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Larry Summers writes.

[we need] policies that restore a situation where reasonable growth and reasonable interest rates can coincide. To start, this means ending the disastrous trends toward ever less government spending and employment each year

The CBO wrote,

By 2038, CBO projects, federal spending would increase to 26 percent of GDP under the assumptions of the extended baseline*, compared with 22 percent in 2012 and an average of 20½ percent over the past 40 years.

Did you two visit the same country?

*The “extended baseline” is an unrealistic scenario, which includes spending cuts that are embedded in current law but unlikely to be retained by Congress. The more realistic “alternative fiscal scenario” projects even higher spending relative to GDP.

What is Financial Repression?

Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart are still paying attention to sovereign debt. In fact, there are so many links in this paper to recent work of theirs that surely another book is in the offing. Here, they write,

the current stage often ends with some combination of capital controls, financial repression, inflation, and default. This turn of the pendulum from liberalization back to more heavy-handed regulation stems from both the greater aversion to risk that usually accompanies severe financial crises, including the desire to prevent new ones from emerging, as well as from the desire to maintain interest rates as low as possible to facilitate debt financing. Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) document how, following World War II (when explicit defaults were limited to the losing side), financial repression via negative real interest rates reduced debt to the tune of 2 to 4 percent a year for the United States, and for the United Kingdom for the years with negative real interest rates. For Italy and Australia, with their higher inflation rates, debt reduction from the financial repression “tax” was on a larger scale and closer to 5 percent per year. As documented in Reinhart (2012), financial repression is well under way in the current post-crisis experience.

(Can anyone find the 2012 paper? It’s not listed in the references.)

Reinhart’s story is that once upon a time, countries emerged from WWII with a lot of sovereign debt. They used financial repression to keep interest rates low, and they got out from under that debt. Then they liberalized, and the financial sectors went crazy, growing rapidly and fueling bubbles. Then the crash came, governments took on a lot of debt again, and now we are back in the cycle of financial repression.

As a story, this is cute. But I cannot buy into it, at least for the United States. Re-read my history of U.S. government debt. Most of the reduction in the ratio of debt to GDP from 1946-1979 was due to the government running primary surpluses in the 40’s, 50’s, and 60’s. That is, if you took out interest payments, outlays were below revenues. The negative real interest rates were during the Great Stagflation, and they only reduced the debt/GDP ratio by a small amount.

Also, I am not sure where the financial repression is coming from today. Reinhart cites risk-based capital requirements that favor sovereign debt, but we have had those since before the financial crisis.

I think my larger issue is that I am unclear about the concept of financial repression. Some possibilities.

1. Financial repression consists of regulations that subsidize purchases of government debt and/or penalize risky private investment. In this case, the interest-rate differential between private securities and government securities is wider than normal. How does one distinguish this from a shift in the risk premium due to market psychology?

2. Financial repression reduces the amount of financial intermediation. But what does that mean?

To me, financial intermediation consists of the financial sector holding long-term, risky assets and issuing short-term, risk-free liabilities. The nonfinancial corporate sector and the household sector get to issue long-term, risky liabilities and to hold short-term, risk-free assets. The household sector ultimately owns the equity in the nonfinancial corporate sector and in the financial sector. The government, through deposits insurance and ad hoc bailouts, has in some sense written put options on firms in the financial sector, and as taxpayers we are on the hook for those put options.

If the government comes up with regulations that make it more difficult for the financial sector to expand and exploit its put options, then you might call that financial repression. But in that case, it is not clear that financial repression is a bad thing.

Perspective on Fiscal Policy, Revisited

From the comments on this post:

the entire discussion is about accounting for “money” which while very important is not the same as real output.

Let us assume, as a first approximation, that real output is the same, regardless of the path of the government budget. In that case, we are talking only about distribution issues. Kotlikoff tends to worry about the intergenerational distribution. We may be on a path in which Baby Boomers consume a lot, and their children and grandchildren are taxed heavily to pay of this.

My own concern is that the distribution issues cause damage to our social and political fabric. We set ourselves up for ever-increasing strife. Please re-read Lenders and Spenders.

Perspective on Fiscal Policy

From Laurence Kotlikoff:

The US fiscal gap now stands at an estimated $205 trillion, or 10.3 percent of all future US GDP. Closing this gap is imperative, and requires a fiscal adjustment of an immediate and permanent 37 percent reduction in spending (apart from servicing official debt), an immediate and permanent 57 percent increase in all federal taxes, or some combination of the two. The necessary size of this adjustment increases the longer it is put off.

Meanwhile, all reasonable centrists can celebrate the Ryan-Murray budget compromise.

The bill will authorize $1.012 trillion worth of discretionary spending in 2014, more than the $967 billion scheduled under sequestration

Have a nice day.

The Confiscation Option

Romain Hatchuel writes,

As applied to the euro zone, the IMF claims that a 10% levy on households’ positive net worth would bring public debt levels back to pre-financial crisis levels. Such a tax sounds crazy, but recall what happened in euro-zone country Cyprus this year: Holders of bank accounts larger than 100,000 euros had to incur losses of up to 100% on their savings above that threshold, in order to “bail-in” the bankrupt Mediterranean state. Japanese households, sitting on one of the world’s largest pools of savings, have particular reason to worry about their assets: At 240% of GDP, their country’s public debt ratio is more than twice that of Cyprus when it defaulted.

I consider this to be one of the most likely scenarios.

The Real Government Balance Sheet

Cullen Roche writes,

total fossil fuel resources owned by the Federal government are valued at over $150 trillion alone.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

My guess is that land is the largest real asset of the government. So there is a case for saying that even with all the unfunded liabilities that the government has accrued, the government is not broke.

I think that the best argument against those of us who say that the U.S. will have to inflate away its debt at some point is the argument that the government could sell assets if it wanted to.

The Tea Party

William Galston has some facts.

Many frustrated liberals, and not a few pundits, think that people who share these beliefs must be downscale and poorly educated. The New York Times survey found the opposite. Only 26% of tea-party supporters regard themselves as working class, versus 34% of the general population; 50% identify as middle class (versus 40% nationally); and 15% consider themselves upper-middle class (versus 10% nationally). Twenty-three percent are college graduates, and an additional 14% have postgraduate training, versus 15% and 10%, respectively, for the overall population. Conversely, only 29% of tea-party supporters have just a high-school education or less, versus 47% for all adults.

Although some tea-party supporters are libertarian, most are not. The Public Religion Research Institute found that fully 47% regard themselves as members of the Christian right, and 55% believe that America is a Christian nation today—not just in the past. On hot-button social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, tea partiers are aligned with social conservatives. Seventy-one percent of tea-party supporters regard themselves as conservatives.

Galston also has delivers some insinuations and assumptions. In particular, he assumes that the the Tea Party movement is some sort of dysfunctional emotional reaction and that the establishment is correct on the fundamental policy issues.

It is possible that this view is correct. However, the probability is not zero that the establishment view on the budget (spend more now; the future will take care of itself, or brilliant health care technocrats will take care of it, or something) is more dangerous than the view of the Tea Party. In fact, the establishment strikes me as suffering from a dysfunctional emotional reaction every time the topic of future budget commitments is brought up.

The Fiscal Brouhaha

First, some reality:

At the close of business on Jan. 20, 2009, the day Obama was inaugurated, the U.S. government debt held by the public was $6,307,311,000,000, according to the Daily Treasury Statement for that day.

At the close of business on Sept. 30, 2013—the last day of fiscal 2013—the Daily Treasury Statement said the U.S. government debt held by the public was $11,976,279,000,000.

I think that it is fair to attribute a lot of this debt increase to policies and economic conditions created under President Bush. Still, I find it ironic that President Obama would tell Wall Street that investors should be concerned about a potential default.

My views of the current situation:

1. Our politicians are like a family with a huge credit card debt. The Republicans are threatening not to make the minimum payment, and that is clearly a case of brinkmanship. However, the Democrats have no plan to keep the debt from growing out of control, and that in its own way is brinkmanship.

2. It is almost as if our political system and the news media are designed to conjure up short-term symbolic conflicts to distract attention from long-term problems.

3. A good rule of thumb in politics is that fiscal conservatives make noise, but spenders win in the end.

Another Edition of “Did You Two Visit the Same Country?”

1. Meg Jacobs writes,

Austerity has shaped American politics and policy for almost four decades. Over that period, the pressure for deficit reduction and spending cuts has been ongoing and intense. Even when liberals have found a modicum of political space to push through new social initiatives, such as President Obama’s Affordable Care Act, the agenda has quickly returned to constraining and limiting the growth of government. Democrats have generally joined Republicans in embracing this cause. The debate has centered on how far to go with austerity, rather than whether austerity is even the right objective.

That is the point of a recent spate of books from the unrepentant Keynesian left, which offers a potent, if largely unheeded, critique of contemporary public policy. These books argue that we’re in the mess we are in today—an anemic recovery, chronic underinvestment in the public sphere, and the specter of EU collapse—because of the austerity policies that the United States and Europe have chosen.

2. Ian Talley writes,

The U.S., Japan and Europe risk drowning in debt, with public obligations in rich countries hitting levels close to the historical peak reached in World War II.

How did the most advanced countries in the world get it so wrong?

Overly optimistic budget projections, poor data on government liabilities and a flawed understanding about how shocks can hurt public finances, the International Monetary Fund says in a new policy paper published Tuesday.

Popular Delusions

The Harvard School of Public Health reports,

Many experts believe that future Medicare spending will have to be reduced in order to lower the federal budget deficit but polls show little support (10% to 36%) for major reductions in Medicare spending for this purpose. In fact, many Americans feel so strongly that they say they would vote against candidates who favor such reductions. Many experts see Medicare as a major contributor to the federal budget deficit today, but only about one-third (31%) of the public agrees.

Pointer from Phil Izzo. Somehow, I don’t think Tyler Cowen would be surprised by these results.