Unlike providing pure public goods or setting generally applicable laws, the more widely accepted function of the state, the direct provision of goods and services can impact on people’s personal wealth and satisfaction in much more pressing ways. . .
. . .producers previously used to competing, albeit imperfectly, under an open market regime, will now set their eyes very carefully on the people tasked with commissioning their services: the public officials. Rather than competing for customers directly, in this new higher-stakes game, they will have to aggressively lobby officials for public contracts or employment. The result is that the same behaviour in the same sector of the economy that produces relatively efficient outcomes under market rules, produces inefficient, even predatory outcomes under democratic rules.
Pointer from Mark Thoma.
The really pure public choice view is that in the market and in politics, the same human motives are operating. They just operate under different institutional rules in each case. The less doctrinaire view would say that social norms also may differ between the market realm and the political realm. In theory, it is possible for the norms of political behavior to attenuate the tendency toward inefficient and predatory outcomes. How well this works in practice is certainly debatable.
The notewriter’s name is Nick Cowen (bio; looks like he’s at NYU’s law school). It’s right below the title, after the date.
However it may now be conceived by those of many differing perspectives, objectives and prejudices, Public Choice THEORY is a THEORY, originally developed from studies of NON-MARKET determinations and processes of “group” decision making.
The studies of Non-Market determinations have used have used methodologies associated with (but not exclusive to) studies of economic activities.
Elements of the THEORY have been applied in the examination of particular results of public administration. As a theory, all effective elements must be considered.
There has been considerable emphasis on those examinations of failures of particular determinations (often referred to as “policies” or administrative actions) and on the indicated conclusions of “causes” or deficiencies.
As so often happens, the examinations in studies of theories, brings people face to face with information they “really don’t want to know.”
“The really pure public choice view is that in the market and in politics, the same human motives are operating.” – This is what really inflames progressives about public choice – the idea that their own motives are as questionable as anyone else’s.
“In theory, it is possible for the norms of political behavior to attenuate the tendency toward inefficient and predatory outcomes.” – Possible, depending on what “norms of political behavior” are operating in a particular polity. And it depends on how you define “predatory.” Progressives, conservatives and libertarians each have their own definition of what qualifies as “predatory.”
There is a mistake in this analysis, because it conflates “motives” with “social norms”–two totally different things.
Of course I will behave differently across employment contexts that have different social norms. But the basic motive is always the same–the make myself and those whom I care about better off. That’s the only assumption public choice theory makes, and it is so absurdly minimalist that it cannot really be refuted.
“producers previously used to competing, albeit imperfectly, under an open market regime, will now set their eyes very carefully on the people tasked with commissioning their services”
This is by design.