Can we trust the social science of trust?

Kevin Vallier writes,

Strikingly, the U.S. is the only established democracy to see a major decline in social trust. In other nations the trend was in the opposite direction. From 1998 to 2014, social trust increased in Sweden from 56.5% to 67%, in Australia from 40% to 54%, and in Germany from 32% to 42%. Meanwhile, the U.S. is becoming more like Brazil, where trust is around 5%. What makes America unique?

. . .Growing up under polarized political institutions may lead young people to generalize from partisan distrust to social distrust. Americans are sorting themselves into social silos, seldom interacting with unlike-minded others, leading to less moderation and more radicalization. This may be due in part to social media, though recent research on the effect of social media has reached mixed conclusions on this question. But the effect is clear: In 2017, around 70% of Democrats said that Donald Trump voters couldn’t be trusted, and around 70% of Republicans said the same of Hillary Clinton voters.

I am skeptical of the quantitative, survey-based approach to this issue. Centrist political parties and establishment politicians have taken a big hit in many countries, not just in the U.S. It seems to me that we live in a Martin Gurri world, not a world in which America is the exception.

I am not sure that political dislike carries over into social distrust so much. If the best surgeon you can find supports the other party, how many people would pick a different surgeon?

Depopulation

Glenn T. Stanton writes,

No fewer than 23 leading nations—including Japan, Spain, South Korea, and Italy—will see their population cut in half by 2100. China’s will drop by a stunning 48 percent. . .

. . .Another 34 countries will see dramatic population declines by 25 to 50 percent by 2100. Beyond this, the projected fertility rates in 183 of 195 countries will not be high enough to maintain current populations by the century’s end. That is called negative population growth and once it starts, it probably won’t stop. These scholars predict that sub-Saharan and North Africa, as well as the Middle East, will be the only super regions fertile enough to maintain their populations without dramatic immigration policies.

The article refers to a Gates Foundation projection.

Professor Christopher Murray, director of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation at the University of Washington’s School of Medicine and head of the Gates study, told the BBC, “I find people laugh it off… they can’t imagine it could be true, they think women will just decide to have more kids. If you can’t [find a solution] then eventually the species disappears.”

Have a Happy New Year.

The political year, 2020

The status of the center rose, even if it remains far below levels it reached sixty years ago. Just looking at the outcome of the Democratic Presidential nomination contest and the House elections, the body politic did not show an appetite for radical progressivism. I could also cite the failure of the affirmative action referendum in California.

Libertarians had a terrible year. Hong Kong’s freedom got crushed. All over the world, officials exercised unprecedented power over individual behavior, with control over the virus the stated intention but not the result, at least in Europe and here.

Government spending and the Fed advanced deeper into the economy. Both political parties continued to retreat from economic liberty, and both seem eager to find a way for government to exploit the economic and technological power of the big tech firms (that is what politicians mean by “regulating big tech.”) In referenda, a higher minimum wage did well.

Looking for a silver lining somewhere? The marijuana legalization movement had more gains, if that’s what gives you a buzz.

Radical progressives had a disappointing year at the ballot box, but otherwise the religion that persecutes heretics had a fantastic year. Cancel culture came to the New York Times. It made major inroads in corporate America and in major investment firms.

Tyler Cowen made a number of predictions for the effect of the pandemic on relative status, and those mostly proved correct. But he did not predict George Floyd’s death, which led to the conversion millions of Americans to Wokeism. Even foreign demonstrators joined the flock.

The resistance to that religion has become more overt, but the religion itself enjoys powerful momentum. Mr. Trump’s executive order to stop preaching the religion to government workers is certain to be reversed.

Vitalik Butarin writes,

If a project having a high moral standing is equivalent to that project having twice as much money, or even more, then culture and narrative are extremely powerful forces that command the equivalent of tens of trillions of dollars of value. And this does not even begin to cover the role of such concepts in shaping our perceptions of legitimacy and coordination. And so anything that influences the culture can have a great impact on the world and on people’s financial interests, and we’re going to see more and more sophisticated efforts from all kinds of actors to do so systematically and deliberately. This is the darker conclusion of the importance of non-monetary social motivations – they create the battlefield for the permanent and final frontier of war, the war that is fortunately not usually deadly but unfortunately impossible to create peace treaties for because of how inextricably subjective it is to determine what even counts as a battle: the culture war.

Pointer from Tyler.

Think of the history of the Catholic Church. The Church translated its cultural power into tremendous wealth (have you seen the Vatican museum?) and political power. Not surprisingly, it attracted some very unsavory people to become popes and cardinals. The Woke religion is in its infancy.

Joseph Henrich watch

Ş. Pelin Akyol and Naci H. Mocan write,

We leverage a Turkish education reform which went into effect in 1997. For political reasons, the reform was implemented very quickly and rather unexpectedly, and it increased the mandatory years of education from 5 to 8 years.

. . .In many societies around the world, the practice of consanguineous marriage is part of the fabric of culture. Nevertheless, our results reveal that the propensity to approve this practice and the propensity to be actually in a consanguineous marriage are malleable and that these tendencies are influenced by women’s educational attainment.

Deficits and inflation: a longer historical overview

Michael Bordo and Mickey D. Levy write,

the initial response combined aspects of the policy response in several overlapping crisis scenarios in the past: World Wars I and II, the Great Depression, and the Global Financial Crisis (Bordo, Levin and Levy 2020). These earlier episodes of induced fiscal and monetary expansion in the 1930s and the World Wars led to rising price levels and inflation. In this paper we survey the historical record for over two centuries on the connection between expansionary fiscal policy and inflation and find that fiscal deficits that are financed by monetary expansion tend to be inflationary.

Do not assume that the last ten years settle the issue of whether deficits are inflationary.

Against the null hypothesis

Maya Escueta and others write (AEA access required),

Two interventions in the United States stand out as being particularly promising—a fairly low-intensity online program that provides students with immediate feedback on math homework was found to have an effect size of 0.18 standard deviations, and a more intensive software-based math curriculum intervention improved seventh and eighth grade math scores by a remarkable 0.63 and 0.56 standard deviations.

This is from a survey article on the effectiveness of various forms of educational interventions that use technology.