I did not treat Doug, whom I have known and have loved since 1967, as an “enemy.” That is a strange way to characterize my scientific criticism of his views on so-called “institutions.” I merely think Doug was, and the many folk who accept his views, mistaken. Briefly, the new orthodoxy about institutions “mattering” (as people usually put it) ignores human ethics and language, reverts without admitting it to a conventional Samuelsonian Max U framework, is strikingly inconsistent with historical evidence, mixes static efficiency with dynamic discovery, never offers quantitative oomph, and retreats to tautology and personal abuse when challenged. It shares such features with psychoanalysis and Marxism and the more dogmatic expressions of Samuelsonian economics. I don’t make such arguments against the new dogma out of some strange animus against one of the most amiable members of our profession, no more than did, say, the rare American geologist before 1965 who advocated for moving continents. I make arguments, as I know you do in your own work, because I believe them to be (probably, with an open mind) true. One can assess my reasons for thinking so by reading pp. 296-354 of Bourgeois Dignity (2010), or earlier this year a paper in the Journal of Institutional Economics and a subsequent debate with Greif, Mokyr, Langlois, and others in reaction, or in the forthcoming volume 3 of the trilogy, out in April: Bourgeois Equality. It is silly and unfair to characterize a serious scientific disagreement as “treating Doug like an enemy.” Doug would never have done so.
Kling wrote “adversary,” not “enemy.” There is a world of difference.
Yes. Her reaction is unfortunate. I’m perplexed by the whole thing anyway. It seems to me like her criticisms could be very easily accepted and that rhetoric and culture could easily be considered as core elements in what we might think of as Norths open societies with functional institutions. Did they really have a longstanding disagreement about this?
My mistake, for which I apologize. True, “adversary” could merely mean “scientific opponent,” which is accurate. But many people react to my criticisms without thinking them through, and do then attribute the attitude of an “enemy” to my writings on ne-institutionalism.
Sure, if the neo-institutionalists would actually do their homework in the humanities, I would agree that ethics, language, conversation, and the like could bring masses of new evidence to the table, with good scientific results. But they don’t, alas, and complain that I am making them read books! Oh, well . . . .
One might actually consider the extensive treatment McCloskey gives to North’s work on the role of “Institutions” (as defined by North) in its possible application (vel non) a compliment to its significance and to the significance of North’s thinking. It is not a “brush-off;” though some might call it evisceration.
North has directed attention to the motivations for “constraints” observed in historical sequences; which McCloskey separates from the “causes” of the enormous betterment of “developed” mankind. North’s (with Wallis’ & Weingast’s) later work on Open Access, focusing on the limitations on “constraints,” may be moving toward a convergence with some of McCloskey’s scholarship and conclusions.
I think Libertarians would be better off using some different term than ‘institutions’ which is susceptible to the Rorschach test problem of multiple incompatible interpretations.
Everybody gets to hide their cards behind the same feel-good euphemism as if there’s some kind of consensus which doesn’t actually exist. It’s a mistake to use one vague word; the relevant factors must be articulated.
The old Libertarians would have simple said, “Free and competitive markets, private property, robust individual liberty, capitalism, fair and predictable courts, and small, low-footprint, and limited government, combined with a smart and virtuous population, is the best recipe humanity has for wealth generation and improvement of social welfare and the human condition.
I suspect that when most progressives celebrate ‘institutions’, they are thinking of completely different things from those in the above list.
Institutions
Agreed as to libertarian disquisitions.
However, North and Wallis explain their use of the term, as does Acemoglu. One does not have to accept their use even though accepting the effects of “constraints” they attribute to or categorize under that term.
Common usages of the term also color understandings.
They reduce them, just as you say, to “constraints.” So it’s back to Max U, the late-lamented Douglass’ “rules of the game.” The point is that the rules are under negotiation in human language games all the time. Think of your marriage, your scientific life, your department, your team, your next conversation. Now try to go on thinking of an institution as a mere given budget line!
Right on! I make the point that “institutions” is like “ether.” It explains by being just vague enough.
It’s a radio feud.
I thought “adversary” was a strong word.
Intellectual progress is a funny thing–for my own development I often think bout somebody who writes something that I think is “not quite right” and it helps me concentrate on what I want to add.
Adversary implies some sort of tournament. There is some sort of problem with the connotation of “adversary.”
Perhaps the term is “foil.” “An intellectual foil.”
We call the our common law system of trials ‘adversarial’. It doesn’t always connote hostility, ill will, or inimical antagonism. In court, it just means that advocates in any disagreement tend to argue back and forth, making their case for their opposing points of view.
I read the relevant part of Bourgeois Dignity. She does treat him as an adversary there.
Yes, “adversary” (Dr. Kling’s term) implies a “game”, “match”, or “tournament”, that is, competition, possibly friendly, and certainly not war. “Enemy” implies war, or at least the hint of violence due to ill will.
Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman were friends (or friendly), but intellectual adversaries.