take the positions that make sense for them, they will tend to automatically have an incentive to trade against the central bank and to neutralize then the effects of the central bank’s trades.

The case where that won’t happen is if the people who would have an incentive to trade against the central bank are financially constrained. In particular, if people who would wish to shift out of the particular kind of assets that the central bank is buying aren’t able to reduce their exposure to those kinds of risks as much as they would like to, you can have the market valuation changing.

But what may very well be happening is then you’re forcing, in fact, parts of the economy to bear types of risk that they don’t want to. You’re pushing them more tightly against their financial constraints and saying that that’s a victory because you’re changing market prices. You’re doing something, but you have to ask whether you’re doing something that’s making the financial markets function more the way you want them to, or making financial constraints have even more perverse effects because they’re constraining people even more.

Pointer from Alex Tabarrok.

Woodford’s conclusion is very anti-Sumnerian when it comes to monetary offset.

I wish the Fed were speaking more about the need for fiscal policy to take on more of the burden of trying to get the economy moving. I’m afraid that, to some extent, the Fed’s desire to stress the fact that we still have tools, we haven’t used all of our ammunition, has had unfortunate effects. Of course, the intention of that is to reassure the public. The feeling is that letting people be scared that maybe we’re out of ideas would itself create uncertainty about the future that would be undesirable for the economy. And that’s understandable. But I worry that it’s had the undesirable effect of letting Congress off the hook a little too easily by letting them say, “The Fed still has lots of things they can do to take care of the situation, so we can play other games.” And I think maybe the Fed would have helped the public debate if it had pushed back a little more on the view that everybody should be assuming the Fed will save everything.

I am sympathetic with Woodford’s skepticism of monetary policy, but I am at least as skeptical of fiscal policy.

The Era of Mood Affiliation

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Menzie Chinn, who may or may not endorse the content, offers a guest post by Alex Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, David Papell and Ruxandra Prodan. They write,

How does this relate to the proposed legislation? Our evidence that, regardless of the policy rule or the loss function, economic performance in rules-based eras is always better than economic performance in discretionary eras supports the concept of a Directive Policy Rule chosen by the Fed. But our results go further. The original Taylor rule provides the strongest delineation between rules-based and discretionary eras, making it, at least according to our metric and class of policy rules, the best choice for the Reference Policy Rule.

In the current political climate, the proposed legislation will inevitably be interpreted in partisan terms because it was introduced in the House Financial Services Committee by two Republican Congressman. Not surprisingly, the first reporting on the legislation by Reuters was entirely political. This is both unfortunate and misleading. We divided our rules-based and discretionary eras with the original Taylor rule between Republican and Democratic Presidents. If we delete the Volcker disinflationary period, out of the 94 quarters with Republican Presidents, 54 were rules-based and 40 were discretionary while, among the 81 quarters with Democratic Presidents, 46 were rules-based and 35 were discretionary. Remarkably, monetary policy over the past 50 years has been rules-based 57 percent of the time and discretionary 43 percent of the time under both Democratic and Republican Presidents. Choosing the original Taylor rule as the Reference Policy Rule is neither a Democratic nor a Republican proposal. It is simply good policy.

I would take the empirical work with a grain of salt. Imagine that monetary policy has no effect whatsoever. Then the Fed may be more likely to appear to be following a Taylor rule when the economy performs well than when it performs poorly.

(Tyler Cowen comments tersely on the post, “not my view.” See Nick Rowe as well.)

But the larger point is that the authors correctly guess that the reaction to the legislation will be based on mood affiliation rather than substance. See my earlier post.

The other recent example suggesting that we are in an era of mood affiliation is the Ex-Im bank.

Polling Economists on Monetary Policy Rules

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The IGM forum asks economists whether or not they agree with the following:

Legislation introduced in Congress would require the Federal Reserve to “submit to the appropriate congressional committees…a Directive Policy Rule”, which shall “describe the strategy or rule of the Federal Open Market Committee for the systematic quantitative adjustment of the Policy Instrument Target to respond to a change in the Intermediate Policy Inputs.” Should the Fed deviate from the rule, the Fed Chair would have to “testify before the appropriate congressional committees as to why the [rule]…is not in compliance.” Enacting this provision would improve monetary policy outcomes in the U.S.

All economists who answered the poll said that they disagreed (a few were “uncertain”), most of them strongly. My comments:

1. The responses are mostly based on liking Bernanke and Yellen while disliking Congress. For example, Robert Shimer writes,

Under current Fed leadership, the statement is likely to be false. Under future leadership, accountability might be justifiable.

Richard Thaler (co-author of Nudge) writes,

I can’t think of any agency in government that would work better with greater supervision from Congress

2. John Taylor testified in favor of the legislation. He was not among those responding to the poll.

3. Robert Hall, saying that he disagreed, referred to an article that he wrote in 1984 which concludes,

What is important about monetary strategy is to have one. Any policy on the frontier of unemployment and price variability that is not fiercely hawkish will give better performance than we had under the meandering policy that we had over the past 30 years.

Nominal GNP targeting is one policy on the frontier…But this paper has shown that differences among sensible policies are small compared to the difference between historical policy and any sensible policy.

4. I still am somewhat unclear what Tyler Cowen means by “mood affiliation,” but this poll seems to be driven by it.

The Consensual Hallucination

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William J. Luther and Lawrence JH. White write,

An inelastic supply in the face of volatile demand makes the value of bitcoin unstable relative to established currencies. While a drawback, this need not preclude bitcoin from spreading as a medium of exchange. Entrepreneurial innovations—market exchange pricing and instantaneous exchange facilities—enable bitcoin to function as a medium of exchange while allocating the speculative risk of holding it to those who are most willing to bear it (for a small price). Although it is still too early to know how greatly these innovations will widen bitcoin use, they give it a better chance of becoming a commonly accepted medium of exchange. If nothing else, the evolution of bitcoin and rival crypto-currencies will continue to provide us with the opportunity to ponder alternative payment systems and the possibilities for non-state money.

One way to think of money is to use William Gibson’s famous description of cyberspace: a consensual hallucination. We accept it as payment because other people accept it as payment. We think that prices will be pretty stable because other people think that prices will be pretty stable.

This takes us away from the mechanical quantity theory of money. Instead it suggests that there are multiple equilibria, one of which we happen to be experiencing. The behavior of prices is part of our consensual hallucination.

If the consensual hallucination concerning the dollar should break down, my guess is that another state currency will serve as the anchor. Swiss Franc? Canadian dollar? Singapore dollar?

The Clearest Inflation Indicator

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Are prices really rising much faster than the official data show? Consider that the percent change from a year ago in the index of compensation per hour (part of the labor department data on productivity and costs) keeps running at about 2 percent. You have to believe one of the following:

1. This measure of the growth in labor costs is itself being distorted by sneaky government statisticians, and compensation is actually growing at a much higher pace.

2. With prices rising faster than official measures, real compensation costs are declining dramatically. In which case,

2a. Productivity is also declining dramatically, or

2b. Business profitability is soaring

3. The official measures of inflation are not hiding significant inflation.

My money is on (3).

Mian-Sufi vs. Scott Sumner and John Taylor

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They write,

What we are witnessing is the limit of what monetary policy alone can do. Sometimes there is a tendency to assume that the Fed can “target” any inflation rate it wishes, or that it can target the overall price level – the so-called nominal GDP targeting. The evidence suggests that the Fed may not be so omnipotent.

Pointer from Mark Thoma. A couple of comments.

1. This seems like an argument against Scott Sumner’s view that monetary policy was too tight in 2008. That is, I take them as saying that there was nothing that the Fed could have done. Scott Sumner would insist that the Fed lacked the will, not the way.

2. Mian and Sufi offer a chart showing that core inflation was below the Fed’s 2 percent target almost the entire period starting in 2000. This seems like an argument against John Taylor’s view that monetary policy was too loose in 2004-2006.

3. I believe that in 2007 the Fed folks thought that inflation was rising, in part because they looked at oil prices, not just core inflation.

4. Mian and Sufi entitle their post “Monetary Policy and Secular Stagnation.” I still want to see an economist reconcile a belief in secular stagnation with a belief in Piketty’s claim that the return on capital is going to exceed the growth rate of the economy on a secular basis. For the record, I believe neither.

Working with the Tautology Model

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Scott Sumner writes,

the NGDP approach is a very naive model that treats NGDP sort of like a big pot of money, which is shared out among workers with sticky wages. If some day the pot is smaller, then there’s less money to share, and some workers end up disappointed (unemployed.) It’s completely agnostic about the micro foundations…

Which is fine with me. Again, think of the mineshaft analogy, with real-world observations on the surface and the optimization-equilibrium paradigm buried below. To connect the two, you can try to start inside the mine and tunnel out, or you can start outside and tunnel in. My displeasure with much of macro the past thirty years is that it insists on the inside-out approach.

Consider the tautology model: hours worked = total wages divided by the hourly wage.

If the Fed were to target total wages, what could go wrong? Sumner cites the Lucas critique. In this context that would mean that the sticky nominal wages you observed in the past were due to the Fed not trying to mess with total wages. As soon as the Fed tries to mess with total wages, workers will catch on and start paying closer attention to real wages.

I believe that something else will go wrong. The Fed will not be able to hit its target for total wages! Suppose we write MV = W, where W is total wages and V is the velocity of money expressed in terms of total wages rather than nominal GDP. What I am inclined to believe is that moderate changes in M will lead to approximately equal and opposite changes in V.

Picture this as the Fed having a steering wheel, M, that is only loosely connected with the front axle, W. The Fed can turn the wheel quite hard while the axle barely wiggles. It may take extensive turning of the monetary steering wheel over a long period of time to obtain a response of total wages. In fact, the period over which wages are sticky may turn out to be shorter than the lag between shifts in monetary policy and changes in total nominal wages.

We have a complex, sophisticated monetary system, in which people’s ability to undertake transactions is not proportional to the amount of currency in circulation. We have a large financial system, in which the Fed is only one player. I keep trying to hold down people’s estimation of the power of the Fed.

Attribution to the Fed

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David Beckworth writes,

The figures below document this failure by the FOMC. The first figure shows the 5-year ‘breakeven’ or expected inflation rate. This is the difference between the 5-year nominal treasury yield and the 5-year TIPs yield and is suppose to reflect treasury market’s forecast for the average annual inflation rate over the next five years. The figure shows that prior to the September 16 FOMC meeting this spread declined from a high of 2.72 percent in early July to 1.23 percent on September 15. That is a decline of 1.23 percent over the two and half months leading up to the September FOMC meeting. This forward looking measure was screaming trouble ahead, but the FOMC ignored it.

He includes several charts. Read the whole thing. If you tell me that the expected inflation rate has declined from 2.72 percent to 1.23 percent, I think that this is somewhat bearish news. But it is not the end of the world.

See also Matt O’Brien‘s reading of the Fed minutes of 2008. It is quite stunning to consider Ben Bernanke’s behavior during September. On the one hand, he participated in the Paulson Panic, supporting TARP and going all out to save the banks. On the other hand he thought that the risks of inflation and recession were relatively balanced. It is consistent with my view of how the Fed looks at the world, which is through the eyes of the big NY financial institutions.

Still, the way I see it, the attempt to attribute the Great Recession to monetary policy seems forced. The people who believe it really believe it. And I cannot tell you that it is absolutely impossible that a small change in expected inflation can send the economy down the toilet. But I think that the human bias to try to find simple, single causes for things is something to correct for here.

Karl Smith’s Question

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As reported by Tyler Cowen.

Name the period or event in economic history where we looked backed and said “hmm, money was less important than we thought at the time

Of course, the trend over the past fifty years has been to assign a large role to money in economic history. I believe that this trend in thinking is wrong-headed.

Let me digress for a moment. A few days ago, I watched “Money for Nothing,” a documentary about the Fed that was sent to me to review. On the positive side, I would say that

1. It includes excerpts of interviews with an outstanding and diverse set of experts, including Allan Meltzer, Alan Blinder, and Janet Yellen.

2. Its rendition of the history of the Fed is well done.

On the negative side, I would say that I have never walked away from a documentary feeling satisfied. That is an understatement. Every documentary, regardless of whether I am sympathetic to its point of view, leaves me feeling swindled. I think the format is suited to leaving people with impressions and illusions, not with genuine understanding.

For example, “Money for Nothing” devotes about 15 seconds each to Brooksley Born and Ned Gramlich. If all you knew about them came from this documentary, then you would have not sense of the ambiguity that surrounds their alleged farsighted desire to increase regulation.

Born was fighting an unlikely turf war, attempting to get the dealer markets in financial derivatives to be overseen by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which has expertise in a very different area–standardized contracts traded on organized exchanges. Now, if you abolished the dealer market in derivatives and forced them onto an exchange, then you could place derivatives under the CFTC’s jurisiction. First, there has to be a debate over whether or not this is a good idea (in the wake of the crisis, many people think it would be a good idea. I do not.) But if we take as given the existing dealer market, Born’s claim of turf was untenable.

Gramlich was worried about consumer protection issues in mortgage lending. There were a lot of mortgage brokers behaving like old-time car salesmen, always trying to make customers pay more than necessary. As the housing boom accelerated, more and more borrowers were on the lower end of the scale in terms of income and sophistication, and the abuses and exploitation by lenders tended to increase. (Keep in mind, however, that down payments were so low that the bulk of the losses from the crash were born by investors, not borrowers. The phrase “predatory borrowing” is not unjustified.) To the best of my knowledge, what Gramlich was not doing was warning that the whole financial system was vulnerable because of what was going on in mortgage markets.

Also, the issue of how money affects the economy is too deep and controversial to be captured in a documentary. “Money for Nothing” appears to claim that both high interest rates and low interest rates are bad for investment. High interest rates choke off investment, while today’s low interest rates choke off saving–which is supposedly hurting investment. Maybe they do not mean to make the latter claim, but, again, it is a format that lends itself to leaving you with impressions, rather than helping you think through an issue. The documentary does not raise the issue of the distinction between short-term inter-bank interest rates (which the Fed can affect) from other interest rates (where the effect of the Fed is in doubt among many economists). It does not bring up the issue of the “zero bound,” which some economists (not me) make a big deal out of.

Finally, and this gets back to Karl Smith’s question, I think that “Money for Nothing” vastly overstates the Fed’s role in the economy. Going forward, the big issue is fiscal policy. Remember the ad from Hillary Clinton’s campaign for President where she played the role of Santa Claus, handing out gifts to various constituency groups? Well, going forward, given the excess of the government’s promises relative to its ability to pay, politicians are going to be playing a lot less Santa and a lot more Scrooge. That is going to cause a fraying of our politics, which is already taking place.

In the coming drama, the Fed is a bit player. If we end up with hyperinflation, it will be the result of a total breakdown on the fiscal side, in which the monetary authorities are given no choice but to try to meet the government’s revenue needs by collecting the inflation tax. Not the most likely outcome, and even if it were to take place, the fault would not lie with the Fed.

More broadly, my inclination in macroeconomics is to get away from aggregate supply and demand. I think that the obsession with money and the Fed is one huge attribution error. It is human nature to look for simple causes and scapegoats. I think we should lean against that.

So I would like to see us place less blame on the Fed for the Great Depression. I would like to see us assign less blame to Arthur Burns for the inflation of the 1970s and assign less credit to Paul Volcker for ending it. I think that we may be over-emphasizing the role of money in all of these cases.

Karl Smith is correct to imply that over time we have come to assign a greater role to money than contemporaries did at the time. That does not necessarily mean that we are wiser.

Fischer Black on the ZLB

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On the topic of aggregate demand, he writes,

When people say that they see shifts in aggregate demand, they mean that they see changes in the match between wants and resources. Thus in a more specific sort of model, high aggregate demand can be a good match. If this is what “aggregate demand” means, we could also call it “aggregate supply.”

That is from p. 87 of the 2010 edition of Exploring General Equilibrium. Basically, he sees a cyclical slowdown as a reflection of capital investments that were made with good intention but turned out to be wrong. In my terminology, people bet on certain patterns of specialization and trade, and those turned out not to be sustainable patterns.

On the Great Depression, he writes,

Firms made investments during the 1920s based on their beliefs about what tastes and technology would be, along many dimensions, during the 1930s. These beliefs turned out to be very wrong, so the investments were not worth much and ability to produce what people wanted was low…

But monetary forces played a big role too…many countries experienced sharp deflation, which drove their nominal interest rates down. Normally, very low nominal interest rates mean a big demand for currency [but] some countries stopped supplying currency passively. This meant a serious breakdown in financial markets.

…the deflations forced short-term nominal interest rates to zero in some countries, and would have made these rates negative were it not for the effective floor at zero. This caused disequilibrium in real asset markets. The real interest rate was forced above its natural level. It was a kind of “currency trap.”

Longer-term nominal interest rates did not fall to zero, because they reflected the chance that the nominal short rate would bounce back to positive levels. But they were artificially high, so longer-term real rates were artificially high, even more so than short-term real rates.

Some notes:

1. He does not believe in AD, but he thinks that the ZLB mattered in the Great Depression. He thinks that the artificially high real interest rates accentuated the mismatches between previous investments and prevailing wants. He does not give any examples. But imagine that you are a farmer, and you invested in farm machinery, and now crop prices are falling. Are you going to throw more money at your investment by buying seeds and fertilizer? Will the bank lend you the money to do so? If growing crops is no longer profitable, then the value of your investment in farm machinery is looking bad.

2. He is saying that just because you observe positive long-term interest rates, that does not mean that the ZLB is unimportant.

3. What about the U.S. in the last five years? On the one hand, we have seen low short-term interest rates. On the other hand, we have not had deflation, so the short-term real interest rate has been low rather than high. Has the long-term real interest rate been artificially high because of the ZLB?

4. In explaining unemployment, I would be inclined to focus more on mismatches involving human capital. In the 1930s, men who had been farm laborers and tenant farmers were thrown out of work by tractors, trucking (which made it possible to shift production away from relatively poor farmland close to cities to better farmland farther away), refrigeration, and so on. Also, workers whose human capital was in cigar rolling or lightbulb glass-blowing found themselves obsolete. In hindsight, these guys should have stayed in school instead of dropping out without completing high school. But as it was, there were too many of them relative to the technology of the 1930s, which ultimately called for a work force with at least a high school education.

Today, I would say that, in hindsight, more people should either have acquired computer skills or prepared for life providing elder care or otherwise engaged in personal services.