Adjustment happens, but it’s a far more painful process than the models and textbooks have imagined. Policy, and the economists, should take it seriously.
Pointer from Mark Thoma.
Difficulty with adjustment is the essence of the PSST story for recessions. If the economy were a GDP factory, then the factory foreman would be temporarily confused about which job to give to which person. Of course, for the factory foreman, substitute the set of entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs.
Muro cites three recent papers, two of which I have covered. The new one is by Danny Yagan, who writes,
living in 2007 in a below-median 2007-2009-fluctuation area caused those workers to have a 1.3%-lower 2014 employment rate. Hence, U.S. local labor markets are limitedly integrated: location has caused long-term joblessness and exacerbated within-skill income inequality. The enduring impact is not explained by more layoffs, more disability insurance enrollment, or reduced migration. Instead, the employment outcomes of cross-area movers are consistent with severe-fluctuation areas continuing to depress their residents’ employment. Impacts are correlated with housing busts but not manufacturing busts, possibly reconciling current experience with history. If recent trends continue, employment rates are estimated to remain diverged into the 2020s—adding up to a relative lost decade for half the country. Employment models should allow market-wide shocks to cause persistent labor force exit, leaving employment depressed even after unemployment returns to normal.
The standard remedies for adjustment, including trade adjustment assistance, and worker re-training, are among the least effective programs government has ever tried. Not surprisingly if decentralized entrepreneurs are having calculation problems, the socialist calculation problem proves worse.