I have finished reading my advance copy of Yuval Levin’s The Fractured Republic. I am confident that when I make up my list of most important books of 2016 that it will be included. Unfortunately, it does not go on sale for another three months.
Levin attempts to interpret extended periods of economic, cultural, and political history in terms of broad themes. Given that such an effort takes huge risks (of which he is aware), I think he does a very creditable job. But these sorts of high-level analyses are always subject to quibbling over details.
One such detail concerns Lyndon Johnsons’ Great Society. Levin–and he is hardly alone in this–sees the legislation of 1965 as a natural product or capstone of an era in which the Federal government took on increasing responsibilities.
I want to push back and to stress the idiosyncratic and accidental nature of the Great Society legislation.
1. Johnson never succeeded in selling his program to the public. The public’s attitude toward the Great Society was predominantly scornful and cynical. Grace Slick, before she became the lead singer for Jefferson Airplane, was in a band called The Great Society. It was not an homage.
2. The left had very mixed feelings about Johnson. Many northern liberals were put off by his southern accent. They were still in mourning over Kennedy and many were put off by Johnson’s lack of the Kennedy charm and grace. Also, by 1965, Vietnam was cutting deeply into his support among liberals, particularly younger ones. And there seemed to be a disconnect between the term Great Society and the urban unrest that was starting to erupt. Rather than wishing to share in the glory of the Great Society, many liberals saw it as an exercise in Johnson’s ego and parliamentary wiles.
3. What made the Great Society possible was the landslide victory that Democrats won in 1964. In that sense, we owe the Great Society to Barry Goldwater. His nomination shattered the Republican Party. In today’s terms, think of an effect on the Republican establishment somewhere between a Cruz nomination and a Trump nomination. Moderate Republican voters stayed away in droves in 1964, and in those days coattail effects were much stronger. As a result, the disaster of 1964 decimated Republicans up and down the ballot. There are those on the right who like to romanticize the Goldwater insurgency by saying that it “paved the way for Reagan.” What it actually paved the way for was Democratic control of Congress that remained well entrenched into the Reagan era and beyond. It was the class of 1964 that passed the Great Society programs and that made them impossible to repeal even when Republicans re-took the Presidency.
It can be difficult to predict the consequences of one’s preferred candidate winning a nomination or an election. That is one reason to agree with Tyler Cowen that you should be careful what you wish for.