I Would Not Publish This Paper

by Sharon Mukand and Dani Rodrik. From the abstract:

We distinguish between three sets of rights – property rights, political rights, and civil rights – and provide a taxonomy of political regimes. The distinctive nature of liberal democracy is that it protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Democratic transitions are typically the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights). Such settlements rarely produce liberal democracy, as the minority has neither the resources nor the numbers to make a contribution at the bargaining table.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen.

My problem is that the paper does not discuss North, Wallis, and Weingast, the subject of my recent review. NWW would say that a non-liberal democracy is just another form of a limited-access order. NWW have a much richer discussion of the elements needed for a transition from a limited-access order to an open-access order.

Greece and Representative Negotiation

John Cochrane writes,

So, the Drachmaized Greece that I see is not the cleanly devalued newly competitive powerhouse that some on the left seem to envision. Instead I see a two-currency economy. Pensioners and government workers and anyone unlucky enough to still have a Greek bank account get Drachmas. Hotel owners, restaurant owners, and exporters get euros, above or under the table.

My comments:

1. I agree with John that nothing real changes with a new currency. Instead, it is a way of arranging the government’s default. In addition to defaulting to bondholders, the government will default to other claimants, including pensioners. But the way it will default to the latter is by paying them in lower-valued currency.

2. I continue to believe that we will see an opaque bailout. What is happening now is pre-concession posturing on the part of the other European nations.

The classic example of pre-concession posturing is the labor union strike. One theory of strikes is that they take place because the union leaders are ready to make a deal, but they need to convince their membership that the union leaders bargained really hard. Going out on strike sends that message. Similarly, for the European leaders, engaging in table-pounding and other theatrics will help convince their constituents that they were really tough on the Greeks. Meanwhile, in the background, an opaque bailout will be arranged.

This theory of representative negotiation also holds for the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The theory predicts that there will be a deal, but in the meantime the negotiators will posture to indicate that they are being very tough with their opponents.

Speaking of Iran nuclear issues, I read Michael Oren’s new book about being Israel’s ambassador to the U.S. I found Oren credible, although for my taste he squeezes too much melodrama out of his experience. One of Oren’s points about the Obama Administration is that it has very tight message discipline, and I believe that we can see that in some of the negative reviews of Oren coming from Obama-linked writers.

Oren’s description of Obama amounts to saying that he operates using the oppressor-oppressed axis, which strikes me as accurate. Even so, it still requires some mental contortions to treat the leadership in Iran as oppressed, rather than as oppressors.

North, Wallis, and Weingast

It is not a new book, but still I wanted to review it.

Open-access orders are likely to be highly stable. Everyone who is ambitious and able to organize others is free to attempt to earn a profit or address a political problem. This gives citizens a feeling of having a stake in the system. Moreover, the layers of beliefs, norms, and institutions that precede the open-access order all serve to reinforce the order once it is in place. For example, Americans are culturally committed to free speech, disdain for corruption, and obedience to the Constitution.

This leads one to be relatively optimistic about the prospects for the United States, regardless of how one feels about recent political and economic trends.

Uncharitable Behavior on Twitter

James Poulos says much with which I agree.

Twitter is a megaphone for the worldview wars. It fosters constant competition among our claims that everyone should care and act as we do.

Read the whole thing. I would like to thank a commenter who told me about “unfollowing,” which is one of many useful but hidden options on Facebook. I have been unfollowing friends, left and right, who use Facebook only to post political views.

I think of myself as anti-elitist. But I am even more anti-mobist. When the mob emerges, I cease to be libertarian and instead become ultra-conservative. There is no phenomenon more barbaric than the mob.

Unwinnable Arguments and Normative Sociology

Young African-American males experience a high incarceration rate. Progressives, conservatives, and libertarians each have a
desired cause for this.

Progressives: racism in the criminal justice system
Conservatives: high propensity of young African-American males to commit crimes
Libertarians; the war on drugs

Progressives prefer the oppressor-oppressed axis, which makes racism the desired cause. Conservatives are most comfortable with the civilization-barbarism axis, which makes criminal behavior the preferred cause. Libertarians prefer the freedom-coercion axis, which makes the war on drugs the preferred cause.

I claim that trying to argue that one of these is the cause is an unwinnable argument. Each of these causal forces has an element of truth, or at least plausibility. The chances are slim of coming up with an empirical analysis that decisively rules in favor of one cause and rules out all other causes.

In general, an unwinnable argument about causality is any argument in which one tries to affirm that X is the sole cause of Y or that X is not at all a cause of Y under circumstances of high causal density.

For example, arguments about the role of financial deregulation in the financial crisis of 2008 tend to be unwinnable. The case for seeing financial deregulation as the sole cause is compelling only to people who are inclined to espouse it. The case for seeing financial deregulation as not a factor at all is compelling only to those of us who are inclined to emphasize other causes.

Some further claims:

1. When there is a desired cause (meaning a cause that fits well with one’s political axis in the three-axes model, chances are the issue involves an unwinnable argument.

2. If your objective is to win an unwinnable argument, then you will tend to engage in normative sociology. To turn your desired cause into the cause, you have to filter out evidence that might support another causal factor and only discuss evidence that supports your desired cause.

It hardly requires saying that I think that it is counterproductive to try to win an unwinnable argument. It is almost as counterproductive to try to reason with someone who is convinced that they can win an unwinnable argument.

I am not saying that it is counterproductive to try to make an argument for or against something being a causal factor. However, I think that it does help to keep in mind that when a desired causal factor is involved it is challenging to remain objective in assessing the evidence.

There is a Cowen-Hanson paper Are Disagreements Honest? that you should read if you have not done so already. One of the reasons that disagreements can persist is because the protagonists engage in normative sociology.

Desired Causes and Actual Causes

Joseph Heath writes,

Often when we study social problems, there is an almost irresistible temptation to study what we would like the cause of those problems to be (for whatever reason), to the neglect of the actual causes. When this goes uncorrected, you can get the phenomenon of “politically correct” explanations for various social problems – where there’s no hard evidence that A actually causes B, but where people, for one reason or another, think that A ought to be the explanation for B. This can lead to a situation in which denying that A is the cause of B becomes morally stigmatized, and so people affirm the connection primarily because they feel obliged to, not because they’ve been persuaded by any evidence.

Pointer from Alex Tabarrok. Heath, borrowing an off-hand joke from Robert Nozick, calls this “normative sociology.” But it is by no means limited to sociology. Think of people blaming snowstorms on global warming. Or blaming the financial crisis on “an atmosphere of deregulation.” Or blaming inequality on the decline in labor unions.

We can also find this normative analysis among libertarians. Blaming terrorism on blowback for foreign intervention.

Or we can find it among conservatives. Blaming the financial crisis on loose monetary policy.

Pinker, Hobbes, and Baltimore

I am still re-reading The Blank Slate. In his chapter on violence, he endorses Hobbes. On p. 330, he writes,

Adjudication by an armed authority appears to be the most effective general violence-reduction technique ever invented. . .there can be no debate on the massive effects of having a criminal justice system as opposed to anarchy. The shockingly high homicide rates of pre-state societies, with 10 to 60 percent of the men dying at the hands of other men, provide one kind of evidence. Another is the emergence of a violent culture of honor in just about any corner of the world that is beyond the reach of the law. Many historians argue that people acquiesced to centralized authorities during the Middle Ages and other periods to relieve themselves of the bureden of having to retaliate against those who would harm them and their kin. And the growth of those authorities may explain the hundredfold decline in homicide rates in European societies since the Middle Ages.

See also Mark Weiner, The Rule of the Clan. A few remarks.

1. This chapter challenges the more anarchist-leaning libertarian views. Instead, Pinker argues that it is natural for humans to form coalition, to fear others’ coalitions, and to launch pre-emptive strikes on relatively small pretenses. (Of course, governments do this as well. Pinker would not argue that nation-states are inherently peaceful with one another. Quite the contrary.) Another excerpt, from p. 331:

When law enforcement vanishes, all manner of violence breaks out: looting, settling old scores, ethnic cleansin, and petty warfare among gangs, warlords and mafias.

2. Reading this chapter, I could not help thinking of Baltimore. Another excerpt, also from p. 331:

The generalization that anarchy in the sense of a lack of government leads to anarchy in the sense of violent chaos may seem banal, but it is often overlooked in today’s still-romantic climate. Government in general is anathema to many conservatives, and the police and prison system are anathema to many liberals. Many people on the left, citing uncertainty about the deterrent value of capital punishment compared to life imprisonment, maintain that deterrence is not effective in general. And many oppose more effective policing of inner-city neighborhoods, even though it may be the most effective way for their decent inhabitants to abjure the code of the streets. Certainly we must combat the racial inequities that put too many African American men in prison, but. . .we must also combat the racial inequities that leave too many African Americans exposed to criminals.

He does proceed to point out that drug laws, by creating an underground economy in which participants cannot call in police to contain disputes, help to promote a climate of violence.

Charles Murray is Revolting

I have just started his latest book, By the People. You may have heard that he calls for civil disobedience against excessive government. I am wondering how he would handle two objections.

1. How will the other side respond? I could see progressives engaging in civil disobedience, also. In fact, if conservatives were to win in 2016, I expect to see the emergence of a very large, and possibly violent, protest movement. If conservatives/libertarians were to set a precedent of disobeying laws, then I think this would encourage progressives to disobey laws. For example, they might decide that laws protecting property rights are unjust, and proceed to “liberate” the possessions and homes of the one percent.

2. Would civil disobedience not leave most progressive policies untouched? Social Security, Medicare, and the core of regulation surely would remain. At best, the protests would work against the silliest, least significant regulations.

3. Civil disobedience is ultimately a form of voice. Libertarians should be focusing on ways to increase the opportunity for exit.

Jonathan Rauch Hearts John Boehner

Rauch has a new e-book (free, at least as of the other day, when I downloaded it) called Political Realism. He argues that progressive political reforms have had adverse unintended consequences. In particular, they have made life more difficult for John Boehner.

Rauch relies on a distinction between professional and amateur politicians, a distinction for which he credits James John Q. Wilson. The pros just want to stay in power, and they will compromise on principles in order to keep it. The amateurs are ideologues.

Rauch argues that seemingly well-intentioned reforms have weakened political parties and thereby strengthened the amateurs. The reforms include attempts to require transparency in government, to restrict campaign finance, to curb earmarks, and to give ordinary voters more power to choose candidates via primaries.

The major unintended consequence of these reforms has been polarization and gridlock. Because the professionals are no longer free to manage the political process, government has become ineffective. Rauch argues that we should dial back the reforms that weaken the party pros and instead think in terms of reforms that strengthen them.

If you believe, as Rauch does, that the professionals would govern more effectively if given more slack, then his argument goes through. However, I am not sure that I buy into that assumption.

I can see one issue–entitlement reform–on which a compromise among professionals could have beneficial effects. But the unsustainable system of entitlements was built by those very professionals whom Rauch extols. My cynical take is that the professionals are good at compromising on the use of other people’s money, most especially when the other people are too young to vote or not even yet born.

If you ask me, the single most consequential political act of my lifetime is likely to be President Obama’s decision to throw the Bowles-Simpson recommendations under the bus. That may have destroyed the last chance to prevent a budget train wreck. Yet Rauch believes that Obama is one of the good guys, a professional able to compromise.

Obama’s professionalism, according to Rauch, is illustrated by the way that health care reform involved compromising with various interests. But if Obamacare is your poster child for professional politics, you are not going to convince me to jump on board the Rauch bandwagon.

As you can tell, my feelings about the book are mixed. I think that the main points are insightful. I see those as

1. Professional politicians are better able to compromise if amateur ideologues are less influential.

2. Progressive reforms have worked to empower amateur ideologues.

However, I do not share Rauch’s optimism for what the professionals might accomplish if they had their way.