Philip Wallach and Kevin R. Kosar write,
The office would have two core functions. First, it would perform cost-benefit analyses of agencies’ significant rules, which number around a hundred per year, in order to provide a disinterested check on agencies’ self-interested math. These CRO analyses would coincide with the prospective estimates that agencies themselves perform. This would create a legislative counterweight to the rule-review function of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs — which is nested within the OMB and thus the Executive Office of the President, and is therefore unable to provide a credibly neutral review process that goes beyond concerns internal to the executive branch.
The CRO’s assessment of a proposed regulation, like CBO’s bill scores, should be posted online and delivered to the committee of jurisdiction. Doing these things would increase the political salience of agency rulemaking, thereby fostering congressional oversight and encouraging policy entrepreneurs in the legislature to take up the subject. A CRO cost-benefit analysis should also be automatically submitted as public comment to the rule, which would oblige an agency response and possibly a recalibration of the rule.
Second, but perhaps just as promising, would be to have CRO perform periodic retrospective analyses informed by real data rather than forward-looking estimates. Agencies sometimes perform “look-back” assessments, but they are modest in number (certainly compared to the massive corpus of standing regulation) and produce only nominal changes. This is unsurprising, since each agency is passing judgment on its own work. CRO reports would regularly goad Congress to examine how the rules produced by existing laws are performing, such that they could work to revise those statutes that have yielded problematic results.
My thoughts.
1. Take the analogy with the Congressional Budget Office. People love the CBO, but its practical impact has been questionable. Since 1975, the Congressional budget process has become worse, not better. Congress has become more evasive of accountability, not less so.
2. The proposed CRO is a solution if the problem is that Congress lacks information about bad regulatory policy. But is that really the problem? The problem is that, as with the budget, there is not much collective will in Congress to set policy.
I think that we have the state of affairs that we do because politicians like it. That means either that the regulators are getting away with something without the public realizing it or the public is basically complacent about regulators running amok. I am afraid that it is the latter.
Would a CRO make the public less complacent? Well, CBO has not made the public any less complacent about the unfunded liabilities of Social Security and Medicare. Instead, the CBO’s main impact has been to increase policy makers’ hubris about the ability of deficit spending to create jobs.
In a better world, what are called “regulations” would be called “laws,” and every single last one of them would require Congressional votes. In an even better world, politicians in Washington would look at all the things that agencies are attempting to regulate and say, “Gee, we have no business doing that. We are not properly informed. We should only regulate in areas where we have a good set of information on which to base regulation.”
I don’t know how to get to a better world. Look, I love checks and balances in theory. And I don’t mean to discourage creative ideas for addressing what I agree is a serious problem. But I am afraid that I must assign a low probability to a CRO moving us in the right direction.
” Since 1975, the Congressional budget process has become worse, not better. Congress has become more evasive of accountability, not less so.”
Umm, you think the creation of the CBO caused this result? Correlation is not causation.
The problem is BS. That is, lying about confidence. Countering some BS with other BS when the parties have little at stake in getting it right is pointless. How many government economic forecasters have lost their jobs for having bad track records? And yet policy is still sold on the basis of those rosy forecasts (e.g. Obamacare enrollments).
The only good way to suppress BS is skin in the game. If the forecast doesn’t turn out to be to true, they need to lose something they care about.
And in the case of regulations, the thing the agencies care about is the existence of the regulation.
Therefore I’ve suggested that a step in the right direction would be a meta-regulation (i.e. an actual Congressional law) that states that if, after three years, the measurement of forecast benefits or results falls short of the stated bands of confidence, then the whole regulation or law self-destructs and automatically repeals itself.
If the proponents of the law really believe in the predicted benefits, they will have no problem with the meta-rule. If they don’t really believe in them, then they will be much more modest in their forecasts, which means they will fall under the necessary cost-benefit ratios much more often.
I think this proposal needs a cost benefit analysis, and it isn’t looking good.
Check out how OIRA was turned into a political weapon by Reagan. the mandates the CRO is given could play a role in ability to coerce regulation towards congressional rather than presidential priorities and gum up works. Think of this as a weapon for divided government
The concept of cost-benefit analysis seems to be focused on monetary effects.
There are the “seen and the unseen” effects, the latter of which are most often ignored or intentionally obscured.
There are all the “tangential” effects produced that generate the “unintended” (unexpected?) (foreseeable?) consequences.
The enormous amounts of money spent on much of “welfare” are nothing compared to the social consequences of generating a particular segment of a society, with further problems..
A CRO won’t “cut it.”
We may well be on our way to “coalitions” replacing “checks and balances” as a governmental format, with the appellate jurisdiction now being co-opted.
The sense of “value” of co-operation among the differing “powers” stems from the public acceptance that government exists to “do things” (to be purposive), which is somewhat at odds with its Constitutional framework. The desires for (or acceptance of) increasing and extending functions foments coalitions amongst those delegated with the powers of the branches of government.