Information and Order

Hundreds of conservative economists have followed Friedrich Hayek into the intellectual swamp of “spontaneous order” and self-organization…

Predictability and order are not spontaneous and cannot be left to the invisible hand. It takes a low-entropy carrier (no surprises) to bear high-entropy information (full of surprisal). In capitalism, the predictable carriers are the rule of law, the maintenance of order, the defense of property rights, the reliability and restraint of regulation, the transparency of accounts, the stability of money, the discipline and futurity of family life, and a level of taxation commensurate with a modest and predictable role of government.

That is George Gilder, in his new book Knowledge and Power. Here is one review. My advice is to be skeptical toward anyone who would either laud the book uncritically or dismiss it categorically.

I was not very far into it before I determined that it is self-recommending in several senses of the word. I saw so much that pertains to my world view that I looked myself up in the index. I found, among several entries, this:

the source of the title for my book was Arnold Kling, Unchecked and Unbalanced: How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial Crisis and Threatens Democracy…which begins; “This book represents an attempt to explore the problem of the discrepancy between the trends in two phenomena: knowledge is becoming more diffuse, while political power is becoming more concentrated.” My book shows that Kling’s insight finds deep roots in the information theory that underlies the modern world economy.

Generally speaking, the thinkers Gilder attacks are more renowned than those, like me, he spares. Several of the attacks are caricatures (his misrepresentation of Burton Malkiel is particularly glaring). He devotes nearly an entire chapter to an attack on “Tyler Cowan,” and I leave it to Tyler Cowen to determine whether his ideas are as misconstrued as his name.

I will compose a longer review, emphasizing what I find valuable about the book, later.

We Need 250 States

Have you heard about the folks who want to create North Colorado? The reader who sent me the link suggested that it was time to plug my essay We Need 250 states. There, I wrote,

In 1790, the largest state in the union, Virginia, had a population of under 700,000. Today, Montgomery County has a population of over 900,000. Our nine-member County Council answers to about the same number of registered voters as the entire House of Representatives of the United States at the time of the founding of the Republic.

We cannot have an accountable democracy with such large political units. We need to break the political entities in the United States down to a manageable size.

I have just started reading America 3.0, by James Bennett and Michael Lotus. One of the early chapters offers a utopian scenario for America in 2040 in which there are 71 states. In that scenario, people have sorted themselves in part by political preferences. That would not work for someone like me, who lives in a blue state but who does not want to move. I think we need the option of virtual citizenry. Imagine I paid user fees in Maryland for specific services here, but for most tax and policy purposes I lived in a virtual state with other libertarian-minded folks.

Notes from a Civilization-Barbarism Symposium

I heard a number of former Bradley Prize winners speak at a symposium Wednesday morning. That evening, there was an awards reception, at which this year’s winners were announced. Yuval Levin said,

Conservatives tend to begin from gratitude for what is good and what works in our society and then strive to build on it, while liberals tend to begin from outrage at what is bad and broken and seek to uproot it.

You need both, because some of what is good about our world is irreplaceable and has to be guarded, while some of what is bad is unacceptable and has to be changed. We should never forget that the people who oppose our various endeavors and argue for another way are well intentioned too, even when they’re wrong, and that they’re not always wrong.

…That’s not to say that conservatives are never outraged, of course. We’ve had a lot of reason to be outraged lately. But it tends to be when we think the legacy and promise we cherish are threatened, rather than when some burning ambition is frustrated.

Overall, I think that he spoke to the civilization-barbarism axis, as one would expect. He also tended toward Thomas Sowell’s “conflict of visions” analysis of the difference between liberals and conservatives.

The Bradley folks are conservatives, not libertarians. In the hallway conversations at the morning symposium, I heard lots of support for government snooping. (Speaking of the snooping program, David Brooks certainly took the conservative line, didn’t he? I think others have pointed out that Brooks is more concerned about the lack of checks and balances against Edward Snowden than about the lack of checks and balances against the intelligence agencies.)

One of the panels at the Bradley symposium addressed the topic of threats to freedom (other than economic policy, which was the subject of a separate panel). A couple of panelists cited Charles Murray’s “coming apart” thesis. Heather MacDonald thought that perhaps too much individual freedom was leading the lower classes into behaviors that lead to dependency. Later, after Robby George voiced similar concerns in response to a luncheon speech by Charles Krauthammer, Krauthammer replied that the Constitution was not designed to require virtuous citizens. On the contrary, it is meant to be robust to human failings. While I appreciate both sides, I think that in the end I come down on the side that a culture of virtue matters more than the Constitution. I think where I would differ from Murray/MacDonald/George is on where the cultural problem lies. I think it lies not with the lower classes but instead with certain parts of the elite. Another panelist, Brad Smith, spoke of the need for conservatives to regain control over the K-12 curriculum. I think that is closer to being on track, and if that is the case, then lamenting the breakdown of the traditional family is barking up the wrong tree.

MacDonald also cited the atmosphere of censorship in academia. Topics on which there is not freedom of speech include gender differences and IQ. But note that, again, this is a problem among the elite.

Krauthammer offered an optimistic take on the electoral prospects of conservatives. Among his reasons:

1. Polls show more conservatives than liberals.

2. The 2012 election was idiosyncratic. Romney lost on the issue of “who cares more about people like you?” in which Obama swamped Romney in exit polls by 60 percentage points. (Krauthammer did not give figures, but one can imagine something like 75 Obama, 15 Romney, 15 undecided)

3. The current scandals hurt Democrats, because they are the party of government.

4. The key issue of our times is the crisis of the welfare state, an issue on which conservatives are better positioned than liberals.

The immigration issue came up in the earlier panel on the economy. Victor Davis Hanson carried the ball for the restrictionist civilization-vs.-barbarism team. Gary Becker proposed using tariffs rather than quotas (although he did not use that terminology). I used that term in my essay ten years ago, and in fact you should read that essay to see how little the issue has changed during the interim.

Comments on NSA Snooping

1. Anyone who desires or expects government agencies to relinquish the use of information-gathering should read David Brin’s The Transparent Society. Indeed, that book is a must-read for anyone who cares enough about the issue to pay attention to recent news reports.

2. I also claim that a must-read is my own article, The Constitution of Surveillance, written nine years ago.

3. I hope people are putting the NSA program in context with the Boston Marathon bombing. Here you go to all this effort to use Big Data to find terrorists, and when you are handed hard, actionable intelligence from the Russians you muff it.

4. I bet you will not find politicians putting the NSA program in context with Chinese cyber-spying, and explaining why ours is good and their is bad. I don’t think politicians are capable of doing the hair-splitting, so I think what they are left with is “What we do is good because we are good, and what they do is bad because they are bad.”

5. The issue is an uncomfortable one for libertarians, because I think that most people believe that the government is snooping in their interest. The majority may even be right about that. I myself have less of a problem with the snooping per se than with the secrecy of the programs. In my view, it is the secrecy, along with an absence of strong institutional checks, that is bound to lead to abuse. Also, see point (3).

6. The issue is an uncomfortable one for progressives, because their impulse is to treat the Obama Administration differently than they would have treated the Bush-Cheney Administration.

7. The issue is an uncomfortable one for conservatives, because it turns them into strange bedfellows. The civilization-barbarism axis clearly argues in favor of government snooping to defend citizens against barbarians, so conservatives feel inclined to betray libertarians and instead offer aid and comfort to President Obama.

8. How does snooping technology relate to the idea of competing private security agencies? Isn’t snooping technology going to be a vital tool for security agencies? What if a rogue private security agency conducts snooping in a way that customers of other agencies see as abusive? What if there are such significant economies of scale in snooping that it is a natural monopoly? David Friedman probably has thought about this.

Maybe the key point is (5). Government officials will argue that what they do must remain secret. They cherish secrecy. They claim that it is for our own good that we do not know what they do. I would say that such claims are often made and rarely true.

Obviously, a lot of other people have written about this. I recommend David Strom’s post (he is the St. Louis technology consultant, not the North Carolina libertarian) for its useful links.

Alberto Mingardi’s Reading List

Compiled in 2002, it is here, and I am sorry to say that I have (so far) read none of these works.

Pointer from Amy Willis.

Mingardi writes,

Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political (University of Chicago Press, 1996, reprint) regarded by Leo Strauss as “an inquiry into the ‘order of human things,'” is fundamental. Schmitt conceptualizes the “political” in terms of a primordial and definitive antithesis between “friend” and “enemy” (“foe”). The very existence of the state rests on this dichotomy. This means that, far more than being a third, “impartial” actor, the state is always the expression of a particular group of individuals. Schmitt teaches that no political order can be conceived as universal, but always and only as a form that originates from a concrete partiality. Against the manipulated justification of government by law, Schmitt’s realism demonstrates how, in reality, there are no abstract institutions, but only clusters of men counterposed as “friends” and “enemies.”

This is what my father (no libertarian) always tried to impress upon me. Politics is about conflict. The “public good” is a woolly concept. So, for that matter is “the state.” Many of the other books on Mingardi’s list appear to treat “the state” as if it were a single individual, rather than an arena through which various individuals and groups engage in conflict.

Reform Conservatism

Ross Douthat defines it.

The core economic challenge facing the American experiment is not income inequality per se, but rather stratification and stagnation — weak mobility from the bottom of the income ladder and wage stagnation for the middle class. These challenges are bound up in a growing social crisis — a retreat from marriage, a weakening of religious and communal ties, a decline in workforce participation — that cannot be solved in Washington D.C. But economic and social policy can make a difference nonetheless, making family life more affordable, upward mobility more likely, and employment easier to find.

Let’s evaluate this along the three-axes model. Even though Douthat shows concern for low-skilled workers, he views the problem in terms of the civilization-barbarism axis rather than the oppressor-oppressed axis. On the freedom-coercion axis, although Douthat throws libertarians a bone by saying that the problems cannot be solved in Washington, he thinks that Washington “can make a difference nonetheless.”

Pointer from Reihan Salam. Indeed, the paragraph above sounds like a reprise of Douthat and Salam’s Grand New Party. Not that there is anything wrong with that.

Read the entire post. If we think in terms of the current institutional structure, I would be willing to sign on to Douthat’s agenda. (One difference is that I would be more favorably disposed to easing up on immigration for low-skilled workers. I think it is at least as likely that low-skilled immigrants are complements for low-skilled domestic workers as it is that they are substitutes. And in general I do not think that protectionist measures can do much for low-skilled workers: protect them from labor at home and they still can face competition from labor abroad, from capital, and from consumer substitution away from artificially high-cost goods and services.)

However, I think that for libertarians, attempting policy reforms within the current institutional structure is an exercise that uses up a lot of energy without moving the ball very far, if at all. I think that any significant motion in a libertarian direction will have to come from an evolution toward competitive government. We need to restructure government services so that there is less centralization, less bundling, and less protection from private competition.

Of course, that is nothing but a reprise of the widely-unread Unchecked and Unbalanced.