A commenter recommended him, and I watched this video.
Some interesting points:
1. As skill in an activity becomes more refined, differences in skill at the high levels tend to narrow. As a result, luck starts to play a relatively larger role. In some sense, it took more luck for George Brett to hit .380 than it did for Ted Williams to hit .400. The standard deviation among major league hitters was higher in Williams’ day, so that when batting averages are scaled by standard deviation, Brett’s best year has a higher Z score than Williams’. The AP statistics text that I use has a problem in which the student calculates this. Mauboussin also refers to this example.
2. He says that luck is difficult to define, but a key element is that it is reasonable to say that the outcome could have been different. He opens the talk by telling a story of how he interviewed for his first job out of college and noticed that highest level executive with whom he interviewed had a trash can with a logo of the Washington Redskins. Because he praised the trash can, the high level executive eventually overrode all the other interviewers and gave Mauboussin the job. I have a similar story about getting into Swarthmore College, which I have told here before. A local alumnus interviewed me, and I guessed that he was the father of a guy I had seen wrestle for the state championship. I talked about that match, and when I came to Swarthmore the Dean of Admissions said that the wrestling coach, Gomer Davies, was looking forward to having me on the team. Having no aptitude for wrestling myself, I never went near Coach Davies.
3. He says that extraordinary success comes neither from pure skill or pure luck. You need a high skill level to compete. But beyond that it takes luck to have extraordinary success. Bill Gates had the skill to do well in technology, but his extraordinary success required luck. If you do not know the story of how Microsoft was awarded the role of providing the operating system for the IBM PC in the early 1980s, then you can get an abbreviated version by listening to the Q&A at the end of the talk.
4. He says that when you are the less skilled player, you need to try to complicate the game. Try a trick play, for example. I would add that you should look for short games. The longer the game goes on, the more likely it is that the other player’s skill advantage will win out. Think of a board game (or a business competition) that consists of many moves. Suppose that on each move, the player with more skill has a 51 percent chance of doing better than the less-skilled player, and conversely the less-skilled player has a 49 percent chance of making a better move. In a short game, the lesser-skilled player might win. But if the game goes on for hundreds of moves, the chances of the lesser-skilled player dwindle. I first wrote about this twenty years ago. I still love that essay.
5. He says that our brain has an “interpreter” that is determined to tell causal stories, even if it has to make them up. There are some famous split-brain experiments that demonstrate this. The interpreter prefers explanations that make something appear inevitable, rather than lucky.
I would illustrate this with the financial crisis of 2008. Although economists did not anticipate the crisis beforehand, they explain it now as if it were inevitable. I just finished Days of Slaughter, Susan Gates’ insider’s account of the fall of Freddie Mac, and it reminds me of the role played by bad luck, in particular the unfortunate choice made by Freddie Mac’s Board to install as CEO in 2003 one Richard Syron, who combined an absence of experience in mortgage lending with an arrogant unconcern for that lack of experience. Another CEO might have charted a different course for Freddie Mac, and for the entire housing market.
Another illustration is the election of Donald Trump. It was very much a random event, but everyone’s interpreter strains to see it otherwise.
6. During the Q&A, he considers the issue of whether popular opinion is right or wrong. When does the wisdom of crowds become the madness of crowds? He says that a necessary condition for wisdom of crowds is diversity of opinion. The crowd is most at risk of going wrong when there is what he calls a “diversity breakdown,” and everyone is thinking alike.