Category Archives: Financial Crisis of 2008

Kling’s Law of Bank Capital Regulation

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Thomas L. Hogan, Neil Meredith, and Xuhao Pan write,

we find that the standard capital ratio is significantly better than the RBC ratio as an indicator of bank risk and performance and that using both ratios simultaneously does not produce better results. Taken in conjunction with the other available evidence, our findings indicate that RBC regulations lead to more risk-taking by individual banks, and more overall risk in the banking system, without improving the effectiveness of the Fed’s capital regulations.

RBC = risk-based capital. Kling’s law is that the capital measure used by regulators will, over time, come to be outperformed by a measure that the regulators are not using. So, if you are using standard capital, risk-based capital measures will better predict bank risk, and conversely.

The reason can be found in my essay, The Chess Game of Financial Regulation.

Regulatory systems break down because the financial sector is dynamic. Financial institutions seek to maximize returns on investment, subject to regulatory constraints. As time goes on, they develop techniques and innovations that produce greater returns but which can also undermine the intent of the regulations.

Knowledge vs. Incentives

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Ing-Haw Cheng, Sahil Raina, and Wei Xiong write,

Our analysis shows little evidence of securitization agents’ awareness of a housing bubble and impending crash in their own home transactions. Securitization agents neither managed to time the market nor exhibited cautiousness in their home transactions. They increased, rather than decreased, their housing exposure during the boom period through second home purchases and swaps into more expensive homes. This difference is not explained by differences in financing terms such as interest rates, or refinancing activity, and is more pronounced in the relatively bubblier Southern California region compared to the New York metro region. Our securitization agents’ overall home portfolio performance was significantly worse than that of control groups. Agents working on the sell-side and for firms which had poor stock price performance through the crisis did particularly poorly themselves.

Of course, the bad incentives in the securitization market could have selected for people who believed in the housing bubble. Still, I believe that the authors have dispelled a notion that the “insiders” knew more than the “outsiders” about the housing bubble.

UPDATE: James Hamilton comments

Suppose we gave an individual securitization agent perfect foresight of what was to come, that is, exact knowledge of the current and future path of their personal bonuses, stock options, and career path. If they had this information, would they have made the same decisions as they actually made in 2005-2006? If so, that would be confirmation that the basic problem was one of misaligned incentives.

Banks and Government

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The second of my essays on the function of banks. In this one, I talk about their relationship with government.

Think of two friends who walk to a neighborhood bar every Saturday night. On a given Saturday, the first friend may be too drunk to walk without assistance, and he may have to lean on the second friend in order to make it home. The following Saturday, it could be the second friend who needs to be supported in order to get home. However, if both of them get too drunk and try to lean on one another to get home, they may collapse together.

This is how I picture the current situation in Europe. Many European banks are unsteady. They need government guarantees and capital injections in order to stay in business. At the same time, many European governments are heavily indebted and running large deficits. They need banks to continue to lend to them in order to fund their spending.

Read the whole thing. My prescription for addressing the relationship between banks and governments is to try to apply the approach of “limited guarantees, for limited purposes.”

John Cochrane on Banking, Expert Forecasting

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1. He liked Admati and Hellwig more than I did.

Ms. Admati and Mr. Hellwig do not offer a detailed regulatory plan. They don’t even advocate a precise number for bank capital, beyond a parenthetical suggestion that banks could get to 20% or 30% quickly by cutting dividend payments. (I would go further: Their ideas justify 50% or even 100%: When you swipe your ATM card, you could just sell $50 of bank stock.)

I think he is being careless. My own essay tries to consider why households would prefer to hold bank debt rather than bank equity. Keep in mind, however, that all of us agree that the relationship between government and banks is problematic, and that the problems are not solved by regulation.

2. He cites a nice essay by Alex Pollock listing statements by regulators prior to the housing crisis that showed their mindset before the crisis. They thought they had everything under control. In 2009, they changed their minds. Now, with Dodd-Frank, they tell us they have everything under control again. Note that Pollock could have included many more pre-crisis quotes, such as the “before” quote from Ben Bernanke.

Of course, Bernanke still believes that we live in mediocristan. On the outlook for long-term interest rates, the other day He said,

While these forecasts embody a wide range of underlying models and assumptions, the basic message is clear–long-term interest rates are expected to rise gradually over the next few years, rising (at least according to these forecasts) to around 3 percent at the end of 2014. The forecasts in chart 4 imply a total increase of between 200 and 300 basis points in long-term yields between now and 2017.

Of course, the forecasts in chart 4 are just forecasts, and reality might well turn out to be different. Chart 5 provides three complementary approaches to summarizing the uncertainty surrounding forecasts of long-term rates. The dark gray bars in the chart are based on the range of forecasts reported in the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, the blue bars are based on the historical uncertainty regarding long-term interest rates as reflected in the Board staff’s FRB/US model of the U.S. economy, and the orange bars give a market-based measure of uncertainty derived from swaptions. These three different measures give a broadly similar picture about the upside and downside risks to the forecasts of long-term rates. Rates 100 basis points higher than the expected paths in chart 4 by 2014 are certainly plausible outcomes as judged by each of the three measures, and this uncertainty grows to as much as 175 basis points by 2017.

Pointer from Mark Thoma.

Ben Bernanke, Before and After

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1. Before (June 12, 2006):

in the area of market risk, advances in data processing have enabled more analytically advanced and more comprehensive evaluations of the interest rate risks associated with individual transactions, portfolios, and even entire organizations. Institutions of all sizes now regularly apply concepts such as duration, convexity, and option-adjusted spreads in the context of analyses that ten years ago would have taxed the processing capabilities of all but a handful of large institutions. From the perspective of bank management and stockholders, the availability of advanced methods for managing interest rate risk leads to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff. For supervisors, the benefit is a greater resilience of the banking system…

Today, credit-risk management encompasses both loan reviews and portfolio analysis. Moreover, the development of new technologies for buying and selling risks has allowed many banks to move away from the traditional book-and-hold lending practice in favor of a more active strategy that seeks the best mix of assets in light of the prevailing credit environment, market conditions, and business opportunities. Much more so than in the past, banks today are able to manage and control obligor and portfolio concentrations, maturities, and loan sizes, and to address and even eliminate problem assets before they create losses. Many banks also stress-test their portfolios on a business-line basis to help inform their overall risk management.

2. After (March 22, 2012):

A second, very important problem was that during this period, financial transactions were becoming more and more complex but the ability of banks and other financial institutions to monitor and measure those risks was not keeping up. That is, their IT systems and resources they devoted to risk management were insufficient…So if in 2006 you asked a bank about the effect if house prices fell 20 percent, it probably would have greatly underestimated the impact on its balance sheet because it did not have the capacity to measure accurately or completely the risks that it was facing.

For (2) I am quoting from the version of Bernanke’s lectures that is printed in The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, sent to me Princeton University Press. Perhaps someone can find a written transcript on line.

Given (1), I find (2) to be disingenuous. Also, in the lecture “Response to the financial crisis,” Bernanke says

when the mortgage-backed securities started going bad, it became evident that AIG was in big trouble and its counterparties began demanding cash or refusing to fund AIG, and it came under tremendous pressure.

In our estimation, the failure of AIG would have been basically the end. It was interacting with so many different firms. It was so interconnected with both the U.S. and the European financial systems and global banks.

This is also disingenous. The problem at AIG was the demands for collateral coming from Goldman Sachs and a number of foreign banks. It was those institutions that needed bailing out, not AIG. I still like what I wrote back in October of 2008.

It is highly unlikely that the buoyancy of the U.S. economy depends on the liveliness of the Liar’s Poker game of mortgage securities trading. We should resist panic reactions and emergency bailouts.

My alternative to bailouts was what I termed the stern sheriff approach. I wrote,

I think that the people who insist on Treasuries as collateral should have to pay a financial penalty, just as someone who has a CD at a bank can be assessed a penalty for early withdrawal. By punishing liquidity preference, we could stop the liquidity squeeze.

The government could have made it difficult for Goldman Sachs and other counterparties to grab low-risk assets from AIG. Staying within the law, simply requiring those counterparties to go to court would have done the trick. Instead, the government essentially seized AIG, paid off the counterparties, and then sold off huge chunks of AIG to avoid taking a loss. If the government was going to exercise arbitrary power that way, it could just as easily have exercised that power to keep AIG liquid and force Goldman and the others to raise short-term funds through other means.

Tracking the Financial Crisis Lawsuits

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Let’s see.

1. The Justice Department is suing a rating agency (Standard and Poor’s). The rating agencies are creatures of the SEC (which created their oligopoly and encouraged them to be paid by the raters rather than the customers of the ratings).

2. The SEC is suing Freddie and Fannie, which are creatures of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under which the two firms were regulated and also given lending quotas for “affordable housing.”

So, when is HUD going to sue a company that is a creature of the Justice Department, just to complete the circle?

One way to view the period 2005-2009 is as a massive destruction of property rights by the government. First, they destroy the right of Freddie, Fannie, and commercial banks to maintain lending standards. Then they confiscate the property of holders of securities in GM and Chrysler to pay off the labor unions. Then they sell off AIG’s assets in order to bail out Goldman Sachs and several large foreign banks. And of course, the government has made every effort to keep banks from enforcing mortgage contracts, while extracting large fines from banks.

It’s beyond crony capitalism. It’s protection-racket capitalism.

No, I am not saying that the private firms did everything right. But whatever the problem with markets, government extortion is not likely to prove to be a good solution.

Housing and Wealth Destruction

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Thomas J. Sugrue writes,

The bursting of the real estate bubble has been a catastrophe for the broad American middle class as a whole, but it has been particularly devastating to African Americans. According to the Center for Responsible Lending in Durham, North Carolina, nearly 25 percent of African Americans who bought or refinanced their homes between 2004 and 2008 (and an equivalent share among Latinos) have already lost or will end up losing their homes—compared to 11.9 percent of white families in the same situation. This disparate impact of the housing crash has made the racial gap in wealth even more extreme. As Reid Cramer, director of the Asset Building Program at the New America Foundation, puts it, “Basically, we have gone from an average minority family owning 10 cents to the dollar compared to the average white family to now owning less than a nickel.” The median black family today holds only $4,955 in assets.

Sugrue can only process this through the oppressor-oppressed model. He blames predatory lending. If he could open his eyes a little wider, he might be able to see the role played by government housing policy. Some notes:

1. From a wealth-destruction perspective, you cannot just look at the people who lost their homes. People who stayed current on their mortgages nonetheless experienced wealth destruction.

2. Probably more borrowers were “victimized” by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and FHA than by Wall Street. That is, my guess is that a majority of the homeowners whose wealth has been crushed paid for their homes with loans backed by one of those agencies.

Speaking of housing, Luigi Zingales finds some numbers regarding occupancy fraud.

In fact, the authors find that more than 6% of mortgage loans misreport the borrower’s occupancy status, while 7% do not disclose second liens.

You get a lower rate by saying you plan to live in the home, so speculators will often lie about that. One of the reasons that programs to “help owners stay in their homes” are not doing very much is that a lot of those owners never occupied the homes in the first place.

Zingales references a working paper that I cannot find. Thus, I cannot tell whether the borrowers defrauded the lenders or the lenders defrauded the investors who bought the loans. I always presume that it is the borrower instigating the fraud. However, Zingales says that the bankers should be prosecuted. He makes it sound as if the lenders would record a loan internally as backed by an investment property and report it to investors as an owner-occupied home. That would require a much more complex conspiratorial action on the part of the lender, and until I learn otherwise, I will doubt that it happened.

Geithner, Wallison, and History

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What is the legacy of Timothy Geithner? In an essay, I write,

In 2009, at the height of the financial crisis, there was widespread public and political support for making serious changes to how Wall Street and the financial sector operated. Presented with an opportunity to break these too-to-big-to-fail banks down to a size where an institution could be allowed to fail without threatening the entire national economy, Geithner instead attempted to restore the status quo. This was a win for the biggest banks, but the nation as a whole may eventually come to regret his policies.

The American Enterprise Institute sent me a copy of Peter J. Wallison’s Bad History, Worse Policy, which provides Wallison’s take on the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank legislation. At $90, the book is priced for libraries and specialists. The book reprints his essays written over the period 2004-2012, with some added commentary in hindsight.

My guess is that a decade from now Wallison will look better than Geithner. In particular, I think that Wallison will be vindicated on the following points:

1. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae lowered their lending standards considerably during the housing bubble, under political pressure. On p. 169, Wallison quotes from Fannie Mae’s 10K disclosure form for 2006:

We have made, and continue to make, significant adjustments to our mortgage sourcing and purchase strategies in an effort to meet HUD’s increased housing goals and new subgoals. These strategies include entering into some purchase and securitization transactions with lower expected economic returns than our typical transactions. We have also relaxed our underwriting criteria to obtain goals-qualifying mortgage loans and increased our investments in higher-risk mortgage loan products that are more likely to serve the borrowers targeted by HUD’s goals and subgoals, which could increase our credit losses. [emphasis added]

2. As a result, Freddie and Fannie purchased large amounts of high-risk mortgages, helping to fuel the housing bubble.

3. Dodd-Frank was enacted in order to enshrine a narrative of the financial crisis. That narrative attributes the crisis primarily to predatory lending and to financial deregulation.

4. The narrative enshrined in Dodd-Frank is false. Predatory lending was a minor factor, especially relative to government housing goals. There are few actual examples of financial deregulation, and the examples most often cited (such as the repeal of portions of Glass-Steagall) had little or no bearing on the crisis.

5. The most significant impact of Dodd-Frank is to entrench the largest banks, as they benefit from their status of “too big do fail.”

Incidentally, Wallison probably would disagree with me that we should go so far as to break up the big banks.

Wallison calmly presents evidence. His enemies would do well to try to do the same.

The Recession and World Trade

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From the DHL Global Connectedness Index 2012.

The Netherlands retains the top rank on this year’s DHL Global Connectedness Index, and 9 of the 10 most connected countries are in Europe.

Pointer from Timothy Taylor. (How does he find these things?) Taylor writes,

Globalization is near an all-time high by this measure [world exports of goods and services divided by world GDP], but notice that it after the drop associated with the Great Recession, this measure of globalization is about the same in 2011 as it was in 2007.

It is not clear why a statistic with GDP in the denominator should experience a drop during a recession. However, my guess is that the answer has to do with the location of the recession. If some emerging economies continued growing while Europe slumped, one would observe world GDP holding up better than world trade.

From a PSST perspective, all GDP is trade. Some of it is intra-border and some of it is cross-border. Trade patterns that were based on unsustainable conditions, primarily inefficient firms remaining in business, were broken by the conditions that emerged in 2008. Firms go out of business all the time. All the time, new businesses are starting and some are growing. I take the view that since 2008 an unusually large number of troubled firms failed and unusually small number of high-growth businesses emerged. To me, calling this a decline in aggregate demand is begging the question–it is simply putting another label on the phenomenon, not explaining it. It could be that stress at banks is a cause of it, but I think instead that it is a symptom. But that leaves me struggling to tell a story that accounts for the sudden, sharp drop in GDP that took place in 2008-2009.

The Physics of Wall Street

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That is the title of a book by James Owen Weatherall. I received a review copy. I will say that I finished it, which is more than can be said for most books that I get sent to review. So I feel entitled to blog about it. The book offers short biographies of students of physics who applied their models in finance, along with layman-friendly explanations of the theories involved. A main theme of the book is that economists are too snotty toward physicists. For exaple, on p. 146-147 he describes attempts by the Santa Fe Institute to bring physicists and economists together in the late 1980s. This worked out poorly, but when the institute invited practitioners from Wall Street, “The traders proved much less defensive than the economists.”

I think that the complaint about snotty economists is pretty widespread. Experts in many disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and biology, believe that they bring techniques that would be useful to economists but are under-appreciated. I am not sure how to react. I think that what Weatherall calls the sociology of the economics profession is as bad as he says it is. But I am not part of the mainstream myself. If you ask folks in the leading departments about the state of economics, they will tell you that it is basically fine.

The book itself contains some well-written stories, a bit reminiscent of The Money Game, which most of you are too young to remember (Weatherall probably never heard of it). I learned little new from the early chapters, but I got a bit more insight into the Santa Fe Institute folks and the chapter on Didier Sornette and his models for sensing major changes was entirely new to me. After that, the book sort of petered out for me. At the end, he calls for a sort of “Manhattan Project” to apply physics to economics. Calling for a “Manhattan Project” on anything is a surefire way to put me off.