I am starting to read up on the topic. I see epistemology as the attempt to articulate what criteria we are using to evaluate the usefulness of economic analysis. Various initial thoughts:
1. I emailed Pete Boettke for advice on what to read to get me started on the topic, and not surprisingly he had useful suggestions. I told him that I of course know about Milton Friedman’s classic position.
2. One can argue that there is no need for epistemology. You could just assume that good economics is what leading economists do. Without having to articulate what they do, just try to do things similarly. However, for someone like myself, who is inclined toward heterodoxy and to doubt that leading economists are doing useful economic analysis, that is not the right answer.
3. One of the articles that Boettke suggested was by Dan Hausman, who wrote
Instead of attempting to discover what methodology neoclassical economists actually practice and to think seriously about how that methodology might be justified, … critics … have usually relied on indefensible philosophical theories of science to support broad condemnations. … Philosophers have, however, little to offer by way of informative well-supported systematic theories of the scientific enterprise and that little does not lend itself to mechanical application.
In other words, if you have a problem with how economists are doing things, that is your problem, not the economists’. Those who can, do, and those who can’t, do epistemology.
To put it another way, I read Hausman as saying that the task of the epistemologist is to figure out what economists do and then justify it. Again, from where I sit as a heterodox economist, this is hardly satisfactory.
What I contend in my forthcoming book is that economic theories are interpretive frameworks. These cannot be tested decisively. They are not falsifiable in the Popperian sense. Think of AS-AD. There is no combination of output and price movements that can falsify it. If they move together, you call it a demand shock. If they move in opposite directions, you call it a supply shock.
What I do not address in the book is the question of how best to evaluate competing interpretive frameworks. I believe that it is an important question. I am not convinced that the best way to answer to the question is to study how frameworks become popular in the profession. I think that factors such as path dependence (model X got published in a good journal, so something that pertains to model X can also get published in a good journal) and ideological preference play outsized roles in such evaluations in practice.
Somewhat related: Noah Smith on objectivity and economics. Pointer from Mark Thoma.