Elites and institutions

Tanner Greer writes,

The New Right vision of politics is unapologetically elitist, hierarchical, and communitarian. The right-wing base, in contrast, is rebellious, egalitarian, and individualist. The New Right and the right base are united in their hatred for the meritocratic striver culture of America’s bicoastal elites. But their attitudes towards elite politics are fundamentally different.

Think of both the left and the right as having an elite and a mass. On the left, the elites and the mass are on the same page. The elites treat the mass as victims in need of help, and the mass on the left is satisfied to be treated that way. On the right, the elite opposes the left’s elite because the elite on the right has its own elitist project. The mass on the right opposes the left’s elite because the mass does not want to be part of any elitist project. So on the right, the elite and the mass are on a different page, except that they both oppose the elite on the left.

My concern these days is with the problem of institutions. Suppose that Harvard and the New York Times suddenly decided to discard Wokeism. Imagine that Harvard reverted to the pursuit of knowledge and the Times reverted to straight factual reporting. In that case, I would respect the value provided by those institutions. The mass on the right would still resent the elitism of those institutions.

I am skeptical of populism. I do not have faith in “the people” either as individuals or collectively. Human nature is far from reliably good. I think that society requires strong norms and institutions in order to constrain behavior. I buy into the civilization vs. barbarism axis.

But I am skeptical of elites. I think that most people who say that they have the answers turn out to be fools or knaves. The better elites are those who focus on norms and institutions, rather than on heroic leadership or “the right policies.” And the better elites are those who focus on the perils of strong government, rather than on its promise.

There is No Labor Shortage

I reprint an essay I first posted almost a quarter century ago.

Although most economists would share my confidence that the market can take care of a labor shortage, there is much that we do not know. We do not know how far away the current wage rate is from the one that is consistent with no excess demand for labor. We do not know if the process of wage adjustment will be inflationary (nominal wages rising) or deflationary (prices falling relative to wages). We do not know how long the process may take.

That was in 1997. In today’s environment, I would bet that the upward adjustment of wages will take place in the context of inflation. As I write this, prices are going up faster than wages, which exacerbates the appearance of a “labor shortage.” Market forces are likely to drive wages higher, and we will see history repeated. Not like 1997. More like 1977.

Inflation is closer to 8 percent

I show my work.

I am just looking at the CPI as reported by the government statisticians. If you rely on media reports, you are not getting the real story told by these numbers. Reporters are claiming that inflation is only 5 percent, and they add that even this number is overstated. Nothing to see here, move along.

John Cochrane agrees with my dismissal of the “base bias” story.

I am looking at the same numbers but taking a three-month average multiplied by 4, and using the core CPI. Such a calculation informs me that inflation is actually 8 percent.

Packer rediscovers Fischer

Reacting to an essay by George Packer, I write,

In a recent essay drawn from a forthcoming book, George Packer says that American society has fractured into four groups. But David Hackett Fischer noticed these same four traditions, dating back to the first English settlers, in his carefully-researched book, Albion’s Seed. Fischer’s concept then became the basis of Walter Russell Mead’s book on tensions in American foreign policy, Special Providence.

Barack Obama on scout mindset

In an interview with Ezra Klein, Obama says,

I forget whether it was Clarence Darrow, or Abraham Lincoln, or some apocryphal figure in the past who said the best way to win an argument is to first be able to make the other person’s argument better than they can.

. . .none of us have a monopoly on truth. It admits doubt, in terms of our own perspectives. But if you practice it long enough, at least for me, it actually allows you to not always persuade others, but at least have some solid ground that you can stand on

Neither Klein nor Obama cite Julia Galef’s book, and the rest of the interview is uninteresting.

What about the anti-liberal left?

In their debate sponsored by Bari Weiss, Christopher Rufo argues that illiberalism on the right, as exemplified by the January 6 Capitol riot, is weak and marginal. But he sees illiberalism on the left as hegemonic, or nearly so.

David French disagrees. Instead, he sees illiberalism on both left and right as having roughly equal status. On this issue, it appears to me that French flails unconvincingly.

I see the left-right difference this way: On the right, those who are ideologically dedicated to illiberalism (Vermeule, for example) lack followers, and the large followings (Trump’s, for example) lack ideological cohesion; In contrast, the illiberal wing of the left has institutional presence, ideological dedication, and leader-follower alignment.

Jonathan Rauch (minute 36+) argues that liberals like himself did not see the illiberalism on the left coming. He thinks that liberals will start to get organized and fight back. I am looking forward to Rauch’s new book.

Some possible outcomes for the future:

1. The “good left” (Rauch and others) overpowers the illiberal Woke left. p = .05

2. The illiberal Woke left suffers a catastrophic electoral defeat at the hands of a non-populist right. p = .05

3. The illiberal Woke left and the populist right continue to dominate political dynamics, with today’s level of discomfort or more. p = .40

4. The U.S. experiences an era of Woke totalitarianism that lasts for a couple of decades, but which eventually collapses into something else (not necessarily good) p = .25

5. Academia, journalism, traditional media, and government become empty battlegrounds, as technological change results in very different forms of social organization (call this the Balaji scenario, if you will). p = .25

Public schools and CRT

Bari Weiss hosts a debate between David French and Christopher Rufo. They are arguing about state laws directed against Critical Race Theory. But they do not debate the same laws.

French argues against laws that would prevent a teacher from presenting Critical Race Theory. Rufo argues in favor of laws that would prevent a teacher from forcing students to adopt racialist tenets, whether those of CRT or others.

As each formulates it, I would support both French and Rufo. It boils down to what the laws actually say.

David French argues that it is illiberal to be passing laws about what can and cannot be taught in schools. Even if you find Christopher Rufo’s counter-arguments persuasive, I think that “ban the teaching of X” is a bad look for those of us fighting on behalf of liberal values.

I would prefer to approach this as a “freedom of conscience” issue. Just as students should be protected from religious indoctrination in public schools, they should be protected from having to subscribe to a particular racial doctrine.

The outrage machines

In an essay, I write,

Even if you could somehow purge social media of every lie, it would still be a sewer. Twitter, Facebook, the New York Times, and Fox News are outrage machines. The articles and posts that attract approval and sharing are those that make people in one tribe feel more reassured that the other tribe is evil.