Jason Furman and Peter Orszag write,
Longstanding evidence (e.g. Krueger and Summers 1988) has documented substantial inter-industry differentials in pay—a mid-level analyst may have the same marginal product wherever he or she works but is paid more at a high-return company than at a low-return company. Newer evidence (Barth et al. 2014 and Song et al. 2015) suggests that much of the rise in earnings inequality represents the increased dispersion of earnings between firms rather than within firms. This is consistent with the combination of a rising dispersion of returns at the firm level and the inter-industry pay differential model, as well as with the notion that firms are wage setters rather than wage takers in a less-than-perfectly-competitive marketplace.
Pointer from Tyler Cowen.
I bristle at the phrase “same marginal product.” Modern workers are not widget-makers, and their value inside an organization is not visible to people outside the organization. Indeed, even within the organization, the value contributed by individual workers cannot be calculated with any precision.
I know someone, call him A, who works in information technology at a firm in a buggy-whip industry. One of his friends, call him B, just took a job at Google. Assume, probably correctly, that the difference between their two compensation packages is a lot wider than the difference in their skills. Some possibilities:
1. This is a disequilibrium situation. Information technology workers currently produce more value at Google than in the buggy-whip industry. In equilibrium, A will move out of the buggy-whip industry and go to work for Google.
2. This is an “efficiency-wage” equilibrium, in which Google pays B slightly more than B’s opportunity cost. This enables Google to be highly selective in who it hires and also to give B an incentive to provide top performance.
I am inclined toward (2). But in either case, the value of B’s work is high relative to B’s wage, which raises the question of why Google does not hire more engineers. Perhaps the value of the next engineer would be lower, because of management limitations at Google.
I think that the key factor here is that the collective management talent assembled at Google is scarce. It generates more value that the collective management talent at the firm in the buggy-whip industry.
What I am suggesting is that the value of a firm depends a great deal on collective management talent. This includes the skills of individual key executives as well as the team chemistry among them.
One of the challenges of maintaining a high-functioning management team is that the “tournament” to get to the top can become corrupt. That is, managers can start to get ahead by undermining other managers rather than by exercising better judgment. As this sort of corruption becomes widespread, a firm can rapidly deteriorate. For me, this is one of the most interesting phenomena in the sociology of organizations.